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           INTRODUCTION  
In this dissertation I examine the manner in which – according to Thomas 
Aquinas - the operations of the sensitive soul contribute to contemplation. Aquinas 
scholars writing about contemplation have traditionally focused their attention on the role 
of the intellect in contemplation. That is understandable, because contemplation is 
primarily an intellectual activity. However, contemplation also involves the operations of 
the sensitive soul, albeit in a secondary way. The act of contemplation is accompanied by 
phantasms1 and the passions of love and delight. The acquisition of knowledge - which 
ordinarily precedes contemplation - requires the involvement of the outer and inner 
senses and of the sensitive appetite. This is so because a human being is an integrated and 
a composite being, made of body and soul, and all our faculties participate in 
contemplation, not to mention in the acquisition of knowledge, which typically precedes 
contemplation.  
The sensitive soul is the soul characteristic of us qua animals. Examining how the 
operations of the sensitive soul contribute to contemplation shows us what difference 
being animal makes to contemplation; how the contemplation of a rational animal differs 
from contemplation of a being who is rational, but not animal. Since, according to 
Aquinas, human happiness consists of contemplation, I argue that the operations of the 
                                                 
1 In Aquinas’s terminology phantasms represent a given thing as sensed and perceived.   
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sensitive soul are necessary for the attainment and the enjoyment of human happiness 
qua contemplation.  
Contemplation Is a Neglected Topic 
No other commentator on Aquinas has approached the question in the way I 
approach it. There is hardly anything in the literature written about the role played by our 
animality in human contemplation.  There is very little written about our animality in 
connection with any problems of Thomas’s philosophy. Thomas Hibbs notes that 
contemplation is one of the topics neglected by Aquinas scholars. He says: “Given 
Thomas’s emphasis on the crucial role of contemplation in the good life, it is surprising 
how little attention has been devoted to the topic or to the role of the intellectual virtues. I 
might list the topic of contemplation and intellectual virtues among those features of 
Aquinas’s moral thought that remain neglected in the literature.”2 It is interesting to note 
that Hibbs mentions contemplation along with intellectual virtues, apparently not even 
considering the possibility that one would discuss it in connection with animality. Even in 
connection with the intellectual virtues, which belong to the rational part of the soul, the 
topic of contemplation has been neglected; discussion of contemplation in connection 
with the sensitive soul is non-existent in the literature today.  
Hibbs mentions Josef Pieper’s book Happiness and Contemplation3 as a 
conspicuous exception to the dearth of books on the topic of contemplation. Pieper writes 
about contemplation and happiness in Happiness and Contemplation and in Leisure the 
                                                 
2 Hibbs, Thomas, S. “Interpretations of Aquinas’s Ethics Since Vatican II” in Ethics of Aquinas, ed. 
Stephen J. Pope, Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2002, pp. 412-425.                          
 
3 Pieper, Josef, Happiness and Contemplation, 1958, tr.Richard and Clara Winston, South Bend, Indiana: 
St. Augustine’s Press, 1998.  
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Basis of Culture. 4 These are classic works. However, his project is to defend the value 
of contemplation in the world of work and constant distractions; he does not closely 
examine what happens in the human soul when we contemplate, or when we engage in 
research leading to contemplation. He certainly is not interested in the role of the 
operations of the sensitive soul in contemplation. Furthermore, he does not analyze what 
Aquinas said about contemplation, but rather discusses contemplation as an essential 
component of a good life from the perspective of Aquinas’s philosophy. More recent 
works on the subject of contemplation also focus on the importance of contemplation for 
living a good life,5 rather than on the way we engage in the contemplation.   
Types of Contemplation  
There are two sides to contemplation: the object of contemplation, and the subject 
who contemplates. The ultimate object of contemplation is God,6 who cannot be known 
in the way material objects are known to us, and who, in fact, cannot be fully known.7 As 
far as the object of contemplation is concerned, the animal side of human nature is 
irrelevant, since we cannot study God the way we study other objects. Aquinas tells us 
that we may also contemplate truth about God’s creation.8 Created things of this world 
                                                 
 
4 Pieper, Josef, Leisure, the Basis of Culture,1948, tr.Gerald Malsbary, South Bend, Indiana: St. 
Augustine’s Press, 1998. 
 
5 For example, Dewan, Lawrence, “Truth and Happiness: Presidential Address”, Proceedings of the 
American Catholic Philosophical Association, 67, 1-20, 1993.  
 
6 Aquinas, Thomas St., Summa Theologica, II-II 180, 4, translated by Fathers of the English Dominican 
Province, Allen, Texas: Christian Classics, 1948. Latin text: Aquinas, Thomas St., Summa Theologiae, 
Roma: Alba-Editiones Paulinae, 1962. Part One of Part Two, Question 3, article 8. Hereafter refered to as 
ST.                   
 
7 ST I 12, 7.               
 
8 ST II-II 180, 4.              
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are material objects, but the truths about them are not material. Thus, from the 
perspective of the object of contemplation, the operations of the sensitive soul, i.e., 
sensory perceptions or passions, are not relevant.   
However, as far as the subject is concerned, namely, a human being, all aspects of 
human nature pertain to contemplation, for the subject who contemplates is a rational 
animal. A human being is able to engage in contemplation, because a human being is a 
rational creature.9 But a human being depends on the operations of the sensitive soul, 
namely, sensory perceptions and the passions, for the acquisition of knowledge, because 
a human is an animal. Senses and passions guide us in the study which precedes 
contemplation. The inner sense of phantasia and passions of love and delight assist the 
intellect in the very act of contemplation. Thomas Aquinas also considered the role of the 
senses in contemplation in the afterlife. He believed that there will be a resurrection at 
which time the souls of the dead will be reunited with their bodies. After the resurrection, 
the whole human being is to experience delight in the contemplation of God, and that 
experience of delight requires the participation of the sensitive soul and the body, as well 
as the intellective soul. From the perspective of the human being who contemplates, the 
operations of the sensitive soul are necessary for the acquisition of knowledge and for the 
enjoyment of contemplation.      
A comprehensive work on the subject of contemplation is Garrigou-Langrange’s 
Christian Perfection and Contemplation.10 Garrigou-Lagrange distinguishes two kinds of 
contemplation: ordinary and mystical. “Ordinary contemplation” is a term used by him to 
                                                 
9 According to Thomas, angels are also able to contemplate God, but angelic contemplation is not the 
subject of this work.  
 
10 Garrigous-Lagrance, R., O.P. Christian Perfection and Contemplation B. Herder Book Co. 1951.           
 5
describe the kind of contemplation to which a person may be led as a result of study of 
the world around us. Mystical contemplation is beyond the powers of unaided human 
reason, for it requires God’s grace.11 Most of Garrigou-Lagrange’s work is devoted to the 
discussion of the mystical type of contemplation. On the other hand, this dissertation 
treats of the ordinary contemplation, and specifically, it examines the role of the sensitive 
soul in the ordinary contemplation. Aquinas himself does not explicitly stress these 
distinctions in his discussion of contemplation, but he mentions them. It is up to Aquinas 
scholars to retrieve from his writings all that he has to say about different types of 
contemplation.  
Aquinas’s discussion of contemplation is two-fold: there is contemplation in this 
life on earth and contemplation in heaven. I shall focus on the earthly contemplation, but 
I will discuss briefly the heavenly kind of contemplation, because there is continuity 
between the two kinds of contemplation. Contemplation of God in heaven is the perfect 
kind of contemplation and the final end towards which we all, according to Thomas, tend. 
Thus, the ordinary contemplation should be considered against this ultimate standard and 
the final end. The other reason to consider it is that, when we do find discussion of 
contemplation in the literature, it is generally a discussion of contemplation in relation to 
our final end, which is heavenly contemplation. I shall briefly discuss that “standard 
view” of contemplation before proceeding to the examination of the role of the sensitive 
soul in contemplation. In earthly life, we may engage in an ordinary contemplation, or in 
a mystical contemplation. The latter is possible through God’s grace. In this dissertation I 
will discuss the ordinary contemplation, not the mystical kind. Furthermore, I will not 
                                                 
 
11 Garrigous-Lagrance, pp. 221-222.  
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discuss all the aspects of contemplation, only the role of the sensitive soul. Because 
there is continuity between earthly contemplation and the heavenly one, some 
consideration will be given to the way our animal nature may continue to function in our 
contemplation of God in heaven.  
Contemplation Constitutes Human Happiness  
When we do find a discussion of contemplation in the literature, it is usually in 
relation to Aquinas’s view of human happiness, because, according to Aquinas, 
contemplation is an activity which constitutes the essence of human happiness.12 Finding 
out what Aquinas says about contemplation helps us to better understand what he tells us 
about the essence of human happiness. Human happiness may be perfect, which is 
contemplation of God in heaven, or it may be imperfect, which is contemplation in this 
life on earth. Aquinas says that ultimate human happiness is contemplation of God in 
heaven: “Final and perfect happiness can consist in nothing else than the vision of the 
Divine Essence.”13 The “vision” is the intellectual vision of God as the essence of the 
First Cause,14 and that means the contemplation of God in heaven: “Consequently 
happiness consists principally in such an operation, viz., in the contemplation of Divine 
things…Therefore the last and perfect happiness, which we await in the life to come, 
consists entirely in contemplation.”15  This is perfect happiness. On earth the greatest 
happiness available to us is also contemplation of God: “But imperfect happiness, such as 
                                                 
12 ST I-II 3, 5.  
 
13 Dicendum quod ultima et perfecta beatitudo non potest esse nisi in visione divinae essentiae. ST I-II 3, 8.  
 
14 Ibid.   
 
15  Unde in tali operatione, scilicet in contemplatione divinorum, maxime consistit beatitudo…Et ideo 
ultima et perfecta beatitudo, quae expectatur in futura vita, tota principaliter consistit in contemplatione.  
ST I-II 3, 5.                           
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can be had here, consists first and principally in contemplation,”16 albeit on earth, 
contemplation and therefore, happiness, cannot be perfect.17   
Contemplation of God in heaven, Aquinas tells us, is an act of the intellect.18 In 
general, contemplation, Aquinas tells us, is simply “gazing upon the truth”, which we 
know.19 Contemplation of God in heaven is possible only by God’s grace, not by the 
human intellect’s own powers.20 In earthly life, we reach the level of contemplation after 
study, for we do not immediately grasp the truth.21 In either mode, contemplation itself is 
a rational activity. For that reason, Aquinas scholars tend to talk about human happiness 
as a rational activity, and ultimately as a Beatific Vision.             
For example, Georg Wieland’s article “Happiness”22 is a short but careful study 
of Aquinas’s treatment of the problem of happiness. It is also a typical presentation of 
what might be called the “Standard View” of happiness. According to this “Standard 
View”, human happiness is essentially the Beatific Vision of God in heaven, which is 
possible only through grace. In order to attain it we have to live virtuous lives on earth. 
We may also speak of earthly happiness, but it is a happiness of an imperfect kind. Even 
on earth, the greatest happiness is found in contemplation of God. But contemplation of 
                                                 
 
16 Beatitudo autem imperfecta, qualis hic haberi potest, primo quidem et principaliter consistit in 
contemplatione. Ibid.                                                       
 
17 ST I-II 3, 2. 
 
18 ST I-II 3, 4.           
 
19 ST II-II 180, 3.       
 
20 ST I 12, 4.        
 
21 ST II-II 180, 3-6.    
 
22 Wieland, Georg, “Happiness (Ia IIa, qq. 1-5)”, tr. By Grant Kaplan, in The Ethics of Aquinas, ed. Stephen 
J. Pope, Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2002, pp.57-68.              
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God on earth cannot be continuous, and can be only indirect since our knowledge 
depends on the senses. These impediments to contemplation and the fact that we cannot 
avoid suffering in this life make our earthly happiness less than perfect. The focus of 
“The Standard View” is on the intellectual or the theological aspects of human happiness, 
and not on the role of the sensitive part of the soul in that happiness.  
Discussion of Thomas’s notion of happiness and contemplation often focuses on 
the problems associated with the happiness beyond this world. When writing about 
human happiness, many authors stress the theological perspective.23 Different aspects of 
perfect and imperfect happiness are considered but almost all discussions of happiness 
focus on the role of the speculative intellect and barely mention the rest of a human 
being. This is well supported, but one could say that it gives us a somewhat unbalanced 
picture of what Aquinas says about human happiness and about contemplation. Since we 
are rational animals and not merely rational beings – like angels – our happiness and our 
way of contemplating God should possess aspects which are characteristic of animals. 
Granted human contemplation is essentially an intellectual activity, yet our way of 
contemplation ought to differ from that of incorporeal, non-animal rational beings. The 
study of that difference, as Aquinas understood it, has been, up to now, neglected by 
scholars.  
 
 
 
                                                 
23 “The sovereign happiness of man here below is to anticipate, in however confused a fashion, the face-to-
face vision of God in the quiet of eternity.” Gilson, Etienne, The Christian Philosophy of Thomas Aquinas, 
tr. L.K. Shook, C.S.B.; Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1994, p.25.                    
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Composite Nature of Human Beings  
A human being who contemplates is a creature of body and soul, not merely an 
intellect.24 A human being is defined by Thomas Aquinas as a “rational animal”.25  
According to Aquinas, humans are composite creatures, made of body and a tripartite 
soul.26 We are able to engage in contemplation, because we have a rational soul. But 
being animals, we also have sensory perceptions and passions, which belong to the 
sensitive part of the soul. Given our composite nature, one would expect that even the 
nonrational side of human nature, i.e., the operations of the sensitive soul, is involved in 
human contemplation, as it must be involved in any human activity. Thomas says that the 
operations of the sensitive soul do belong to human happiness (and therefore 
contemplation), albeit in a secondary way. They belong to happiness because in earthly 
life the senses and passions guide and assist us in the acquisition of knowledge and in the 
act of contemplation; while in heaven they will enhance our enjoyment of heavenly 
contemplation.   
Aquinas scholars remind the reader of the importance of the body for happiness,27 
since Aquinas explicitly tells us that the body is necessary for human happiness,28 and 
that we cannot think of ourselves as disembodied souls. However, this point tends to be 
                                                 
 
24 ST I 75, 4.          
 
25 ST I 75, 3; ST I 76, 3.     
 
26 ST I 76, 3; ST I 78, 1. 
 
27 Copleston, F. C. Aquinas, Penguin Books, 1991, pp.156-178; Pasnau, Robert, Thomas Aquinas on 
Human Nature. A Thomistic Study of  Summa Theologiae Ia 75-89,Cambridge University Press, 2002, 
pp.73-99, 380-393;  Stump, Eleonore, Aquinas, New Yor: Routledge, 2003, pp.191-216; Davies, Brian, The 
Thought of Thomas Aquinas, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992,  pp.211-220;  McInerny, Ralph, St. Thomas 
Aquinas, University of Notre Dame Press, 1982, pp.38-50;  Wieland, p.62;  Gilson, pp. 187-199.                            
 
28 ST I-II 4, 5.    
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undeveloped. According to Aquinas, humans have a composite nature, which persists 
even in heaven and which must be taken into account in any discussion of human 
endeavors. However, nobody has examined what that means with respect to the activity 
of contemplation. Operations of the sensitive soul are necessary for human happiness – 
and thus, contemplation – because it is the happiness of a whole human being, not merely 
of a part of a human soul.   
If we wish to investigate the role of the operations of the sensitive soul in human 
happiness, the text to consider is ST I-II 3, 3. In it, Thomas Aquinas asks “Whether 
Happiness is an Operation of the Sensitive Part, or of the Intellective Part Only?”29 He 
answers that human happiness essentially consists of a person’s mind being united with 
God, and therefore it is essentially the operation of the intellective soul.  However, 
operations of the sensitive soul are required for the imperfect happiness on earth, and 
they will enter, though not essentially, into the enjoyment of our happiness in heaven.  
Since ultimate happiness in heaven is contemplation of God,30 and the activity 
especially connected with happiness on earth is contemplation of divine truth,31 and 
contemplation is rational activity, it follows that happiness essentially consists of the 
operations of the intellective soul.32  
However, in I-II 3, 3 Thomas devotes more space to the explanation that, despite 
contemplation being essentially a rational activity, the operations of the sensitive soul are 
necessary for an imperfect happiness on earth and for a complete happiness after the 
                                                 
29 Utrum Beatitudo Sit Operatio Sensitivae Partis Aut Intellectivae Tantum  ST I-II 3, 3. 
 
30 ST I-II 3, 8. 
 
31 ST II-II 182, 1; ST II-II 180, 4. 
 
32 ST I-II 3, 4. 
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resurrection of the body. Although happiness essentially pertains to the intellective 
soul, other parts of the soul are also important for the attainment of happiness, even if 
they play a lesser role by comparison with that of the intellective part.  
Now the operation of sense cannot belong to happiness essentially. For 
man’s happiness consists essentially in his being united to the Uncreated 
Good , which is his last end…to Which man cannot be united by an 
operation of his senses….Nevertheless the operations of the senses can 
belong to happiness, both antecedently and consequently: antecedently, in 
respect of imperfect happiness which can be had in this life, since the 
operation of the intellect demands a previous operation of the sense; - 
consequently, in that perfect happiness which we await in heaven; because 
at the resurrection.33  
 
Happiness as contemplation of God is also called “perfect happiness”. Contemplation of 
God in heaven is possible for the souls separated from their bodies, and therefore, no 
operations of the sensitive soul are required. After the resurrection of the body, the whole 
human being will experience happiness, and since the whole human is an embodied 
creature, the experience of perfect happiness will include the feelings, i.e. the operations 
of the sensitive soul. Because of their contribution to happiness Thomas says that these 
operations belong to the happiness “consequently”.34 In perfect happiness of the 
resurrected human being the operations of the sensitive soul will contribute to the full 
enjoyment of that happiness.  
Before we attain perfect happiness we have to live on earth, where we can be 
happy in an imperfect way. Thomas Aquinas points towards three ways in which the 
                                                 
33 Essentialiter quidem non potest pertinere operatio sensus ad beatitudinem. Nam beatitudo hominis 
consistit essentialiter in coniunctione ipsius ad bonum increatum, quod est ultimus finis, …cui homo 
coniungi non potest per sensus operationem.…Possunt autem operationes sensus pertinere ad beatitudinem 
antecedenter et consequenter. Antecedenter quidem, secudum beatitudinem imperfectam, qualis in 
praesenti vita haberi potest; nam operatio intellectus praeexigit operationem sensus. – Consequenter autem, 
in illa perfecta beatitudine quae expectatur in caelo, quia post resurrectionem.  ST I-II 3, 3. 
 
34 ST I-II 3, 3. 
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operations of the sensitive soul are necessary for imperfect happiness.35  First of all, we 
need sensory perception in order to think, and so the operations of the intellect depend on 
the operations of the sensitive part of the soul. Secondly, a certain measure of sensible 
goods is necessary for living a good, virtuous life on earth. Thirdly, in earthly life, we 
have to proceed from the “perfection of the lower part” to the perfection of the higher 
part.36 Thus, the operation of the sensitive soul may belong to the happiness antecedently 
– because we need our senses for the intellectual operations - and consequently – because 
of the resurrection of the bodies.  
We need the operations of the sensitive soul for earthly happiness. In the Reply to 
Objection 3 of the same question ST I-II 3, 3 Aquinas says this: “In perfect happiness the 
entire man is perfected, in the lower part of his nature, by an overflow from the higher. 
But in the imperfect happiness of this life, it is otherwise; we advance from the perfection 
of the lower part to the perfection of the higher part.”37 The perfection of the intellective 
part of the soul – the part of the soul which engages in contemplation – depends on the 
perfection of the lower part of the soul, i.e. the vegetative and the sensitive parts of the 
soul.38 We cannot attain the imperfect happiness unless the lower part of the soul is 
perfected. Our animality, i.e. the body and the operations of the sensitive soul, play a 
significant role in the pursuit of human happiness.  
                                                 
 
35 ST I-II 3, 3. 
 
36 ST I-II 3, 3 ad 3. 
 
37 Dicendum quod in perfecta beatitudine perficitur totus homo, sed in inferiori parte per redundantiam a 
superiori. In beatitudine autem imperfecta praesentis vitae, e converso a perfectione inferioris partis 
proceditur ad perfectionem superioris.  ST I-II 3,3 ad 3. 
 
38 The operations of the vegetative part of the soul are: digestion of food, growth and reproduction. The 
operations of the sensitive part of the soul are: sensory perceptions, passions and locomotion.  
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The achievement of perfection “of the lower part” refers to the actualization of 
our potency, inasmuch as it is possible in this life. According to Aquinas, all beings, 
including human beings, act for an end,39 which is their perfection,40 and towards which 
they are guided by their natural appetites.41 In the case of human beings, the guidance of 
the appetites natural to humans involves all aspects of human nature, including the 
operations of the sensitive soul. When Aquinas says that the perfection of the higher part 
requires the perfection of the lower part, he means that the perfection of the intellectual 
part of the soul depends on the perfection of the sensitive and even the vegetative part of 
the soul, and the achievement of that perfection is guided by natural inclinations. I shall 
examine the way intellectual operations, and especially contemplation, depend on the 
operations of the sensitive soul.    
 There are two kinds of operations which belong to the sensitive soul: sensory 
perception and passions. Since operations of the sensitive soul participate in the activity 
of contemplation, then either sensory perceptions or passions, or both, ought to be 
involved. It is easy to see that sensory perceptions would be necessary at least in the early 
stages of knowledge acquisition. I will argue that senses and passions are necessary to 
guide us in our study which would lead us to learn some truth. I will also argue that we 
cannot contemplate without the use of phantasms, and that there is a sensual component 
to the delight of contemplation.  
 
                                                 
 
39 ST I-II 1, 2. 
 
40 ST I-II 1, 5. 
 
41 ST I-II 1, 2. 
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Sensory Perception and Phantasms   
There is, of course, a basic kind of dependence of the intellect on the senses: 
thinking has to begin with phantasms,42 which are not possible without sensory 
perception.43 As was mentioned above, Thomas pointed to that basic dependence as the 
reason why the operations of the sensitive soul belong to earthly happiness antecedently. 
Aquinas tells us that on earth we cannot have a direct apprehension of God’s essence; we 
must learn about God through His effects.44 Aquinas says:  
Since the human intellect in the present state of life cannot understand 
even immaterial created substances, [angels] … much less can it 
understand the essence of the uncreated substance [God]. Hence it must be 
said simply that God is not the first object of our knowledge. Rather do we 
know God through creatures…while the first object of our knowledge in 
this life is the quiddity of a material thing, which is the proper object of 
our intellect.45  
 
Thus, in earthly life, contemplation of God is preceded by the study of the created world.  
Learning about the world around us requires sensory perception. In order to 
acquire knowledge about its world the animal has to receive the sensory data and process 
it in a way which enables the animal to sense things, and to know them as useful or 
harmful. Being animals, humans also need sensory perception for the acquisition of 
                                                 
42 ST I 85, 2.        
 
43 ST I 84, 7 and  8. 
 
44 ST I 88, 3.    
 
45 Dicendum quod cum intellectus humanus secundum statum praesentis vitae non possit intelligere 
substantias immateriales creatas…multo minus potest intelligere essentiam substantiae increatae. Unde 
simpliciter dicendum est quod Deus non est primum quod a nobis cognoscitur; sed magis per creaturas in 
Dei cognitionem pervenimus…Primum autem quod intelligitur a nobis secundum statum praesentis vitae, 
est quidditas rei materialis, quae est nostri intellectus obiectum.  ST I 88, 3.                 
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knowledge. And without acquiring knowledge, we are not able to engage in the 
ordinary contemplation.46       
Aquinas scholars often remind us that the senses are important for our thought 
processes,47 but how that affects human contemplation has not been examined. In 
discussing contemplation, scholars usually emphasize its intellectual and non-sensory 
features. 48 That is understandable since contemplation is essentially a rational activity. 
Indeed, Aquinas says that happiness, qua contemplation, is an operation of the 
speculative intellect.49 Of course, given Aquinas’s holistic view of human nature, the 
whole person must be somehow involved in contemplation; and so, the scholars 
sometimes mention that happiness, which is ultimately contemplation of God in heaven, 
must include the involvement of the body and the senses.50 When the scholars do mention 
the involvement of the body and the senses, it is usually in discussing happiness after the 
resurrection. However, if the body and the sensitive part of the soul are somehow 
involved in contemplation, then they ought to be involved in earthly contemplation, as 
well as the post-resurrection contemplation. In fact, one would expect that the operations 
of the sensitive soul would be needed more in earthly life than in the life in heaven. I will 
                                                 
 
46 I am writing about the ordinary, not a mystical contemplation.  
 
47 Copleston, pp.178-184; Gilson, pp.200-206; Pasnau, pp.267-329; Stump, pp. 244-276; et al.           
 
48 O’Reilly Kevin, “Efficient and Final Causality”, The Modern Schoolman, LXXXII, November 2004;  
Kenny Anthony, “Aquinas on Aristotelian Happiness”, in Aquinas’s Moral Theory, Scott MacDonald and 
Eleonore Stump eds., Cornell University Press, 1999;  Pinckairs Servais, Th. OP, Les source de la morale 
chretienne, Editions Universitaires Fribourg, Editions du Cerf Paris, 1985, p.431; Wieland, p. 64.  
 
49 ST I-II 3, 5.  
 
50 Bonino Serge-Thomas, “Charisms, Forms, and State of Life” in The Ethics of Aquinas, Stephen J. Pope 
ed., pp.340-354;  Wieland p.62;  Hoye William J. Actualitas Omnium Actuum: Man’s Beatific Vision of 
God as Apprehended by Thomas Aquinas, Verlag Anton Hain KG – Meisenheim am Glan, 1975, pp. 206-
232.      
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show that these operations are necessary for earthly contemplation, while after 
resurrection, operations of the sensitive soul are necessary for our perfection, and 
consequently enhance the delight of heavenly contemplation.     
We must note that in all rational the beings intellect functions only within the 
limits of their nature. Angels can contemplate God only in accordance with their specific 
nature (which is different for each angel).51 It follows that humans can contemplate God 
only within the limits of their specific nature, and that nature includes animal body’s 
ability to experience sensations and passions. That shall be our nature for eternity, else 
we would cease to exist.52 I will show that, according to Aquinas, we use phantasms in 
all our intellectual acts, even in contemplation. Furthermore, the perfection of our nature 
requires that phantasms figure even in heavenly contemplation, after the resurrection of 
the body.         
I shall examine the way our dependence on sensory perceptions manifests itself in 
our pursuit of knowledge and even in contemplation of truth. Human beings never cease 
to be animals, even when they engage in rational activities.  
Passions  
The cognitive aspect of human nature qua animal is constituted by the senses, 
while passions constitute the affective aspect of human nature qua animal. Happiness 
essentially consists of contemplation. But human happiness cannot be independent of 
senses and passions. Happiness which is not dependent on passions or sensory 
                                                 
 
51 ST I 50, 4; ST I 55, 3; ST I 56, 3. 
 
52 Thomas Aquinas St., Summa Contra Gentiles,  IV 79, 81, and 84, Book Four translated by Charles J. 
O’Neil, University of Notre Dame Press, 1975. Latin text:S. Thomae de Aquino, Summa Contra Gentiles, 
Editio Leonina Manualis, Romae, An. Tip. Editrice Laziale, 1934. Hereafter refered to as SCG;   See also:             
ST I-II 4, 5; ST Supplement, 80. 
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perceptions is the angelic kind of happiness, since angels do not have passions or 
senses. Humans are composite beings, possessing animal bodies, and their happiness has 
to include those bodies and the appropriate sensations and passions. I shall argue that 
Thomas Aquinas also tells us – though not always explicitly – that all aspects of our 
nature, and particularly passions, which are in the sensitive soul, guide us in our pursuit 
of happiness and enhance our enjoyment of happiness, and that is because we can be 
happy only as complete and integrated beings. A human being, according to Aquinas, is a 
creature that possesses an intellective soul – a trait of rational creatures - and also 
possesses a sensitive soul - a trait of animals. The sensitive soul is the seat of passions. 
Passions influence our choices, including those choices which lead us to study and 
contemplation.         
Aquinas scholars do not pay much attention to the role of passions in 
contemplation. In the literature, passions are often discussed in relation to the practice of 
virtues, or in relation to human psychology in general. For example, Ralph McInerny53 
gives us a standard view of human happiness according to Aquinas, stressing the 
development of virtue as necessary for the attainment of happiness, and contrasting 
perfect happiness in heaven with the imperfect one on earth. He argues for the 
complementarity of the philosophical and the theological view of human happiness. But 
he does not discuss contemplation, of which the happiness consists. In discussing 
morality, or practical reasoning, Aquinas scholars tend to focus on the role of the 
intellect. Passions are supposed to be appropriately cultivated in a virtuous person, and 
for that reason passions are noticed in those works which discuss the development of 
                                                 
53 McInerny “Ethics” in Cambridge Companion to Aquinas, Kretzman and Stump eds., Cambridge 
University Press, 1993, pp.196-216. 
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virtues in relation to happiness. For example, Gilson, despite his frequent mentioning 
of the importance of the body, speaks of passions as “the matter on which the virtues are 
exercised.”54  
Often the passions are discussed as something which may distract one from the 
practice of virtue. Yet Aquinas has a positive view of passions as helping us in our 
development of virtues,55 and in the pursuit of our happiness. Animals are capable of 
certain passions, in accordance with natural inclinations proper to their natures. Passions 
must enter into our pursuit of the final end, which is happiness. I will show how passions 
guide us in the research which ultimately may lead us to contemplation. Among the 
scholars writing more recently, there is tendency to discuss passions in a more positive 
light. For example, Robert Pasnau in his book Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature is of 
the opinion that Thomas Aquinas ascribed a positive role to animal passions and 
inclinations in our moral acts;56 however, he only hints at such a possibility and does not 
examine it in sufficient detail to give us a full picture of the role played by animal 
passions in our moral acts, not to mention contemplation.  
A good analysis of the relationship between passions and reason is given by 
Uffenheimer-Lippens.57 Her article appeared in 2003, which is quite recent, and perhaps 
is an indication of a growing awareness of the importance Aquinas ascribed to passions in 
moral acts. However, there is lack of research on the relationship between passions and 
                                                 
 
54 Gilson, p.285-286. 
 
55  ST I-II 59, 5 ad.3.           
 
56 Pasnau, chapter 8, especially pp. 262-264.   
 
57 Uffenheimer-Lippens, Elisabeth, “Rationalized Passions and Passionate Rationality: Thomas Aquinas on 
the Relation Between Reason and the Passions”, The Review of Metaphysics 56, March 2003: 525-558.  
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the intellectual activities, like research or contemplation. The closest approach to it is 
found in Robert Miner’s book Thomas Aquinas on the Passions.58 Miner touches upon 
several topics which I discuss in detail in my dissertation. Those topics deal with the way 
sensual love, desire, delight and natural appetites affect, or are affected by the rational 
part of the soul. He mentions that love (amor) as a passion is what draws us to God,59 the 
fact that the rational desire somehow influences the sensitive part of the soul;60 the 
relationship between intellectual joy and the sensual delight;61 and he refers to the fact 
that, according to Thomas, natural appetites orient us to the good, which includes the 
rational kind of good.62 However, Miner does not discuss these issues, for he devotes 
only several sentences to each of the above, in the context of a broader discussion of 
Thomas’s treatment of passions. Furthermore, Miner draws the reader’s attention to the 
fact that our rationality ennobles the passions, rather than to the fact that the passions 
enter into our intellectual activities or learning and contemplation. What Miner mentions, 
I closely examine in my dissertation.  
Thus, there are no works that examine how the passions contribute to 
contemplation. I will show that passions are crucial to our acquisition of knowledge, that 
we contemplate what we love and that delight accompanies contemplation. It is so, 
because passions guide us in our pursuit of the good. According to Aquinas, sentient 
                                                 
 
58 Miner, Robert, Thomas Aquinas on the Passions, Cambridge University Press, 2009. 
 
59 Ibid. p.121.          
 
60 Ibid. p.159.  
      
61 Ibid. pp.165-170. 
 
62 Ibid. pp.13-28 and pp.171-172.      
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beings – which include humans and other animals - are motivated to act by passions.63 
Our pursuit of study and contemplation likewise is motivated by passions. Since I am 
examining how passions figure in contemplation, which is the essence of human 
happiness, I shall focus on the passions of love, desire and pleasure, because these orient 
us to our good directly. Passions which helps us to avoid harm, for example, fear, orient 
us to our good indirectly, through avoidance of evil rather than through the pursuit of the 
good.  
Natural Inclinations 
The sensitive soul is relevant to human contemplation also because our natural 
inclinations, and thus our appetites, guide us towards our good, and our greatest good is 
contemplation of truth.64 According to Thomas’s metaphysics, our natural appetite for 
knowledge is on a continuum with other natural appetites, such as our appetite for food or 
sex, or even stone’s “appetite” for the ground.65 What kinds of appetites we have depend 
on what we are, for every kind of a being has certain behavioral tendencies, i.e. 
inclinations, characteristic of its kind.66 According to Thomas, in the order of creation, all 
beings are oriented towards the good. They pursue their own good, and also contribute to 
the good of others and the common good. The way all beings are oriented towards the 
good is through their inclinations.67 This is not a moral sense of “the good”, but a 
                                                 
 
63 ST I 80, 1 and 2. 
 
64 ST II-II 180, 1. 
 
65 ST I-II 28, 6; ST I-II 1, 2. 
 
66 ST I 78, 1 ad 3; ST I 80, 1 ad 3; ST I-II 8, 1.                                          
 
67 SCG III 3, 16, 22.  
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metaphysical notion of the good relating to the goodness of creation. A human being, 
like all created things, is a thing naturally oriented towards its good, its final end, and the 
greatest good of human beings is contemplation of God. Every being is equipped with 
natural inclinations which direct it to the achievement of its final end. Humans are no 
exception and are likewise equipped with natural inclinations which direct them to their 
ends. We naturally turn our attention to things because of our desires. But we have 
certain desires, because of our natural inclinations. The inclinations are what the desires 
are based on. We humans contemplate because we have a natural desire for knowledge,68 
because of our natural inclination to truth.69 Natural desires point us towards the good. 
Our desire for truth is also the desire for the good, since the truth is convertible with the 
good.70 All natural desires which belong to a given creature must function within the 
context of that creature as a whole. Our animal desires direct us to preserve our lives or to 
preserve our species, and that is good for us qua animals.71 Our desire for knowledge 
directs us to search for the first cause that is God, and that is good for us qua rational 
beings.72 We might expect that our contemplation can only be practiced in a way which is 
integrated with everything else about us, including the sensitive soul, the vegetative soul 
and the body. All our natural desires taken together help us to achieve perfection and 
happiness. Thomas says this about our natural love of truth: “Each individual delights in 
                                                 
 
68 ST II-II 180, 7. 
 
69 ST I-II 94, 2. 
 
70 ST I 6, 4. 
 
71 ST I-II 31,  7. 
 
72 ST I-II 3, 8; ST I-II 31, 7. 
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the operation which befits him according to his own nature or habit. Now 
contemplation of the truth befits a man according to his nature as a rational animal the 
result being that all men naturally desire to know, so that consequently they delight in the 
knowledge of truth.”73 
  Some authors note that, according to Aquinas, human happiness is a fulfillment, a 
self-realization or actualization of a human being. Copleston writes: “In every particular 
choice [of the will] the object is chosen because it contributes to or is thought of as 
contributing to the attainment of the supreme good for man, the possession of which is 
happiness or beatitude in the subjective sense.”74 He goes on to say that that supreme 
good for man is God. That is, of course, what Aquinas says. However, I will argue that 
Aquinas says more about our choices as contributing to our happiness.  
Jean Porter is the author who stresses the importance of natural inclinations for 
human happiness and the fact that happiness is the fulfillment proper to our nature.75 She 
acknowledges that natural inclinations guide us towards our perfection, and therefore 
happiness: “The inclinations of the human person similarly provide the intelligible 
principles in terms of which she attains her perfection, thus attaining union with God in 
the way connatural to her as a specific kind of creature.”76 She discusses how natural 
                                                 
 
73 Quia unicuique delectabilis est operatio sibi conveniens secundum propriam naturam vel habitum. 
Contemplatio autem veritatis competit homini secundum suam naturam, prout est animal rationale. Ex quo 
contingit quod omnes homines ex natura scire desiderant: et per consequens in cognitione veritatis 
delectantur.  ST II-II 180,7. 
 
74 Copleston, p.187.     
 
75 Porter, Jean, Nature as Reason, Grand Rapids, Michigan: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 
1999, p.169.             
 
76 Porter, p.266. 
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inclinations dispose us to be virtuous and, vice-versa, how virtues perfect us so that we 
can follow natural inclinations in a correct way.77 She considers the way rationality 
influences how human beings act on their inclinations, while I will stress how the natural 
inclinations guide us in our pursuits. Porter says more than most authors about the 
corporeal and animal aspects of human happiness, yet in her conclusions she downplays 
the importance of animal inclinations and desires and focuses on rationality instead. She 
emphasizes rationality and her aim is to show how our pursuit of happiness through the 
pursuit of various proximate ends is informed by reason.  And ultimately she looks at the 
problem of human happiness from a theological perspective. But she does not discuss the 
topic of contemplation. She considers the way rationality influences how human beings 
act on their inclinations, while I will stress how the natural inclinations guide us in our 
pursuits. 
Many authors mention natural inclinations when writing about ethics, human 
nature, or about Aquinas’s metaphysics in general. For example, Miner explains how 
passions follow from natural inclinations,78 and Pasnau writes about inclinations,79 but 
neither of them discusses contemplation.      
Lawrence Feingold in The Natural Desire to See God According to St. Thomas 
Aquinas and His Interpreters80 discusses the desire to see God in the context of human 
natural desires. However, his approach is different than mine in two ways. First, he 
                                                 
 
77 Porter, p.176. 
      
78 Miner, pp.13-28.     
 
79 Pasnau, pp. 201-209.       
 
80 Feingold, Lawrence, The Natural Desire to See god According to St. Thomas Aquinas and His 
Interpreters, Ave Maria, FL: Sapientia Press of Ave Maria University, 2010.      
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focuses on the act of the will, whereas I focus on the act of the intellect. Second, he 
shows how the desire for God differs from other natural desires, while I examine what 
our desire for knowledge – ultimately for the knowledge of God – shares with other 
natural desires.  
Pinckairs is an author who connects our natural inclination to truth to other 
natural inclinations.81 However, he writes about the inclination to truth in relation to 
moral problems, not in relation to animal nature.      
       In my discussion of contemplation I will look at contemplation from the 
perspective of the actualization or fulfillment proper to a human being. I will examine the 
way our acquisition of knowledge is guided by and stems from our desires, which in turn 
arise from our natural inclinations. 
Perfection According to Our Nature  
According to Aquinas’s metaphysics, all creatures tend to actualize their potency, 
to fulfill their natural capacity and thus to achieve perfection. Human beings likewise 
have a natural tendency to achieve that fulfillment, and that is the metaphysical meaning 
of human “happiness”. Thus, happiness, metaphysically speaking, is the fulfillment of 
human nature.  
All creatures are endowed with natural inclinations, and in the case of humans, 
those inclinations are inclinations of a being that is corporeal, living, sentient, and 
rational, thus reflecting the complexity of human nature. Since we are rational, our 
happiness, our fulfillment requires the satisfaction of our desire for knowledge. That 
desire will be completely satisfied in heaven, and imperfectly satisfied in earthly life.   
                                                 
 
81 Pinckairs, pp.400-431.      
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But the fulfillment of inclinations which we share with animals is also necessary for 
the attainment and the enjoyment of human happiness in this world, because our desire 
for knowledge, although of a rational kind, is interconnected with the desires of the 
animal kind. Furthermore, perfection of the sensitive soul, as well as the perfection of the 
rational soul, is necessary for the perfect human happiness in heaven. It is so, because 
according to Thomas’s metaphysics, happiness is the achievement of our final end,82 and 
is comparable to any other kind of being’s achievement of its final end, and that being’s 
actualization, and thus, perfection. If human happiness is the actualization of a human 
being, it must be actualization of a whole human being, not a divided one. Thus, human 
happiness must involve the sensitive as well as the intellective soul.  
Perfection can be understood as the fulfillment of our nature, that is the 
achievement of our proper ends. In my discussion of human happiness I am adopting the 
perspective of happiness as a fulfillment or actualization of potency, because from that 
perspective we can see what role the sensitive soul plays in the attainment and the 
enjoyment of happiness. From that perspective we can understand why the perfection of 
the lower part of the soul is necessary for the perfection of the higher part in earthly life, 
and why in heaven the higher part in turn perfects the lower part by overflow.83  
Perfection of the lower part, i.e the sensitive soul, is necessary for the attainment of the 
perfection of the rational soul, because our senses, our passions and our natural appetites 
guide us towards our good, including the rational good, which is knowledge. Without 
their guidance, we would not be able to achieve that good (or any other good, for that 
                                                 
82 ST Prologue I-II. 
 
83 ST I-II 3, 3 ad 3 “Overflow” is the influence of the rational part of the soul on the sensitive part.  
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matter). Without the guidance of the senses and passions, we would not be able to 
achieve our final end, which is contemplation of God in heaven. On the other hand, the 
perfection of the higher part, i.e. the rational soul, causes the perfection of the sensitive 
soul, after the resurrection. Happiness is the fulfillment of our nature. Contemplation, in 
which human happiness essentially consists, is the fulfillment of our nature as rational 
beings. But since we are not merely rational beings, but rational animals, our perfection 
must include the perfection of the animal side of our nature. And so, in perfect happiness 
of a perfected human being, not only the rational soul, but also the sensitive soul must be 
perfected.  
Delight 
Ordinary contemplation is preceded by study. Study of anything begins with 
sensory perceptions and with desires. Desires include sensual as well as rational desires 
with respect to a given object. Study ends in contemplation, which also corresponds to 
the satisfaction of a desire, i.e. desire for truth, and thus a delight. Aquinas defines 
pleasure as “the repose of the appetite in some good”84 - when we acquire some 
knowledge we also acquire something good, and thus we experience pleasure,85 as our 
desire for knowledge is satisfied. Thus, contemplation of truth is delightful.86 This is not 
only true of our earthly contemplation, but also, of heavenly contemplation, which is our 
ultimate fulfillment. I will show that the delight of contemplation has a sensual as well as 
an intellectual component. Participation in the delight of heavenly contemplation is also 
                                                 
84 Delectatio est quies appetitus in bono  ST I-II 34, 2. 
 
85 ST I-II 32, 8 “Whether Wonder is a Cause of Pleasure [delectationis]?” Utrum Admiratio Sit Causa 
Delectationis. 
 
86 ST I-II 32, 8; ST II-II 180, 7.      
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the way in which the sensitive part of the soul belongs to human happiness 
“consequently”.87 Aquinas scholars do mention the delight of contemplation when they 
write about contemplation, but nobody has examined the nature of that delight.  
Summary       
In this dissertation I examine what Aquinas tells us about the way in which the 
operations of the sensitive soul participate in contemplation. I focus on earthly, ordinary 
contemplation, however, I also briefly consider heavenly contemplation. The comparison 
between the earthly and the heavenly modes of contemplation helps us to better 
understand the role of the operations of the sensitive soul in human contemplation.     
In the first chapter I look at the nature of human contemplation and the way our 
natural appetites direct us towards contemplation. I discuss what we contemplate, how we 
contemplate it, and why.       
In chapter two I examine the way contemplation depends on the production of 
phantasms. I will show that phantasms accompany human contemplation both in earthly 
life, and in heaven, after the resurrection of the body.  
In chapter three I investigate the role of passions in contemplation, especially the 
passions of love and desire. Passions are necessary for human happiness because we must 
be happy as whole beings, because our natural inclinations and passions which arise from 
them are necessary for the achievement of happiness, and because our nature determines 
that we cannot be completely happy without experiencing some passions. The passions 
are necessary for human happiness qua contemplation both antecedently, on earth, and 
consequently, in heaven.  
                                                 
 
87 ST I-II 3, 3.  
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In chapter four I consider the nature of delight experienced in contemplation. I 
will show that the delight of contemplation includes sensual as well as intellectual 
delight. It is so, not only in earthly life, but also in heaven, after the resurrection.  
 According to Aquinas humans have a composite nature, which persists even in 
heaven and which must be taken account of in discussion of any human endeavors; 
however, nobody has so far examined what that means with respect to the activity of 
contemplation.  
We are animals because we possess bodies and sensitive souls. I will show that 
the very act of contemplation and also the pursuit of knowledge, which may lead us to 
contemplation, depends not only on operations of the intellective part of the soul, but also 
on the operations of the sensitive part of the soul, which we share with other animals.  
Being animal implies being dependent on sensory perception for the acquisition of 
knowledge, and being directed by sensitive appetite and passions towards objects which 
one might know anything about. Those features of human nature also manifest 
themselves in the way humans contemplate, not to mention in the way humans acquire 
knowledge. Furthermore, I will show that phantasms and passions are necessary for the 
enjoyment of contemplation, both in earth and in heaven. Given the composite nature of a 
human being, the operations of the sensitive soul belong to human happiness, for they 
must be involved in any activity of a composite being.  
Aquinas does not tell us explicitly what the role of the sensitive soul is in 
contemplation, or even in the acquisition of knowledge; instead, one has to retrieve that 
information from his texts and interpret it. That information is found in his theory of 
 29
knowledge, in the discussion of passions, in the discussion of contemplative life, and in 
the discussion of happiness.      
I will examine the difference that being animal makes to human contemplation. I 
am writing from the perspective of a human being contemplating, not from the 
perspective of the object contemplated. As far as the object is concerned, only the 
intellect is needed for the contemplation; but as far as the contemplating human being is 
concerned, the nature of the whole human being ought to be considered. Even though the 
animal powers of a human being play only a secondary role in human contemplation, the 
examination of their role can give us a more complete picture of that contemplation. In 
this work, I will consider only the animal side of human nature.     
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CHAPTER ONE  
CONTEMPLATION AND NATURAL APPETITES 
In this chapter I consider what contemplation is and discuss how our desire for 
knowledge, which ought to lead us to contemplation, is embedded in our nature. I look at 
the nature of human contemplation and the way our natural appetites direct us towards 
contemplation.  Although this dissertation focuses on the ordinary contemplation, it is 
necessary to briefly consider the ultimate in human contemplation, that is, the Beatific 
Vision. To begin with, we need to consider what contemplation is, what we contemplate, 
how and why we do it.  
The Nature of Contemplation    
What we contemplate  
Contemplation of God in heaven is the vision of God, the seeing of the essence of 
God in the Beatific Vision and contemplating what one sees. On earth, imperfect 
happiness is also identified with contemplation, especially contemplation of truths 
pertaining to God, although Thomas recognizes that we may also contemplate truths 
concerning creatures.1 Contemplation is an act of beholding the truth. It is an act of 
intellect, but different from other acts of the intellect, namely formation of a concept, 
formation of a proposition, or reasoning.2 Contemplation goes beyond reasoning.3 
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2 ST I 85, 5.                   
 
3 ST II-II 180, 3.      
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Thomas says: “But contemplation regards the simple act of gazing on the truth.” 4  
That might be accepted as a definition of contemplation. It is an act of knowing the truth, 
simply knowing it and regarding it. When we contemplate, we see the truth, and we are 
past the point of discussing it, trying to discover it, or wondering about it. What we 
contemplate is what we recognize as the truth, and all we need to do is simply to behold it 
and delight in it.5 Thomas says: “Accordingly, then, the contemplative life has one act 
wherein it is finally completed, namely the contemplation of truth, and from this act it 
derives its unity.”6                
Following Aristotle, Thomas limits the kinds of objects which can be 
contemplated to those of theology, metaphysics, physics and mathematics.7 Thomas asks 
whether the contemplative life consists in the contemplation of God Himself, or also in 
contemplation of any truth.8 He answers that principally, contemplative life is devoted to 
the contemplation of God: “That which belongs principally to the contemplative life is 
the contemplation of the divine truth, because this contemplation is the end of the whole 
human life.”9 Although contemplation ultimately is supposed to be contemplation of 
God, Aquinas does allow for the contemplation of other objects also. Thomas tells us that 
                                                 
 
4 Sed contemplatio pertinet ad ipsum simplicem intuitum veritatis. ST II-II 180, 3 ad 1. 
 
5 ST II-II 180, articles 3, 6 and 7. 
 
6 Sic igitur vita contemplativa unum quidem actum habet in quo finaliter perficitur, scilicet 
contemplationem veritatis , a quo habet unitatem. ST II-II 180, 3. 
 
7 In NE X 10, 2097; In Met I 1, 35 ; In Met I 2, 47-51 See also: Commentary on the “De Trinitate”o f 
Boethius, Questions V and VI.  
 
8 ST II-II 180, 4. 
 
9 Principaliter quidem ad vitam contemplativam pertinet contemplatio divinae veritatis; quia huiusmodi 
contemplatio est finis totius humanae vitae.  ST II-II 180, 4. 
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even though principally contemplative life is devoted to the contemplation of God, in a 
secondary way contemplation of God’s effects, i.e. created things around us, also belongs 
to the contemplative life, for it guides us to the knowledge of God. Thomas says: “Since, 
however, God’s effects show us the way to the contemplation of God Himself…it follows 
that the contemplation of the divine effects also belongs to the contemplative life, 
inasmuch as man is guided thereby to the knowledge of God.”10 This should not be 
interpreted as meaning that we have to practice contemplation on earth in order to do it 
well in heaven. (What we need to do in order to attain heavenly happiness is to develop 
virtues, and especially to love one another.) What Thomas means is that when we study 
and contemplate created things, if we do it right, we will eventually be led to discovery of 
truths about God. He says:  
Now in itself the very order of things is such, that God is knowable and 
lovable for Himself, since He is essentially truth and goodness itself, 
whereby other things are known and loved: but with regard to us, since our 
knowledge is derived through the senses, those things are knowable first, 
which are nearer to our senses, and the last term of knowledge is that 
which is most remote from our senses.11     
                                                 
10 Sed quia per divinos effectus in Dei contemplationem manuducimur … inde est quod etiam contemplatio 
divinorum effectuum secundario ad vitam contemplativam pertinet, prout scilicet ex hoc manuducitur homo 
in Dei cognitionem.  ST II-II 180, 4.  
 
Also: “Our natural knowledge begins from sense. Hence our natural knowledge can go as far as it can be 
led by sensible things. But our mind cannot be led by sense so far as to see the essence of God; because the 
sensible effects of God do not equal the power of God as their cause . Hence from the knowledge of 
sensible things the whole power of God cannot be known; nor therefore can His essence be seen. But 
because they are His effects and depend on their cause, we can be led from them so far as to know of God 
whether He exists, and to know of Him what must necessarily belong to Him, as the first cause of all 
things, exceeding all things caused by Him.”    
 
Dicendum quod naturalis nostra cognitio a sensu principium sumit; unde tantum se nostra naturalis cognitio 
extendere potest, inquantum manuduci potest per sensibilia. Ex sensibilibus autem non potest usque ad hoc 
intellectus noster pertingere quod divinam essentiam videat; quia creaturae sensibiles sunt effectus Dei 
virtutem causae non adaequantes. Unde ex sensibilium cognitione non potest tota Dei virtus cognosci et per 
consequens nec eius essentia videri. Sed quia sunt eius effectus a causa dependentes, ex eis in hoc perduci 
possumus ut cognoscamus de Deo an est; et ut cognoscamus de ipso ea quae necesse est ei convenire 
secundum quod est prima omnium causa, excedens omnia sua causata.  ST I 12, 12.   
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And he concludes that we come to know God through learning about created things. God 
is knowable, but the acquisition of knowledge depends on the nature of the knower12 and 
since humans have to gain their knowledge by learning about the sensible things, it is that 
human way of gaining knowledge that would eventually lead humans to the knowledge 
of God, in earthly life. Thus in earthly life, we may contemplate other objects, besides 
God.  
Thomas also considers the claim that contemplation of any truth and not only 
divine truth perfects the human intellect.13 Thomas says that indeed knowledge of any 
truth makes the human intellect more perfect: “The ultimate perfection of the human 
intellect is the divine truth: and other truths perfect the intellect in relation to divine 
truth.”14 Thus, while it is best to contemplate divine truth, contemplation of any truth is 
good. And in view of the fact that on earth what we know of divine truth we can know 
only in a vague way, “through a glass and in a dark manner”,15 it follows that 
contemplation of divine effects on earth is very helpful in trying to learn more about the 
causes of these effects, which eventually leads us to the first cause (provided that a given 
person would continue her reflections that far).  
                                                                                                                                                 
11 Est autem ipse ordo rerum talis secundum se quod Deus est propter seipsum cognoscibilis et diligibilis, 
utpote essentialiter existens ipsa veritas et bonitas, per quam alia et cognoscuntur et amantur. Sed quoad 
nos, quia nostra cognitio a sensu ortum habet, prius sunt cognoscibilia quae sunt sensui propinquiora; et 
ultimus terminus cognitionis est in eo quod est maxime a sensu remotum. ST II-II 27, 4.     
 
12 ST II-II 27, 4 ;  See also:  ST I 12, 4 and 11;  ST I 85,1.  
 
13 ST II-II 180, 4 Obj. 4. 
 
14 Dicendum quod ultima perfectio humani intellectus est veritas divina: aliae autem veritates perficiunt 
intellectum in ordine ad veritatem divinam.  ST II-II 180, 4 ad 4. 
 
15 Per speculum et in aenigmate  ST II-II 180, 4.  
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Furthermore we learn about God by reflecting about the material objects, by 
considering their characteristics and their causes. Thus, even if we are one day to engage 
in the most exalted contemplation, we must begin humbly by gaining some knowledge 
about the things around us. Some objects might be attractive to us and cause us to 
wonder. We say that we find those things interesting. By reflecting about them and by 
learning more about them, we might also come to understand some truth which we might 
contemplate. Thus, we may also contemplate the truths of created things.  
Therefore, Aquinas tells us that although strictly speaking we ought to 
contemplate the ultimate truth, which is God,16  we may also contemplate truths about 
created things which are God’s effects and thus be led to the contemplation of their First 
Cause.17  As the ultimate Truth is God, the object to which all our contemplation 
eventually leads is God. One could say that all objects of contemplation converge on 
God.  
How we contemplate 
Our perfect happiness, according to Aquinas, is the Beatific Vision, that is, the 
intellectual vision of God in heaven.18 The human intellect cannot attain the Beatific 
Vision by its own power, but only by the grace of God.19 In our earthly life, the Beatific 
Vision, and thus perfect happiness, is not possible at all.20 On earth we may enjoy 
                                                 
16 ST I 16, 5; ST II-II 180, 4. 
 
17 ST II-II 180, 4. 
 
18 ST I-II 3, 8.    
 
19 ST I 12, 11.    
 
20 ST I 12, 11; ST II-II 180, 5. 
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imperfect happiness, which would principally consist of contemplation.21 That 
imperfect happiness of earthly contemplation we can attain by the use of our own powers.   
The human way of gathering knowledge involves the use of senses and arriving at 
understanding through reasoning. On earth our intellectual operations depend on our 
bodies, and in particular our senses and the phantasms produced on the basis of sensory 
perception. Whatever we contemplate, our contemplation on earth involves the use of 
phantasms. 22 On earth, we can contemplate God only indirectly, in a mediated way.      
On earth, we may contemplate truths about created things. And it must be noted 
that since we cannot contemplate God as He is seen in heaven, we must always begin our 
contemplation with something found in this world, in fact, with some sensible object. 
And that is so because we are animals and not merely rational creatures. Thomas says: 
“The proper object of the human intellect, which is united to the body, is a quiddity or 
nature existing in corporeal matter; and through such natures of visible things it rises to a 
certain knowledge of things invisible.”23 Since a human being is a kind of animal, it is 
designed to know corporeal objects. But as a rational creature, a human being can use the 
knowledge of material things to learn something about the immaterial ones.24    
Because we are a certain kind of animal, contemplation of any truth in this life 
requires us to go through a lengthy process of perceiving, learning, reasoning and finally, 
                                                 
 
21 ST I-II 3, 5. 
    
22 ST I 84, 7;  ST I-II 5, 1; ST II-II 180, 5 ad 2. 
 
23 Intellectus autem humani, qui est coniunctus corpori, proprium obiectum est quidditas sive natura in 
materia corporali existens; et per huiusmodi naturas visibilium rerum etiam in invisibilium rerum aliqualem 
cognitionem ascendit. ST I 84, 7. 
 
24 ST I 88, 2; ST I 84, 7 ad 3. 
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arriving at understanding of some truth. Thomas contrasts our manner of 
contemplation with that of angels 25 Angels perceive the truth immediately by a simple 
act of apprehension. 26 We must arrive at the perception of truth by ratiocination. And, as 
was said above, even before we can start deducing any conclusions from any premises, 
we must go through a process which begins with sensory perception of material objects 
and ends with the formation of concepts, which we can then use to formulate premises. 
This laborious way of arriving at the understanding of truth is necessary for us because of 
our animality, which requires sensory input in order to make thinking possible. 
Formulation of concepts and reasoning is necessary for us because we are boundary 
beings, both, rational and animal, endowed with an immaterial, incorporeal intellect and 
an animal body and the sensitive soul. Angels contemplate God uniformly and 
unceasingly,27 while humans in this life can engage in contemplation only for limited 
intervals of time, during which we withdraw our attention from any external objects, stop 
thinking discursively, and concentrate on the simple truth which is the object of our 
contemplation. And even that simple truth cannot be God as such, as we would see Him 
in heaven, for we cannot see God in our present life.  
As was mentioned above, in the life to come, we will be able to gaze upon God 
directly and to do so unceasingly, but that will be because of God’s grace,28 not by our 
own powers. Our own powers are those of a rational animal. Because of our animality, 
                                                 
 
25 ST II-II 180, 3 and 6. 
 
26 ST II-II 180, 6. 
 
27 ST II-II 180, 6 ad 2. 
 
28 ST I 12, 4; ST I-II 5, 5 and 6. 
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we do not have the capacity for simple apprehension of truth, and that puts us at a 
disadvantage next to angels. However, we should note that when that impediment is 
removed by God’s grace in heaven, we will be able to apprehend truth without recourse 
to discursive reasoning. We will be able to enjoy God on the level of intellect, and to 
experience contemplation as delightful even with our senses and our bodies.29 Enjoying 
contemplation in a sensual way in addition to rational enjoyment is a delight of which 
angels are not capable, but we are, because we are animals, albeit rational animals.          
We cannot ever fully understand what we contemplate 
In heaven, we are able to contemplate God directly, in the Beatific Vision, while 
on earth we are able contemplate God indirectly by the power of the human intellect only. 
The Beatific Vision is not possible in this life.30 That is because “the mode of knowledge 
follows the mode of the nature of the knower.” 31 and human nature is such that the soul 
is joined to the body and because of that we must begin with knowing material, sensible 
things, and then derive certain conclusions from the knowledge of those things. Thomas 
says: “But our soul, as long as we live in this life, has its being in corporeal matter; hence 
naturally it knows only what has a form in matter, or what can be known by such a 
form.”32 We cannot know the essence of God through the natures of material things.33 
                                                 
 
29 ST I-II 4, 5 and 6. 
 
30 ST I 12, 11; ST I-II 5, 3. 
 
31 Modus cognitionis sequitur modum naturae rei cognoscentis. ST I 12, 11. 
 
32 Anima autem nostra, quamdiu in hac vita vivimus, habet esse in materia corporali; unde naturaliter non 
cogniscit aliqua nisi quae habent formam in materia, vel quae per huiusmodi cogniscit possunt. ST I 12, 11. 
 
33 ST I 88, 1 and 2.       
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Thus, we cannot know the essence of God on earth; we can only know various 
attributes of God.  
In heaven, the beatified contemplate God. But even in heaven the human intellect 
by itself is not able to comprehend God. No creature is able to comprehend God. God is 
infinite and the Creator of all, and as such cannot be comprehended by any of His finite 
creatures. Thomas says: “It is impossible for any created intellect to comprehend God.”34 
It is impossible to comprehend God even for those who are enjoying the Beatific Vision. 
It is impossible to comprehend God even for the angels. It is impossible to comprehend 
God for any created intellect because a creature is finite and dependent on the Creator, 
whereas the Creator is infinite and is the source of all creatures.  
Comprehension has two meanings, according to Thomas. In a strict sense, to 
comprehend something means that we know that something perfectly i.e., that we know it 
“as far as it can be known.”35 Since every creature is finite, while God is infinite, no finite 
creature can comprehend the infinite God, no creature can know God as fully as God can 
be known. But comprehension also may mean that we attain something, that we “catch” 
something. In that sense, created intellects may be said to comprehend God, that is they 
may see God and thus possess God as present.36 In that second sense of comprehension as 
attainment, human intellect comprehends God in the Beatific Vision in heaven. However, 
it does not attain Beatific Vision by its own powers.   
                                                 
 
34 Dicendum quod comprehendere Deum impossibile est cuicumque intellectui creato. ST I 12, 7.  
                  
35 And that is perfectly known which is known as far as it can be known.   
 
Perfecte autem cognoscitur, quod tantum cognoscitur, quantum est cognoscibile. Ibid.       
 
36 Ibid.      
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It is beyond the power of any created intellect to know God in the absence of 
grace.37  “It is impossible for any created intellect to see the essence of God by its own 
natural power.”38 That is because the mode of knowledge depends on the nature of the 
knower, as was mentioned above. Only God is capable of knowing Godself, of knowing 
fully God’s essence. Only divine intellect can know itself by its own power.39  No created 
intellect is able to know the essence of God by its creature powers.    
Nevertheless, created intellects – angels and the saints in heaven – can see the 
essence of God, thanks to God’s grace. (God’s grace allows even a human intellect to 
possess knowledge of God.)40  It is not full comprehension, but knowledge in a sense of 
grasping, understanding the essence of God. Thomas says: “Therefore, he who sees 
God’s essence, sees in Him that He exists infinitely, and is infinitely knowable; 
nevertheless, this infinite mode does not extend to enable the knower to know 
infinitely.”41                         
Knowing the essence of God becomes possible for the human intellect, because 
by the grace of God, the divine essence itself becomes the intelligible form, which 
informs a human intellect: “But when any created intellect sees the essence of God, the 
essence of God itself becomes the intelligible form of the intellect.”42 Human intellect has 
                                                 
 
37 ST I 12, articles 4, 5 and 7. 
 
38 Dicendum quod impossibile est quod aliquis intellectus creatus per sua naturalia essentiam Dei videat. 
ST I 12, 4.  
 
39 ST I 12, 4;  See also: SCG III 52. 
                  
40 ST I 12, articles 5 and 13; ST I-II 5, 5.  
 
41 Qui igitur videt Deum per essentiam, videt hoc in eo, quod infinite existit et infinite cognoscibilis est: sed 
hic infinitus modus non competit et ut scilicet ipse infinite cognoscat. ST I 12, 7 ad 3. 
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to be informed by the intelligible species of things it comes to know; in the Beatific 
Vision, human intellect is informed by the intelligible form which is the essence of 
God.43      
In order to receive that intelligible form which is the essence of God, the human 
intellect has to be changed in its disposition, it has to be made fit for the reception of 
God’s essence. “Again, nothing is receptive of a more sublime form unless it be elevated 
by means of a disposition to the capacity for this form, for a proper act is produced in a 
proper potency.”44  The power of a human intellect must be strengthened. But it cannot 
be strengthened merely by intensification, because the knowledge of God is a knowledge 
of a different type than the knowledge of things for which human intellect has a natural 
disposition. Therefore, the human intellect must acquire a new disposition.45 This 
supernatural, higher than natural disposition can be received only by divine grace. 
Thomas calls this new, higher than natural disposition “the light of glory”: “Therefore, 
this disposition whereby the created intellect is raised to the intellectual vision of divine 
substance is fittingly called the light of glory; not because it makes some object actually 
intelligible, as does the light of the agent intellect, but because it makes the intellect 
actually powerful enough to understand.”46 The divine grace by which a human intellect 
                                                                                                                                                 
42 Cum autem aliquis intellectus creatus videt Deum per essentiam, ipsa essentia Dei fit forma intelligibilis 
intellectus. ST I 12, 5. 
 
43 ST I 12, 4 ad 2; SCG III 52 and 53. 
 
44 Adhuc. Nihil est susceptivum formae sublimioris nisi per aliquam dispositionem ad illius capacitatem 
elevetur: proprius enim actus in propria potentia fit. SCG III 53, 3. 
 
45 SCG III 53, 5. 
 
46 Illa igitur dispositio qua intellectus creatus ad intellectualem divinae substantiae visionem extollitur, 
congrue lux gloraie dicitur: non propter hoc quod faciat intelligibile in actu, sicut lux intellectus agentis; 
sed per hoc quod facit intellectum potentem actu intelligere. SCG III 53, 6  See also: ST I 12, 5. 
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is enabled to attain the Beatific Vision is called “the light of glory”. The Beatific 
Vision is the immediate intellectual vision of the essence of God.       
Not all people will possess equal knowledge of God in heaven. The saints are not 
equally knowledgeable, or equally happy in a sense that there are grades of knowledge, 
happiness and perfection among them.47 “Now, that one man enjoys God more than 
another, happens through his being better disposed or ordered to the enjoyment of Him. 
And in this sense one man can be happier than another.” 48 However, each receives 
according to his/her nature and his/her merit and in that sense each possesses the fullness 
of happiness when he/she is admitted to the enjoyment of the Beatific Vision.49 “Hence 
the intellect which has more of the light of glory will see God the more perfectly; and he 
will have a fuller participation of the light of glory who has more charity” 50  As was 
explained above, the light of glory is the supernatural disposition by which a human 
intellect is enabled to see, to know God. Those who will receive more of the light of 
glory will be those who have more charity, which is the love of God. Those who love 
God more, will be also allowed to know more of God in his essence. In heaven our 
potential for knowing God will be fulfilled with respect to our capacity, although no 
creature can ever know God completely.      
                                                 
 
47 ST I 12, 6; ST I-II 5, 2. 
 
48 Contingit autem aliquem perfectius frui Deo quam alium, ex eo quod est melius dispositus vel ordinatus 
ad eius fruitionem. Et secundum hoc potest aliquis alio beatior esse. ST I-II 5, 2.       
 
49 ST I 12, 6; ST I-II 5, 2.  
 
50 Unde intellectus plus participans de lumine gloriae, perfectius Deum videbit. Plus autem participabit de 
lumine gloriae, qui plus habet de caritate. ST I 12, 6.  
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Because the object worthy of our contemplation exceeds our capacity for 
comprehension, contemplation is accompanied by admiration (admiratio).51  “Admiration 
is a kind of fear resulting from the apprehension of a thing that surpasses our faculties: 
hence it results from the contemplation of the sublime truth.”52 This admiration (also 
translated sometimes as “wonder”, or as “amazement”), which occurs in the face of 
something which surpasses our capacity for comprehension, applies to both the perfect 
contemplation in heaven and the imperfect contemplation in earthly life.53 Admiration or 
wonder is felt by us when we come upon something which is unknown, or which 
surpasses our capacity for understanding.54 What we can find out about God through our 
reason alone is very little, for we can only know that God is, but not what God is.55 Those 
who, through grace receive the vision of God while they are still living on earth cannot 
know God fully, although their knowledge exceeds what human reason can know about 
God naturally.56 And even those who contemplate God in heaven cannot know God in 
                                                 
 
51 Pieper, Josef, Happiness and Contemplation, tr. Richard and Clara Winston,  South Bend, Indiana: St. 
Augustine’s Press, 1998, p.75.   
 
52 Dicendum quod admiratio est species timoris consequens apprehensionem alicuius rei excedentis 
nostrum facultatem. Unde admiratio est actus consequens contemplationem sublimis veritatis. ST II-II 180, 
3 ad 3.  
 
53 This contemplation will be perfect in the life to come, when we shall see God face to face, wherefore it 
will make us perfectly happy: Whereas now the contemplation of the divine truth is competent to us 
imperfectly, namely through a glass and in a dark manner.  
 
Quae [contemplatio] quidem in futura vita erit perfecta, quando videbimus eum facie ad faciem: unde et 
perfecte beatos faciet. Nunc autem contemplatio divinae veritatis competit nobis imperfecte, videlicet per 
speculum et in aenigmate. ST II-II 180, 4.    
 
54 Est autem admiratio desiderium quodam sciendi, quod in homine contingit ex hoc quod videt effectum et 
ignorat causam, vel ex hoc quod causa talis effectus excedit cognitionem aut facultatem ipsius.ST I-II 32, 8. 
 
55 ST I 12, 12. 
 
56 ST I 12, 13;  ST II-II 175, 1 and 180, 5. 
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His whole being, because no finite intellect can comprehend the infinite God, as was 
explained above. Thus, the contemplation of God is always accompanied by admiration, 
or wonder, or amazement.  
Those who engage in ordinary contemplation on earth and contemplate God can 
know God only through the power of their reason, and that is not sufficient to know 
God’s essence. Aquinas tells us that using natural reason to study the created world, we 
can come to understand that God exists and to know His attributes, but we cannot know 
what God is.57 But even to get some knowledge of God by natural reason, we need God’s 
help. Aquinas tells us: “The knowledge which we have by natural reason contains two 
things: images derived from the sensible objects; and the natural intelligible light, 
enabling us to abstract from them intelligible conceptions. Now in both of these, human 
knowledge is assisted by the revelation of grace.”58 Human reason derives its knowledge 
from sensible objects, through the formation of phantasms and intelligible concepts and 
those are impediments to seeing the Divine Essence, because God is not a sensible 
object.59 Thus, we may come to know something about God, but we cannot know what 
God is. Those who contemplate God on earth are aware that their object of contemplation 
far exceeds their capacity for comprehension. As they try to learn more about God, they 
also realize better their own limitations, and thus amazement and admiration attach to the 
contemplation of God.  
                                                 
 
57 ST I 12, 12. 
 
58 Cognitio enim quam per naturalem rationem habemus, duo requirit: scilicet, phantasmata ex sensibilibus 
accepta, et lumen naturale intelligibile, cuius virtute intelligibiles conceptiones ab eis abstrahimus. Et 
quantum ad utrumque iuvatur humana cognitio per revelationem gratiae. ST I 12, 13. 
 
59 ST I 3;  ST II-II 175, 4 and 5; ST II-II 180, 5.  
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But at least we could hope that those who engage in the study of metaphysics, 
mathematics, or natural philosophy, and contemplate truths concerning created things 
rather than God may fully comprehend the object of their contemplation. Aquinas does 
allow that the contemplation of God’s effects counts as contemplation, for the effects 
ought to lead us to their Cause.60 Aquinas does not address this particular question, but it 
seems to me that he would say that even these contemplatives would feel amazement and 
know that they could not fully understand the object of their contemplation. For as they 
would contemplate some truth about things of this world, they would realize that there is 
still something they do not know about it, they would wonder.61   They could never get to 
understand the first cause of the object they contemplate until they arrive at the First 
Cause, who is God, and nobody can fully comprehend God. Thomas says: 
“Consequently, when man knows an effect, and knows that it has a cause there naturally 
remains in man the desire to know about that cause, what it is. And this desire is one of 
wonder, and causes inquiry… Consenquently, for perfect happiness the intellect needs to 
reach the very Essence of the First Cause.”62  Thus, even those who contemplate objects 
belonging to physics or metaphysics, rather than theology, would not be able fully satiate 
their desire for knowledge until their wondering led them to God. Then their desire to 
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62 Et ideo remanet naturaliter homini desiderium, cum cognoscit effectum, et scit eum habere causam, ut 
etiam sciat de causa quid est. Et illud desiderium est admirationis, et causat inquisitionem…Ad perfectam 
igitur beatitudinem requiritur quod intellectus pertingat ad ipsam essentiam primae causae. ST I-II 3, 8.         
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know the cause would be fulfilled, but the object of their contemplation would forever 
remain not completely known.63           
Thus, contemplation, whether on earth or in heaven, whether centering on God or 
on God’s creation, is necessarily accompanied by admiration caused by the limitations of 
human capacity for knowing, by the fact that human knowledge has to be derived from 
the knowledge of sensible objects, and by the fact that humans are finite beings and 
therefore unable to fully comprehend the First Cause who is God. The object of our 
contemplation is always beyond our full comprehension.    
Why contemplation makes us happy 
Aquinas tells us that contemplation is the essence of our happiness, both here on 
earth and in heaven. Aquinas says that the reason why the vision of God, contemplation 
of God in heaven, makes us happy is because then we shall know the essence of the First 
Cause: “For perfect happiness the intellect needs to reach the very Essence of the First 
Cause.”64 The object of the intellect is the quiddity, or the essence of material things,65 
and so, our knowledge has to be derived from material things in the sense that we must 
begin with the study of material things around us. The pursuit of knowledge begins with 
wonder.66 Wonder leads to inquiry about the causes of things.  According to Aquinas, to 
know something is to know it through its causes, to know why it is so and not 
                                                 
 
63 ST I 12.   
 
64 Ad perfectam…beatitudinem requiritur quod intellectus pertingat ad ipsam essentiam primae causae. ST 
I-II 3, 8. 
 
65 ST I 84, 7. 
 
66 ST I-II 32, 8. 
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otherwise.67 To attain perfect knowledge, the intellect has to penetrate beyond sensible 
qualities to the essence of the cause itself.68 When the intellect grasps the essence of the 
cause of things, the intellect attains its completion.69 Everything desires its own 
perfection, and so does the intellect, and achieves it when it knows the essence of the 
cause. The very First Cause is God. Knowing that God is the First Cause is an imperfect 
knowledge. Knowing God and thus knowing the very essence of that First Cause is a 
perfect knowledge. In attaining perfect knowledge, the intellect achieves its own 
perfection.  
Thus, contemplation of God in heaven makes us happy because in attaining the 
knowledge of the essence of the First Cause we attain perfect knowledge, and we achieve 
the perfection of our intellect. Earthly contemplation involves less than perfect 
knowledge. Aquinas distinguishes between perfect and imperfect happiness, 
corresponding to the heavenly and earthly contemplation.70 Even though the object of our 
contemplation – whether God Himself, or even some truth about creation – always eludes 
our understanding, contemplation is the essence of our happiness, because it perfects our 
intellect.  
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Traits of happiness 
Aquinas says that we all want happiness and we always act for the sake of that 
end, which is our final end.71  All creatures always act for an end72 and all their actions 
ultimately are guided by their final end and their greatest good,73 which in case of human 
beings is called “happiness”. Thomas says: “Happiness means the acquisition of the last 
end”.74 Thus, all we ever do we do because we want to attain happiness.  
Thomas was familiar with Aristotle’s writings on happiness and often refers to 
them in his texts.75 He agrees with Aristotle’s view of the traits of happiness. Happiness 
is our greatest good, self-sufficient and complete, a good we pursue for its own sake.76 
Happiness is a self-sufficient good, i.e., a happy person has everything she needs and 
does not need anything else. If they needed something else they would not yet be 
happy.77 Happiness is the attainment of our greatest and our final good, since if there 
were something we might add to what we possess, we would not yet possess happiness.78 
Since, according to Aquinas and Aristotle, we always act for the sake of some good and 
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ultimately we act for the sake of the greatest good,79 it follows that we always act for 
the sake of happiness. (We shall see later that Aquinas provides a metaphysical 
explanation of why this is so when he talks about inclinations proper to each kind of a 
being.) Thomas says:” Therefore, that is absolutely perfect which is always desirable for 
itself and never for another. But happiness appears to be of this nature, for we never seek 
it for something else but always for itself.”80 We seek other things because we think they 
will bring us closer to happiness. Even honor, knowledge and virtue, Aquinas says, we 
choose because we believe that by possessing them we will be happy. But happiness as 
such we seek for its own sake. Happiness, then, is something for the sake of which we do 
other things.81  
Thomas, in agreement with Aristotle, concludes that human happiness consists 
essentially of contemplation. Contemplation as an intellectual activity is an activity of a 
rational being, and so becomes humans qua rational beings. Rationality is the supreme 
trait of a human being, it is what differentiates us from other animals. Human happiness 
ought to be an activity which is characteristic of humans82 and therefore the activity of 
the rational kind. Such an activity is contemplation of truth,83 for two reasons: first, 
because rationality is the supreme trait of a human being, and second, because the objects 
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of contemplation are the highest of all the objects that can be known. Furthermore, 
according to Aristotle, rationality is that which is most divine in us.84 Thomas agrees, but 
with respect to “something divine” he adds that humans possess rationality because they 
are made in the image of God.85 Thus, contemplation is the supreme activity a human 
being is capable of, and the activity of which human happiness consists.86    
 Thomas and Aristotle also point out that contemplation can be the most 
continuous of activities.87 Happiness is something in which we wish to continue forever, 
so the activity of which happiness consists must be the kind of activity which may be 
continuous, and that is contemplation. Contemplation is also the most pleasant of all 
activities, for intellectual pleasures are greater than bodily ones.88 Self-sufficiency is 
found in contemplation, and that is another trait of happiness.89 Aristotle also points out 
that contemplation requires leisure, and since we labor in order to enjoy leisure, 
contemplation belongs to that better part of life which is rest and leisure.90 Finally, 
contemplation is something in which we engage for its own sake and not because it is 
useful for something else: “Now happiness is so desirable in itself that it is never sought 
for the sake of anything else…But this is evident only in the contemplation of wisdom 
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which is loved for itself and not for something else.”91 That, above all, shows that 
contemplation must be what human happiness consists of.   
Thus, we know general characteristics of happiness, and we know that the highest 
happiness is contemplation. Aquinas, again following Aristotle, also shows that nothing 
else but contemplation could be our happiness. He gives us a negative analysis through 
which we find out what happiness must be because of what it cannot be.  
Happiness is contemplation of God 
All people want happiness and all pursue it. Many people search for happiness in 
the form of wealth, power, or pleasure. Thomas considers whether they are searching for 
happiness in the right places. He does not think that these goods can be the essence of 
happiness, although they may be helpful for the attaining of happiness. In the case of 
external goods, like wealth, power or glory, Thomas observes that they can be used for 
good or evil, while the supreme good – which is happiness – excludes all evil.92 Also, 
external goods cannot completely satisfy us, for we may want still more of them and 
more of many other goods. In this way, they do not fulfill the self-sufficiency 
requirement of happiness.93 Thomas also points out that wealth has only instrumental 
value,94 and that honor or glory, if accorded to a deserving person, are only a testament to 
that person’s excellence and thus one would have to pursue excellence as an end, rather 
                                                 
91 ST II-II 182, 1; Felicitas est ita per se appetibilis, quod nullo modo appetitur propter aliud. Hoc autem 
apparet in sola speculatione sapientiae, quod propter seipsam diligatur, et non propter aliud.  IN NE X 10, 
2097; NE X 1177b1-4;  See also: ST II-II 182, 1.            
 
92 ST I-II 2, 4.  
 
93 Ibid. 
 
94 ST I-II 2, 1. 
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than honor or glory. But the most excellent activity is contemplation of truth, of which 
happiness consists, and which may only incidentally bring us honor or glory.95 That 
brings us to the next group of candidates for happiness, which are the goods of the body 
and soul, such as health, beauty or virtue.  
Some people may pursue happiness as their own excellence, thus treating 
themselves as the supreme good and the final end. Thomas objects to this on 
metaphysical grounds. Our actions are directed to an end, towards some object, and 
through our actions and through that object we actualize ourselves. But those objects are 
exterior to ourselves, and thus we are not able to make ourselves happy by ourselves 
without the help of something external to us. Therefore, something external to us must be 
the object which makes us happy. According to Thomas that object is God.96  
Through their actions human beings, like any created beings, actualize their 
potency. That actualization of potency is the attainment of perfection. Creatures may 
attain perfection in some respect and not in others, and there may be gradations of 
perfection.  
    In the case of bodily perfection, that is bodily goods such as health or strength, 
Thomas notes that in a human being, the body exists for the good of the soul, and not 
vice-versa, and thus bodily goods cannot be the supreme good and the final end of a 
human being.97 Bodily perfection is good, but it cannot be our greatest good.  
                                                 
95 ST I-II 2, 2 and 3. 
 
96 ST I 103, 2; ST I-II 2, 5; ST I-II 2, 7; ST I-II 3, 2. 
 
97 ST I-II 2, 5. 
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 Perfection of a human soul, i.e. becoming an excellent, virtuous person, is 
considered by some to be the ultimate end worthy of pursuing for its own sake.  
But according to Thomas, we pursue our happiness through our souls (and for that we 
need to have excellent souls), but the soul itself cannot be its own final end, because it 
cannot actualize itself by itself. (As was mentioned above, one actualizes oneself through 
actions directed towards external objects.) Actualization means attainment of perfection. 
The soul achieves its perfection only when it sees God in the Beatific Vision.98 No 
created soul can attain the Beatific Vision by its own powers.99 Therefore, we cannot 
perfect ourselves by ourselves, for we are actualized only when we behold God. Thomas 
says: “Happiness is something belonging to the soul; but that which constitutes happiness 
is something outside of the soul” 100 That something outside is God.  
To say that things try to get actualized means that they try to attain their proper 
goodness according to their nature or that they try to achieve their perfection. In case of 
rational beings, perfection means happiness. Thomas says: “Happiness is man’s supreme 
perfection.”101 And he continues: “Now each thing is perfect in so far as it is actual”102 
Thus, happiness implies perfection, which implies actualization.   
For creatures, actualization requires actions and operations characteristic of them, 
as certain kinds of beings.103 Only God who is being itself can be happy simply because 
                                                 
98 ST I-II 3, 8. 
 
99 ST I 12, 4. 
 
100 Beatitudo est aliquid animae; sed in quo consistit beatitudo, est aliquid extra animam. ST I-II 2, 7. 
 
101 Beatitudo ultima hominis perfectio. ST I-II 3, 2. 
 
102 Unumquodque autem intentum perfectum est, inquantum est actu.  Ibid.                   
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He is, and he does not attain happiness by any action or operation. The perfection of a 
human being is primarily the perfection of the rational soul, for it is rationality which 
makes us different from other animals.104  Thus, human happiness ultimately consists in 
an operation of the speculative intellect.105 Aquinas defines happiness as an intellectual 
activity.106 That operation of the speculative intellect which constitutes our ultimate 
happiness is direct contemplation of God i.e., the Beatific Vision.  
If happiness is an operation of the speculative intellect, then one could ask 
whether happiness consists in the consideration of speculative sciences. Thomas 
considers that question 107 and answers that we are led to the speculative sciences by the 
knowledge we acquire through our senses, the knowledge of material things. But the 
human intellect cannot be perfected by something lower than itself, namely, material 
things. The human intellect must attain perfection through knowledge of something 
above it: “For a thing is not perfected by something lower, except in so far as the lower 
partakes of something higher.”108 The human intellect must be ultimately perfected by 
that which is the highest, i.e. God, and so, the study of speculative sciences cannot be the 
essence of human happiness. However, Thomas acknowledges that to a certain extent we 
may find happiness in the study of speculative sciences; to the extent that our thinking 
                                                                                                                                                 
103 ST I-II 5, 7. 
 
104 ST I-II 3, 5; In NE I 10, 126.                  
 
105 ST I-II 3, 2; 3, 2 ad 4; 3, 5. 
 
106 ST I-II 3. 
 
107 ST I-II 3, 6.  
 
108 Non enim aliquid perficitur ab aliquo inferiori, nisi secundum quod in inferiori est aliqua participatio 
suprioris.  ST I-II 3, 6. 
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about God may be similar to the contemplation of God: “However, just as in sensible 
forms there is a participation of the higher substances, so the consideration of speculative 
sciences is a certain participation of true and perfect happiness.”109           
Thus, according to Aquinas, what makes us happy must be something outside the 
soul, and something uncreated, which can perfect human intellect.110 God obviously is 
not a created good, and it is through God that we can be perfected. Thus, God must be 
what makes us happy. According to Thomas, happiness is found only in the Beatific 
Vision of God in heaven.111 Although some people seek happiness in earthly goods, 
Thomas says again and again that they are mistaken. No created good constitutes human 
happiness: “Now the object of the will, i.e., of man’s appetite, is the universal good; just 
as the object of the intellect is the universal true. Hence, it is evident that naught can lull 
man’s will, save the universal good. This is to be found not in any creature, but in God 
alone.”112 Universal good, according to Aquinas, is God. Goodness is what created beings 
like us desire, since they desire being and perfection.113 Thus, the final end of our actions 
is goodness.114 Every created being possess goodness only by participation,115 therefore 
                                                 
109 Sed sicut in formis sensibilibus participatur aliqua similitudo substantiarum superiorum, ita consideratio 
scientiarum speculativarum est quaedam participatio verae et perfectae beatitudinis. Ibid.                               
 
110 ST I-II 3, 1and  2. 
 
111 ST I-II 3, 8. 
 
112 Obiectum autem voluntatis, quae est appetitus humanus, est universale bonum; sicut obiectum 
intellectus est universale verum. Ex quo patet quod nihil potest quietare voluntatem hominis, nisi bonum 
universale. Quod non invenitur in aliquot creato, sed solum in Deo.  ST I-II 2, 8.              
 
113 ST I 4, 2 (perfection); ST I 5, 4 (desire for good).          
 
114 ST I 5, 4. 
 
115 ST I 6, 3 and 4.                     
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no created good can fully satisfy human longing, and thus no created good can be our 
final end or constitute our happiness. The supreme good, and therefore our final end, is 
God.116 Therefore, we want God, because God is Good Itself.  
As the good is what the appetite tends to, truth is what the intellect tends to.117 
Truth itself is God. Thomas says: “For His being is not only conformed to His intellect, 
but it is the very act of His intellect; and His act of understanding is the measure and 
cause of every other being and of every other intellect, and He Himself is His own 
existence and act of understanding. Whence it follows not only that truth is in Him, but 
that He is truth itself, and the sovereign and first truth. “118 Thus, we want God because 
we want truth, good and perfection that is the fullness of being, and those we find in the 
highest degree in God. Thomas concludes that only God can be our happiness.119   
 Yet even that happiness in heaven is only a participation in God’s happiness. Only 
God Himself is happy simply because He is. We are happy by participation in God’s 
happiness.120 We participate in God’s happiness when we contemplate God. We can find 
                                                 
116 ST I 6, 2.  
 
117 ST I 16, 1.  
 
118 Nam esse suum non solum est conforme suo intellectui, sed etiam est ipsum suum intelligere; et suum 
inteligere est mensura et cause omnis alterius esse, et omnis alterius intellectus; et ipse est suum esse et 
intelligere. Unde sequitur quod non solum in ipso sit veritas, sed quod ipse sit ipsa summa et prima veritas. 
ST I 16, 5.               
 
119 ST I-II 2, 8. 
 
120 God is happiness by His Essence: for He is happy not by acquisition or participation of something else, 
but by His Essence. On the other had, men are happy … by participation.   
 
Dicendum quod Deus est beatitudo per essentiam suam; non enim per adeptionem aut participationem 
alicuius alterius beatus est, sed per essentiam suam. Homines autem sunt beati…per participationem.  ST I-
II 3, 1 ad.1 See also: ST I-II 3, 2 ad 4.  
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happiness only in the Beatific Vision of God in heaven: “Final and perfect happiness 
can consist in nothing else than the vision of Divine Essence”.121       
Rational animal in heaven  
 The purpose of the above discussion was to present, very briefly, the standard 
view of human happiness as contemplation of God in heaven, and of the imperfect 
happiness as contemplation of God on earth. I do not argue with that standard view. But I 
will now add to it what Aquinas says about the role which the operations of the sensitive 
soul play in our contemplation.      
According to Thomas Aquinas, our animal bodies will be resurrected in a 
glorified state, but still as material bodies, identical with our earthly bodies but without 
any imperfections.122 Thus after the resurrection, the saints who contemplate God will be 
complete, embodied human beings. As far as the object of their contemplation is 
concerned, i.e., God, the enjoyment of God in heaven does not depend on the sensory 
input and thus, does not depend on the possession of the body.123 However, as far as the 
people who contemplate are concerned, the body is necessary for human happiness even 
in heaven, because as composite creatures, composed of souls and bodies, we cannot be 
fully ourselves and thus cannot be completely happy unless we are embodied.124  
                                                 
 
121 Dicendum quod ultima et perfecta beatitudo non potest esse nisi in visione divinae essentiae. ST I-II 3, 
8.  
                 
122 SCG IV 85 and 86.             
 
123 ST I-II 3, 3; ST I-II 4, 5.   
 
124 ST I-II 4, 5; ST I-II 3, 3.        
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Since we are animals, knowing something theoretically – through the 
operations of the speculative intellect – is not as completely enjoyable for us as knowing 
that thing theoretically and at the same time being able to experience it sensually. The 
object of our contemplation, God, is not a sensible object and so cannot be sensed. But 
we who are human subjects contemplating God, have such a nature that we need to 
experience passions in addition to our having an intellectual vision of God, in order to be 
completely happy as complete human beings, in order to experience our happiness to the 
fullest extent.125 That is why Thomas claims that we need bodies for complete heavenly 
happiness.126 In heaven, we shall retain our identity, and after the resurrection, we will 
have our bodies again. Being reunited with our bodies will make it possible for us to 
experience delight of contemplation of God, both on a rational and on a sensual level.      
There are disadvantages and advantages to being the kind of creature that the 
human being is, a boundary creature possessing characteristics of an animal and of a 
rational kind of being. The disadvantage lies in our dependence on sensory perception 
and discursive reasoning which do not allow us to apprehend the truth directly, as angels 
do. This disadvantage stays with us throughout our earthly life, making our earthly 
experience of contemplation quite imperfect, while in heaven we can enjoy the perfect 
                                                 
125 SCG IV 86, 4; ST Supplement 82, 3 & 4.                   
 
126 And thus it is that separation from the body is said to hold the soul back from tending with all its might 
to the vision of the Divine Essence. For the soul desires to enjoy God in such a way that the enjoyment also 
may overflow into the body, as far as possible. And therefore, as long as it enjoys God, without the 
fellowship of the body, its appetite is at rest in that which it has, in such a way, that it would still wish the 
body to attain to its share.   
 
Et sic separatio animae a corpore dicitur animam retardare, ne tota intentione tendat in visionem divinae 
essentiae. Appetit enim anima sic frui Deo, quod etiam ipsa fruitio derivetur ad corpus per redundantiam, 
sicut est possibile. Et ideo quandiu ipsa fruitur Deo sine corpore, appetitus eius sic quiescit in eo, quod 
tamen adhuc ad participationem eius vellet suum corpus pertingere. ST I-II 4, 5 ad 4.  
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contemplation only by God’s grace. However, being an animal gives us the advantage 
of enjoying contemplation in more ways that a mere rational creature would.  
As rational creatures, we can know God and can have the delight which belongs 
to the intellectual enjoyment of God. But as rational animals, we can feel the delight of 
the Beatific Vision even on a sensual level. (I shall discuss the sensual component of the 
delight of contemplation in chapter 4.)  
Earthly happiness  
Thomas asks: “Whether one can one be happy in this life?”127 He answers that, 
strictly speaking, we cannot be happy in this life. The Beatific Vision is not possible in 
this life.128 Thus, perfect and true happiness is not possible in earthly life. Furthermore, 
happiness by definition must exclude all suffering and it is not possible to avoid suffering 
in this life.129 However, in earthly life, we may have an imperfect kind of happiness.130 
Thus, people who look for supreme happiness on earth are going to be disappointed, but 
those whose expectations are adjusted to earthly possibilities may reasonably hope for 
happiness.  
Earthly happiness requires some external goods, and goods of the body. First of 
all, earthly happiness depends in many ways on the body. One cannot be really happy if 
one is sick or in pain. So bodily goods, although they do not constitute the essence of 
happiness,131 are nevertheless of great importance for the achievement of earthly 
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128 ST I 12, 11. 
 
129 ST I-II 5, 3.  
 
130 ST I-II 3, 3 and 5; ST I-II 5, 3. 
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happiness. And since the body needs to be fed and otherwise cared for, external goods 
also are needed for earthly happiness. Furthermore, such goods are useful for the 
performance of virtuous deeds. Thus Aquinas says: “For man needs in this life, the 
necessities of the body, both for the operation of contemplative virtue, and for the 
operation of active virtue, for which latter he needs also many other things by means of 
which to perform its operations.”132 For example, good health allows us to do useful work 
which may benefit others, while surplus of material goods makes almsgiving possible.   
Goods of the soul, i.e. virtues, which were rejected as the essence of happiness, 
nevertheless, are needed for earthly happiness, for only a virtuous person can attain true  
perfection. Human beings cannot achieve eternal happiness without the moral virtues. 
God, who is Being Itself, is happy without performing any actions or operations.133 
Creatures (whether humans or angels) cannot attain happiness without some actions or 
operations, for only through actions and operations do created beings actualize 
themselves.134 Rational creatures, endowed with reason and will, are the origin of their 
actions, and their actions may be meritorious and be rewarded with happiness. For that 
reason, people need to perform good works, for which the development of virtues is 
necessary.135 The achievement of happiness requires the development of the virtues.136  
                                                                                                                                                 
131 ST I-II 2, 5.  
 
132 Indiget enim homo in hac vita necessariis corporis tam ad operationem virtutis contemplativae, quam 
etiam ad operationem virtutis activae, ad quam etiam plura alia requiruntur, quibus exerceat opera activae 
virtutis. ST I-II 4, 7.         
 
133 ST I-II 5, 7. 
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However, while virtues and even external goods are needed for earthly 
happiness, they do not constitute the essence of that happiness, for they are only 
instrumental goods. Even the development of virtues is only instrumentally good. 
Development of virtues is directed by the practical intellect. But happiness –whether 
perfect or imperfect - consists primarily in the operation of the speculative intellect, as 
was mentioned above, because a human being as a rational creature is perfected through 
the operation of the speculative intellect.  
Aquinas tells us that earthly happiness consists of contemplation: “Therefore the 
last and perfect happiness, which we await in the life to come, consists entirely in 
contemplation. But imperfect happiness, such as can be had here, consists first and 
principally in contemplation, but secondarily in an operation of the practical intellect 
directing human actions and passions, as stated in Ethics. X. 7, 8.”137 Thus, earthly 
happiness has this in common with heavenly happiness: it consists primarily in the 
activity of contemplation. That befits a creature that is rational.  
Contemplation follows from our desire for knowledge. Desire for knowledge is 
natural to us qua rational beings. As children, we begin observing the world around us 
and asking “Why?” and we continue wondering about things as long as we live. The 
answer to our final “Why?” can be found only beyond this world, when we attain union 
with God. Then we shall know the essence of the First Cause. Our desire for truth and 
                                                                                                                                                 
136 According to Aquinas, virtues are connected with one another. There cannot be moral virtues without 
intellectual ones (ST I-II 58, 4), there cannot be prudence without moral virtues (ST I-II 58, 5), and there 
cannot be moral virtues without charity (ST I-II 65, 2) Thus, we need to develop all the virtues in order to 
attain happiness.  
 
137 Et ideo ultima et perfecta beatitudo, quae expectatur in futura vita, tota principaliter consistit in 
contemplatione. Beatitudo autem imperfecta, qualis hic haberi potest, primo quidem et principaliter 
consistit in contemplatione: secundario vero in operatione practici intellectus ordinantis actiones et 
passiones humanas, ut dicitur in X Eth.  ST I-II 3, 5.  
 61
knowledge will be ultimately satisfied when we meet the First Cause, that is, God in 
heaven. When we know the essence of the First Cause, we shall achieve perfection qua 
rational creatures, and we shall also achieve our greatest happiness. On earth, we may 
attain to some knowledge of God’s creation.138 That measure of truth, which is available 
to us on earth, can satisfy us to some extent and thus make us happy to some extent.139  
Desire for knowledge leads us to the practice of contemplation of the created world and 
ultimately of God, who is the cause of this world.                         
Contemplation and the complex human being  
And thus we have a brief description of what Thomas Aquinas said about 
contemplation as our ultimate happiness. Our ultimate happiness consists in the Beatific 
Vision of God in heaven, and it is an operation of the speculative intellect. It is not 
possible for the human intellect to enjoy the Vision of God by its own power, but only 
with the help of God’s grace, i.e., the light of glory. On earth, some measure of happiness 
may be found in earthly contemplation. People who look for supreme happiness on earth 
are doomed to disappointment, and those who try to find happiness through the pursuit of 
such things like wealth or sensual pleasures are definitely mistaken.  
Human happiness is principally contemplation of God, and as such it is the 
operation of the speculative intellect. But given human nature, even though 
contemplation is essentially the operation of speculative intellect, all the other aspects of 
human nature are also involved, although non-essentially. Earthly contemplation would 
be impossible without previous operations of the sensitive soul, and even of the 
                                                 
 
138 ST I 88, 3. 
 
139 ST II-II 180, 4 and 5.                                                                                                                                                
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vegetative soul. While in heaven, perfection according to our nature requires also 
perfection of our bodies. Thus, Aquinas tells us that the perfection of the body is 
necessary for happiness, both on earth and in heaven.140 He tells us that operations of the 
sensitive soul belong to happiness consequently, after the resurrection of the body, 
because they help us to achieve our complete perfection.141 While on earth operations of 
the sensitive soul belong to happiness antecedently, because in earthly life thinking 
requires input from the sensitive soul.142 In heaven, the “lower” parts of the soul (the 
vegetative and the sensitive soul) will be perfected by the “overflow” from the rational 
part of the soul,143 while on earth, our advancement in spiritual development is either 
helped or hindered by the body and the “lower” parts of the soul.144   
Contemplation is the essence of happiness, and it is a rational activity, and so it 
might follow that our happiness is a rational activity without the admixture of other kinds 
of activities. However, this view gives us an incomplete picture of what Thomas said 
about happiness that is found in contemplation. Thomas concludes that happiness must be 
contemplation of God, or at least of some truth, following a negative analysis, which 
parallels the analysis presented in Aristotle’s Book I of the Nicomachaen Ethics, and 
which shows what happiness must be after we eliminate all that happiness cannot be. But 
there is also a way of showing that contemplation is our happiness, not because it is 
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Utrum ad Beatitudinem Requiratur Aliqua Perfectio Corporis. 
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143 ST I-II 3, 3;  4, 6. 
 
144 Ibid. 
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leftover after everything else has been eliminated, but because contemplation is what 
completes us after other kinds of goods are possessed. To get this more complete picture 
of happiness and contemplation we have to consider Aquinas’s view of the role of 
passions - which are the movements of sensitive appetites - in human happiness, and also 
look closely at the role of sensory perception. Although the activity of the rational soul is 
of primary importance, the non-rational side of our nature, which we share with other 
animals, is also needed for the practice of contemplation, and especially for learning 
which must precede contemplation. According to Thomas, the human activity of 
contemplation reflects our animal nature as well as our rational nature, and our animality 
affects the manner of our contemplation. That would be expected, given that we engage 
in contemplation as whole beings, composed of body and soul.  
Contemplation is our fulfillment. It was already mentioned above that 
contemplation perfects human intellect. It is worthwhile, though, to consider in what 
sense contemplation is the fulfillment of a human being as a composite being, a whole 
rational animal. For that we need to consider the nature of a human being and to look at a 
human being from the perspective of Aquinas’s teleology. Aquinas’s teleology is a topic 
which cannot be fully discussed in this dissertation, but a very brief discussion of the 
nature of human fulfillment in the context of Aquinas’s teleology is needed in order to 
provide us with a better understanding of the place of a human being as a rational animal 
among other kinds of beings.     
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Teleology  
Aquinas sees the world as an orderly structure, and because it is orderly, it is a 
work of a wise being. According to Aquinas, the world is governed, and it is governed in 
a way that helps all things to achieve their perfection, their proper good.145 According to 
Aquinas, God created the world and governs it. God is the creator and the First Cause of 
all things that exist.146 And God is also their Final Cause 147  
According to Thomas, all agents act for an end.148 Even non-rational agents 
always act for an end, while human beings, who are rational agents, act for an end and 
                                                 
145 Certain ancient philosophers denied the government of the world, saying that all things happened by 
chance. But such opinion can be refuted as impossible in two ways. First, by observation of things 
themselves: for we observe that in nature things happen always or nearly always for the best; which would 
not be the case unless some sort of providence directed nature towards good as an end; which is to govern. 
Wherefore the unfailing order we observe in things is a sign of their being governed … Secondly, this is 
clear from a consideration of Divine goodness … For as it belongs to the best to produce the best, it is not 
fitting that the supreme goodness of God should produce things without giving them their perfection. Now 
a thing’s ultimate perfection consists in the attainment of its end. Therefore it belongs to the Divine 
goodness, as it brought things into existence, so to lead them to their end: and this is to govern.    
 
Dicendum quod quidam antique philosphi gubernationem mundo subtraxerunt, dicentes omnia fortuito agi. 
Sed haec positio ostenditur esse impossibilis ex duobus. Primo quidem, ex eo quod apparet in ipsis rebus. 
Videmus enim in rebus naturalibus provenire quod melius est, aut semper aut in pluribus; quod non 
contingeret, nisi per aliquam providentiam res  naturales dirigerentur ad finem boni, quod est gubernare. 
Unde ipse ordo certus rerum manifeste demonstrat gubernationem mundi… Secundo autem apparet idem 
ex consideratione divinae bonitatis…Cum enim optimi sit optima producere, non convenit summae Dei 
bonitati quod res productas ad perfectum non perducat. Ultima autem perfectio est uniuscuiusque in 
consecutione finis. Unde ad divinam bonitate pertinet ut sicut produxit res in esse, ita etiam eas ad finem 
perducat. Quod est gubernare.  ST I 103, 1. 
 
146 ST I 44, 1.  
 
147 Every agent acts for an end: otherwise one thing would not follow more than another from the action of 
the agent, unless it were by chance….But it does not belong to the First Agent, Who is agent only to act for 
the acquisition of some end; He intends only to communicate his perfection, which is His goodness; while 
every creature intends to acquire its own perfection, which is the likeness of the divine perfection and 
goodness. Therefore the divine goodness is the end of all things.    
 
Dicendum quod omne agens agit propter finem; alioquin ex actione agentis non magis sequeretur hoc quam 
illud, nisi a casu….Sed primo agenti, qui est agens tantum, non convenit agere propter acquisitionem 
alicuius finis; sed intendit solum communicare suam perfectionem, quae est eius bonitas. Et unaquaeque 
creatura intendit consequi suam perfectionem, quae est similitude perfectionis et bonitatis divinae. Sic ergo 
divina bonitas est finis rerum omnium.  ST I 44, 4. 
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direct themselves to an end that they cognize.149  All beings naturally tend to their 
ultimate end, which is their fulfillment, the actualization of their potency, and thus all 
their proximate ends are subsumed under that final end.150 For human beings, their final 
end is their eternal happiness in heaven. According to Thomas, all human beings want 
happiness 151 and all humans always act for the sake of their last end, their happiness.152  
It follows that all human actions ultimately tend to that final end which is the eternal 
happiness in heaven, which is contemplation of God in heaven.153 Or rather, all our acts 
would tend to eternal happiness if we always pursued the real good, though in case of 
humans, who often mistake the apparent for the real good, that is not always the case. 
Nevertheless, people always try to attain happiness. We all pursue happiness, though with 
varied success, and we, like all beings, are naturally endowed with inclinations which 
orient us towards that goal. The idea that all our actions aim at happiness and that our 
ultimate happiness is the vision of God in heaven follows from Aquinas’s overall scheme 
of how the created world operates.  
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Fulfillment, actualization, perfection 
Only God is Being Itself.154  All created things have their being from God, by 
participation in God who is Being Itself, and achieve actualization of their potency only 
through God.155 God is the principle of being of all things which exist and without God 
nothing can exist, nothing can continue to exist.156 All things created exist because they 
participate in God’s being.157 Only God is Goodness; created things possess being and 
goodness by participation.158 Created things exist and are good insofar as they are 
actualized, and they are actualized by participation in God’s being and goodness.159  
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158 ST I 6, 4.                 
 
159 It is absolutely true that, there is first something which is essentially being and is essentially good, which 
we call God…and Aristotle agrees with this. Hence from the first being, essentially such, and good, 
everything can be called good and a being , inasmuch as it participates in it by way of a certain assimilation 
which is far removed and defective… Everything is therefore called good from the divine goodness, as 
from the first exemplary effective and final principle of all goodness. Nevertheless, everything is called 
good by reason of the similitude of the divine goodness belonging to it, which is formally its own 
goodness, whereby it is denominated good. And so of all things there is one goodness, and yet many 
goodnesses.        
 
Tamen hoc absolute verum est, quod aliquid est primum, quod per suam essentiam est ens et bonum, quod 
dicimus Deum…Huic etiam sententiae concordat Aristoteles. A primo igitur per suam essentiam ente et 
bono, unumquodque potest dici bonum et ens, inquantum participat ipsum per modum cuiusdam 
assimilationis, licet remote et deficienter…Sic ergo unumquodque dicitur bonum bonitate divina, sicut 
primo principio exemplari, effectivo et finali totius bonitatis. Nihilominus tamen unumquodque dicitur 
bonum similitudine divinae bonitatis sibi inhaerente, quae est formaliter sua bonitas denominans ipsum. Et 
sic est bonitas una omnium; et etiam multae bonitates.   ST I 6,4;    
 
Also:  Now, all things get their being from the fact that they are made like unto God, Who is subsisting 
being itself, for all things exist merely as participants in existing being. Therefore, all things desire as their 
ultimate end to be made like unto God.      
 
Secundum hoc autem esse habent omnia quod Deo assimilantur, qui est ipsum esse subsistens: cum omnia 
sint solum quasi esse participantia. Omnia igitur appetunt quasi ultimum finem Deo assimilari.  SCG III 19 
par. 3  Also: QDV 22 aa.1 and 2, Aquinas, Thomas St., Truth, tr. James V. McGlynn, S.J., Hackett 
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All beings strive to achieve their final end. Achieving their final end, things 
achieve their perfection, actualization of their potency and goodness proper to their 
natures. To achieve the final end and actualization means that a given thing has attained 
its perfection: “For a thing is perfect in proportion to its state of actuality, because we call 
that perfect which lacks nothing of the mode of its perfection.”160 It means having the 
fullness of being according to one’s nature.  
All things are oriented to God as their greatest good. God is being itself, and 
being is equivalent to the good. “Goodness and being are really the same, and differ only 
in idea…But goodness presents the aspect of desirableness, which being does not 
present.” 161 Goodness therefore is the final cause, because it is what all things desire.162 
To say that all things “desire” goodness, and ultimately “desire” God (or “love” God) is 
not a statement of any thing’s emotional state, but refers to the natural tendencies of all 
beings to achieve their actualization, which is also their perfection. And hence, created 
things naturally “desire” to exist and possess goodness proper to their natures. Created 
things strive to fully actualize their being, to achieve their perfection. Thus, every thing is 
moved towards some end and ultimately every thing tends to good which would be its 
perfection and, according to Aquinas, an imitation of divine goodness.163  
                                                                                                                                                 
Publishing company, Inc. 1994.  Latin text: Thomas Aquinas, “Quaestiones disputatae de veritate”, in 
Opera Omnia, Parma, reprinted in New York: Musurgia Publishers, 1949, Hereafter refered to as: QDV.         
 
160 Hoc enim dicitur aliquid esse perfectum, secundum quod est actu, nam perfectum dicitur, cui nihil deest 
secundum modum suae perfectionis. ST I 4, 1.  
 
161 Dicendum quod bonum et ens sunt idem secundum rem: sed differunt secundum rationem tantum….sed 
bonum dicit rationem appetibilis, quam non dicit ens. ST I 5, 1. 
 
162 ST I 5, 4; ST I 103, 2. 
 
163 Hence, it becomes obvious that even things which lack knowledge can be made to work for an end, and 
to seek the good by a natural appetite, and to seek the divine likeness and their own perfection. … For, by 
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Human beings, like all other beings, naturally strive to achieve fullness of their 
being, their perfection, “since everything desires its own perfection, a man desires for his 
ultimate end, that which he desires as his perfect and crowning good.”164 That perfection, 
in case of humans, would be called “happiness”, and it would consist of the Beatific 
Vision.    
Beatific vision as the final end             
Since human beings are the image of God,165 we can most fully participate in 
God’s goodness when we see God in heaven. That is why when we meet our First 
Cause,166 who is our origin, our will is satisfied.167 We achieve our perfection and 
fulfillment in an intellectual way because the most important aspect of our nature is the 
fact that we are rational beings.  
                                                                                                                                                 
the fact that they tend to their own perfection they tend to the good, since a thing is good to the extent that 
it is perfect. Moreover, by virtue of tending to be good it tends to the divine likeness, for a thing is made 
like unto God in so far as it is good. And this or that particular good thing becomes an object of desire 
according as it is a likeness of prime goodness. So, too, for this reason it tends to its own good, because it 
tends to the divine likeness and not conversely. Hence, it is clear that all things desire the divine likeness as 
an ultimate end.    
 
Planum igitur fit quod ea etiam quae cognitione carent, possunt operari propter finem; et appetere bonum 
naturali appetitu; et appetere perfectionem….Nam per hoc quod tendunt per suam perfectionem, tendunt ad 
bonum: cum unumquodque in tantum bonum sit in quantum est perfectum. Secundum vero quod tendit ad 
hoc quod sit bonum, tendit in divinam similitudinem: Deo enim assimilatur aliquid inquantum bonum est. 
Bonum autem hoc vel illud particulare habet quod sit appetibile inquantum est similitudo primae bonitatis. 
Propter hoc igitur tendit in proprium bonum, quia tendit in divinam smilitudinem, et non e converso. Unde 
patet quod omnia appetunt divinam similitudinem quasi ultimum finem. SCG III 24, 6; Also: ST I 103,4. 
 
164 Quia cum unumquodque appetat suam perfectionem, illud appetit aliquis ut ultimum finem, quod appetit 
ut bonum perfectum et completivum sui ipsius. ST I-II 1, 5. 
 
165 ST I 93, 1. 
 
166 ST I-II 3, 8. 
 
167 ST I-II 5, 8. 
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Human happiness is human perfection. What is perfect must be actualized. A 
living being that acts is ultimately actualized through an activity. Thus, a human being is 
actualized through some kind of activity. Since humans are rational beings, their ultimate 
actualization is the activity of the intellective part of the soul. In heaven, when we 
achieve the state of perfection, our minds are united to God by “continual, everlasting 
operation”168 It will be an operation of the intellective part of human soul,169 and 
specifically, it will be an operation of an intellect,170 for it is an act of intellect to 
apprehend the end, which in case of the Beatific Vision is God Himself. Our greatest 
happiness will consist in the contemplation of God171 in the vision of Divine Essence.172  
“Final and perfect happiness can consist in nothing else than the vision of the Divine 
Essence.”173 Then we shall know the essence of the First Cause, and in this way the 
human intellect will achieve its perfection.  
Comprehensive vision of divine essence is possible only for God Himself, as was 
discussed above. Only God fully understands His own essence. We, the creatures, can 
only participate in that knowledge, as we can only participate in being and in goodness. 
But when we fully participate, according to our nature, in God’s being, goodness and 
knowledge, we achieve our fulfillment, our final good, our happiness. 
                                                 
168 Continua et sempiterna operatione   ST I-II 3, 2 ad 4.              
 
169 ST I-II 3, 3. 
 
170 ST I-II 3, 4.  
 
171 ST I-II 3, 5. 
 
172 ST I-II 3, 8. 
 
173 ST I-II 3, 8. 
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When beings achieve their final good, they rest. Thus, human beings rest when 
they return to God in heaven. Delight is defined as the rest in the good attained.174 
Delight, Thomas says, attaches to the attainment of our final end and our perfection, 
which we find in the Beatific Vision.175       
Non-rational beings achieve their end, their good, but it is not called happiness. 
Only for rational creatures, like human beings, that rest is happiness. For non-rational 
beings, the rest in the good follows their fulfillment and the attainment of their ends, but 
it is not what Aquinas calls “happiness”.176 Happiness is the fulfillment proper to one’s 
nature, but only in the case of rational natures, who are capable of understanding it. 
Happiness, according to Aquinas is “knowing and loving God” 177 which is possible only 
for rational creatures, who are capable of contemplation of the Divine Essence.    
 Thus, happiness can be described as fulfillment in accordance with human nature. 
That also means that human nature is perfected, and that our potency is actualized, 
because we have attained our good. There may be gradations of perfection, for a being 
may attain some good, but not all the good proper to it, and thus, it may actualized with 
respect to some aspects of its nature, but not with respect to others.  
‘Actualization’, ‘perfection’ and ‘fulfillment’ are terms which can be used when 
we talk of created beings attaining their good. But only in case of rational creatures, like 
                                                 
 
174 ST I-II 25, 2;  ST I-II 32, 1. 
 
175 ST I-II 4, 1. 
 
176 ST I-II 1, 8.   
 
177 For man and other rational creatures attain to their last end by knowing and loving God. Nam homo et 
aliae rationales creaturae consequentur ultimum finem cognoscendo et amando Deum.  ST I-II 1, 8.   
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humans, can we also say that they have attained happiness. Human beings may be 
perfected in some respects and may be happy to some extent in this life. Only in heaven 
will the beatified achieve full perfection and complete happiness.  
Form and Natural Inclination 
 Although in the governance of the world God is the first and the final cause, He 
also allows intermediary causes.178 And all things are disposed toward their last end and 
to the order of the whole creation through all their actions, not only through those which 
lead to the final end.179 God is not the immediate cause of all effects. God has created the 
world is such a way that created things are also endowed with powers to be secondary 
causes. Thomas says: “Secondary causes are the executors of divine providence.”180 
These secondary causes are living and non-living entities, found in the world of nature, 
which we ordinarily observe as causes of various events. For example, water may be the 
cause of the erosion of rocks, bees may be the cause of pollination of flowers, etc. 
                                                 
178 ST I 22, 2 ; 104,2; 105,5.  
 
179 But an agent does not move except out of intention for an end. For if the agent were not determinate to 
some particular effect, it would not do one thing rather than another: consequently in order that it produce a 
determinate effect, it must, of necessity, be determined to some certain one, which has the nature of an end.    
 
Agens autem non movet nisi ex intentione finis. Si enim agens non esset determinatum ad aliquem 
effectum, non magis ageret hoc quam illud; ad hoc ergo quod determinatum effectum producat, necesse est 
quod determinetur ad aliquid certum, quod habet rationem finis.  ST I-II 1, 2;  
 
Also: If an agent did not incline toward some definite effect, all results would be a matter of indifference 
for him.   
 
Si agens non tenderet ad aliquem effectum determinatum, omnes effectus essent ei indifferentes. SCG III 2, 
8.     
 
In the next paragraph Aquinas answers the objection that some actions seem to be aimless and their effects 
indifferent, for example, absent-minded scratching of a beard. He points out that if we look at the whole 
picture we find that even such actions do serve some purpose.  
 
180 Sunt igitur secundae causae divinae providentiae executrices.  SCG III 77, 2. 
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Aquinas’s teleological view of the world demands that there be purpose in the 
operations of created things.181 And he also tells us that the Creator as the cause endows 
beings with certain powers, powers to act for ends for which they are designed. Aquinas 
would not say that divine providence causes erosion of rocks, but that divine providence 
gave water the power to erode rocks, and that divine providence is manifested in the 
power of water. Aquinas says: “God works in things in such a manner that things have 
their proper operation.”182 According to Thomas, God works in every agent by being the 
end of action, by being the primary agent, and by giving things their form and power. 
First of all, nothing is good except insofar as it participates in the goodness of God. In 
this way God, as the good, is the end of every action. Secondly, when there are several 
agents, the second one, acts in virtue of the first agent. In this way God, as the primary 
agent, is the cause of every action. Finally, God gives created beings their form and 
preserves their powers and their existence. In this way also God is the cause of every 
action. Thus, God is the primary agent, but created things are secondary agents, and the 
secondary agents have purposes and powers to cause things.                                                         
Created things strive to actualize themselves and to achieve their perfection 
according to their natures and through their natural appetites. Actualization of any 
particular thing depends on what kind of a thing it is, and that is determined by its 
form.183 How a given thing acts or is acted upon depends on its form, which is the 
                                                 
181 Indeed, all things created would seem, in a way, to be purposeless, if they lacked an operation proper to 
them; since the purpose of everything is its operation.     
 
Quinimmo omnes res creatae viderentur quodammodo esse frustra, si propria operatione destituerentur; 
cum omnes res sint propter suam operationem. ST I 105, 5. 
 
182 Deum operari in rebus, quod tamen ipsae res propriam habeant operationem. ST I 105, 5. 
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principle of action. 184 Every being has a determined nature, essence, form, which 
governs its operations.185   
Human beings also have a certain nature, which governs their operations, 
including such activities as study or contemplation. To better understand how the 
operations of the sensitive soul may participate in contemplation, we need to consider 
what kind of creatures humans are, what is our nature. There is no space in this 
dissertation to fully discuss all that Aquinas said about human nature, but a few points 
must be noted because of their relevance to the present argument. 
The concept of nature  
Thomas follows Aristotle in his definition of “nature” of things: “He says that 
those things which have in themselves a principle of their motion have a nature. And such 
are all subjects of nature. For nature is a subject insofar as it is called matter, and nature is 
                                                                                                                                                 
183 Everything is said to be good so far as it is perfect; for in that way only is it desirable…But since 
everything is what it is by its form…in order for a thing to be perfect and good it must have a form, 
together with all that precedes and follows upon that form.…But the form itself is signified by the species; 
for everything is placed in its species by its form…Further, upon the form follows an inclination to the end, 
or to an action, or  something of the sort; for everything, in so far as it is in act, acts and tends towards that 
which is in accordance with its form.     
 
Dicendum quod unumquodque dicitur bonum, inquantum est perfectum; sic enim est appetibile…Cum 
autem unumquodque sit id quod est, per suam formam…Ipsa autem forma significatur per speciem, quia 
per formam unumquodque in specie constituitur….Ad formam autem consequitur inclinatio ad finem, aut 
ad actionem, aut ad aliquid huiusmodi; quia unumquodque, inquantum est actu, agit. ST I 5, 5. Also: SCG 
III 20 & 21. 
 
184 The end, the agent, and the form are principles of action, but in a certain order. For the first principle of 
action is the end which moves the agent; the second is the agent; the third is the form of that which the 
agent applies to action (although the agent also acts through its own form); as may be clearly seen in things 
made by art.  
 
Et agens et forma se habent ut actionis principium, se ordine quodam. Nam primum quidem principium 
actionis est finis, qui movet agentem; secundo vero agens; tertio autem forma eius quod ab agente 
applicatur ad agendum quamvis et ipsum agens per formam suam agat; ut patet in artificialibus. ST I 105, 
5.  
 
185  Inclination follows every form.  Quamlibet formam sequitur aliqua inclinatio.  ST I 80,1. 
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in a subject insofar as it is called form.”186  Thomas contrasts things which “have a 
nature,” i.e. natural things, with artificial things, such as a bed or clothing. Natural things, 
whether animate or inanimate, have certain natural tendencies and certain patterns of 
behavior, and thus they have in themselves a “principle of their motion”. That principle 
of motion may cause things to tend to a certain place, for example, to fall downwards, or 
it may regulate the increase and decrease, which pertains to plants and animals, or it may 
regulate various alterations, which can be observed in chemical reactions. By contrast, 
artificial things can be moved in various ways only by an agent.  
According to Thomas (in agreement with Aristotle) all things on earth are 
composed of matter and form. Thomas notes that “nature” is a subject with respect to 
matter, because what can be altered is matter, however “nature” is in a subject with 
respect to form, for the way things are altered depends on the form.187 Furthermore, 
Thomas explains that “according to nature” may refer both, to the thing which is a natural 
kind of a thing, and to the phenomena caused by it or adhering to it as accidents.188 Here 
Thomas (after Aristotle) gives an example of fire – a natural kind of thing – which has 
the property of being carried upwards, and which property is not itself a “nature”, but is 
“according to nature”.  Thus if Aquinas refers to “human nature” it implies that a human 
                                                 
186 Et dicit quod habentia naturam sunt illa quae habent in seipsis principium sui motus. Et talia sunt omnia 
subjecta naturae: quia natura est subjectum, secundum quod natura dicitur materia: et est in subjecto, 
secundum quod natura dicitur forma. In Ph II 1, 146, Aquinas, Thomas, St. Commentary on Aristotle’s 
Physics, tr. Richard J. Blackwell, Richard J. Spath, and w. Edmund Thirlkel, Notre Dame, Indiana: Dumb 
Ox Books, 1999.   Latin text: Thomas Aquinas, “Commentarium in VIII libros Physicorum,” in Opera 
Omnia, Parma, reprinted in New York: Musurgia Publishers, 1949. Hereafter refered to as: In Ph.   
    
187 In Ph II 1, 146; In Ph II 2, 151 and 152.   
 
188 In Ph II 1, 147. 
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being is a natural being, endowed with its characteristic principles governing its 
development and behavior, and possessing characteristic powers.  
The human soul  
 Humans are composite beings, composed of body and soul.189 The soul is the 
form, while the body is the matter.190 Soul itself is not a person.191 Humans are corporeal 
and ensouled creatures. Humans are not the only creatures composed of soul and body, 
for all living beings on earth are such composites. However, different kinds of earthly 
creatures possess different kinds of souls. All of them must possess a vegetative soul.192 
This is the soul which causes the living thing to grow, to change nourishment into the 
substance of its body, and to reproduce.193 Animals possess the vegetative soul, since 
they, like plants, grow and reproduce, but animals also possess the sensitive soul. 
Animals, unlike plants, have to maintain their life through their actions, such as foraging 
for food or defending themselves from danger. For that purpose, animals need the ability 
to gain knowledge about their environment and to react to that environment, and those 
abilities belong to the sensitive the soul.194 Human beings are living and sentient beings, 
and thus they possess both the vegetative and the sensitive soul.195 But human beings are 
                                                 
 
189 ST I 75, 4.              
 
190 ST I 76, 1. 
 
191 ST I 75, 4. 
 
192 ST I 78, 1. 
 
193 ST I 78, 1 and 2. 
 
194 ST I 78, 1; ST I 80, 1 and 3. 
 
195 ST I 78, 1. 
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also rational creatures, possessed of reason and will.196  Reason and will belong to the 
rational soul.197       
Thus, a human being is a creature possessed of a tripartite soul.198 The 
development and physical functioning of a human being is governed by the vegetative 
part of the soul, as is the case with all living things, sensory perception, locomotion and 
some cognitive operations are governed by the sensitive part of the soul, as is the case 
with all animals, and the rational thinking and willing is governed by the intellective part 
of the soul. The powers of each part of the soul, separately and together, regulate our 
behavior.  
Natural inclinations                                           
According to its nature, every being possesses certain inclinations, also called 
natural appetites, which are steady dispositions to act in certain ways, and which help it 
to pursue its ends. Thus, all created things have natural inclinations to operate in ways 
characteristic of their kind, in accordance with their nature. Inclination is a kind of 
appetite.199 Inclination is a general tendency to behave in a certain way, for example, to 
fall towards the ground, or to search for nourishment, etc. The object of an inclination (or 
                                                 
 
196 ST I 78, 1; ST I 76, 4; ST I-II Prologue.  
 
197 ST I  79, 1; ST I 80, 2.      
 
198 ST I 77, 4;  ST I 78, 1.         
             
199 The appetite is nothing else than an inclination of a person desirous of a thing towards that thing.       
 
Appetitus nihil aliud est quam quaedam inclinatio appetentis in aliquid. ST I-II 8, 1.   
 
In some passages Aquinas also uses the word love (amor) in ways synonymous with inclination or appetite. 
Love is defined as the principle of movement towards the end loved. ST I-II 26, 1.      
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appetite) is good.200 Every being loves and seeks what is suitable to it, and thus, what 
is good for it. Inclination follows form and so everything is inclined to its proper good in 
a way characteristic to it: “The natural appetite is that inclination which each thing has, of 
its own nature, for something; wherefore by its natural appetite each power desires 
something suitable to itself.”201    
Things may move themselves or be moved by other agents, but all agents act for 
the sake of their good, and what that good is depends on the nature of the agent that 
moves.202 Natural desires follow from natural inclinations.203 For example, the fact that 
                                                 
 
200 Natural inclinations always orient a given being towards its proper good, according to its nature. So 
called “bad desires” may be caused by environmental disturbance, by illness, or, in case of humans, by 
error in judgment and bad habits.   
 
201 Dicendum quod appetitus naturalis est inclinatio cuiuislibet rei in aliquid ex natura sua; unde naturali 
appetitu quaelibet potentia desiderat sibi conveniens.  ST I 78, 1 ad. 3;  See also: ST I 80, 1 ad. 3;  
 
See also: In the natural appetite the principle of this movement is the appetitive subject’s connaturalness 
with the thing to which it tends, and may be called natural love.    
 
In appetitu autem naturali principium huiusmodi motus est connaturalitas appetentis ad id in quod tendit, 
quae dici potest amor naturalis. ST I-II 26,1;    
 
See also:  Nature so understood seems to express essence as what underlies a thing’s characteristic 
behavior.  “Essence and Existence (De Ente et Essentia),” in Thomas Aquinas. Selected Philosophical 
Writings. selected and translated by Timothy McDermott, New York: Oxford University Press, Inc.1993, 
p.92; Latin text:  
 
Tamen nature nomen hoc modo sumpte uidetur significare essentiam rei secundum quod habet ordinem ad 
propriam operationem rei.  De Ente et Essentia    In  Le “De Ente et Essentia” de S. Thomas D’Aquin.  M.-
D. Roland-Gosselin, O.P. , LeSaulchoir, Kain (Belgique), 1926, p.4.             
 
202 But it must be noted that, since every inclination results from a form, the natural appetite results from a 
form existing in the nature of things: while the sensitive appetite, as also the intellective appetite or rational 
appetite, which we call the will, follows from an apprehended form.     
 
Sed considerandum est quod cum omnis inclinatio consequatur formam in natura existentem; appetitus 
autem sensitivus, vel etiam intellectivus se rationalis, qui dicitur voluntas, sequitutr formam apprehensam. 
ST I-II 8, 1; 
 
See also:  Now, the good that is proper to a thing may be received in many ways. One way depends on 
what is appropriate to the essential character of the individual. It is thus that an animal seeks his good, 
when he desires the food whereby he may be kept in existence. A second way depends on what is 
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humans experience desire for food follows from natural inclination to self-
preservation. And the fact that humans experience a desire for knowledge follows from 
an inclination to truth natural to all rational beings.204                         
Human actions, like the actions of all beings, aim at some end. Humans are 
possessed of reason and will and thus, have the power to judge and to make their 
choices.205 However, before we get to the point at which we can make choices – choices 
regarding contemplation, for example - we are guided by natural inclinations, like all 
other created beings.206 We share many aspects of our nature with non-rational creatures, 
and so we are also moved in analogous ways.  
Inclinations proper to each kind 
All things, according to Aquinas, are disposed to fulfill their ends and seek their 
good.207 All the proximate ends therefore are subordinated to the final end: “For a thing is 
                                                                                                                                                 
appropriate to the species. It is in this way that an animal desires his proper good, inasmuch as he desires 
the procreation of offspring… A third way depends on the essential character of his genus. It is in this way 
that an equivocal agent seeks its proper good by an act of causation, as in the case of the heavens. And a 
fourth way depends on the analogical likeness of things produced, in relation to their source. And it is in 
this way that God, Who is beyond genus, gives existing being to all, because of His own goodness.       
 
Bonum autem suum cuiuslibet rei potest accipi multipliciter. Uno qui proprium ratione individui. Et sic 
appetit animal suum bonum cum appetit cibum, quo in esse conservatur. Alio modo, secundum quod est 
eiuis ratione speciei. Et sic appetit proprium bonum animal inquantum appetit generationem prolis…Tertio 
vero modo, ratione generis. Et sic appetit proprium bonum in causando agens aequivocum: sicut caelum. 
Quarto autem modo, ratione similitudinis analogiae principiatorum ad suum principium. Et sic Deus, qui 
est extra genus, propter suum bonum omnibus rebus dat esse.   SCG III 24, 7.           
 
203 ST I-II 26, 2; ST I 81, 1.          
 
204 ST I-II 94, 2;  In Met I 1, 2-4, Aquinas, Thomas St., Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics. Tr. John 
P. Rowan, Notre Dame Indiana: Dumb Ox Books, 1995.  Latin text: Thomas Aquinas, “Commentarium in 
XII libros Metaphysicorum,” in Opera Omnia, Parma, reprinted in New York: Musurgia Publishers, 1949. 
Hereafter refered to as: In Met.               
 
205 ST I-II Prologue.            
 
206 ST I-II 1, 2. 
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not moved toward a proximate end unless for the sake of a last end.” 208And they are 
disposed to fulfill their ends, whether they move themselves or are moved.209 According 
to Thomas, all things are moved towards their last end, their fulfillment, completion and 
perfection. This is in accordance with the will of God, the creator and the First Cause. 
Even things which lack reason, and even inanimate things move towards their last end, 
not because they know it, but because they are designed that way. “But those things that 
lack reason tend to an end, by natural inclination, as being moved by another and not by 
themselves… For the entire irrational nature is in comparison to God as an instrument to 
the principal agent.”210    
Different kinds of things operate in different ways, according to their nature. As 
was mentioned above, all things are endowed with natural inclinations or appetites.  
Aquinas distinguishes three kinds of inclinations or appetites: natural, sensitive and 
rational.211 
Natural inclination is the kind of attraction which a stone has for the earth. That 
kind of inclination is the principle by which all beings seek what is proper to them. 
Inclinations possessed by inanimate things are studied today (although not under that 
name) by physicists and chemists, for example that tendency of stones to fall to the 
                                                                                                                                                 
207 Therefore, the end of all things is a good.  Finis igitur omnium est bonum. SCG III 16, 4.  See also: SCG 
III, 3 ; ST I 5 and 4; ST I 103, 2. 
 
208 Non enim movetur aliquid in finem proximum nisi propter finem postremum. SCG III 17, 9.  See also: 
ST I-II 1, 6. 
 
209 SCG III,2; ST I-II 1,2. 
 
210 Illa vero quae ratione carent, tendunt in finem propter naturalem inclinationem, quasi ab alio mota, non 
autem a seipsis.  Nam tota irrationalis natura comparatur ad Deum sicut instrumentum ad agens principale. 
ST I-II 1, 2. 
 
211 ST I-II 28, 6. 
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ground, or tendency of various materials to react with certain chemical agents. 
According to the Aristotelian system of physics with which Aquinas was familiar, 
inclinations of inanimate things were studied by natural philosophers and what these 
philosophers studied was the motion of objects, according to Aristotelian philosophy.212 
According to Thomas, all created things, even things devoid of knowledge, and even 
inanimate ones are made to act for some end 213 All things possess natural appetites, 
because ultimately all things are oriented towards their First and Final Cause that is God, 
who is the source of their being.214  
Living things like plants possess the kind of inclinations which in the modern 
world are studied by biologists, such as inclination to grow or to nourish itself.215 
Animals possess more complex kinds of inclinations to behave in ways affected by their 
sensory perceptions and in response to the perceived situations. Animals have natural 
inclinations of the type found in any sensible objects and of the type found in any living 
objects, but in addition to that, animals also have sensitive appetites, which are in the 
sensitive soul.216 What is characteristic of animal nature are the movements of those 
                                                 
 
212 ST I 80, 1; ST I-II 26, 1; SCG III 24, 6; In Ph III 1, 276.                    
 
213 Hence, it becomes obvious that even things which lack in knowledge can be made to work for an end, 
and to seek the good by a natural appetite, and to seek the divine likeness and their own perfection.    
 
Planum igitur fit quod ea etiam quae cognitione carent, possunt operari propter finem; et appetere bonum 
naturali appetitu; et appetere divinam similitudinem; et propriam perfectionem. SCG III 24, 6;  See also ST 
I 103, 2 and 4.  
 
214 SCG III 17 & 24.   
 
215 ST I 78, 1 and 2; In DA II 7 and  9. 
 
216 Therefore, just as the natural appetite tends to good existing in a thing; so the animal or voluntary 
appetite tends to a good which is apprehended.     
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sensitive appetites.217  These movements are responses of an animal to situations it 
encounters and are called “passions”218  Desire Aquinas regards as one of the passions.219  
Natural Desires  
 From natural inclinations follow natural desires.220 Natural inclinations orient a 
given being towards its good.221 In case of a sentient being, that good affects the power of 
sensitive appetite of the animal.222 The good which is the appetible object causes the 
animal’s sensitive appetite to become adapted to it, which adaptation is called love.223 
The sensitive appetite is a power which allows the animal to react appropriately to 
whatever is either useful or harmful to it, but it is not oriented towards particular objects. 
That particular orientation towards particular objects is called love (amor). For example, I 
as a human being have a natural inclination to preserve my life, and that requires, among 
other things, eating. The power of the sensitive appetite causes me to move towards food, 
                                                                                                                                                 
Sicut igitur id in quo tendit appetitus naturalis, est bonum existens in re; ita id in quod tendit appetitus 
animalis vel voluntaries, est bonum apprehensum.   ST I-II 8,1; See also:  ST I 80, 1; QDV 22, 3;    
 
See also: In DA III 15, Aquinas, Thomas, St. Commentary on Aristotle’s De Anima, tr. Kenelm foster, O.P. 
and Silvester Humphries, O.P., Notre Dame, Indiana: Dumb Ox Books, 1994.  Latin text: Thomas Aquinas, 
“Sententia libri De anima,” in Opera Omnia, Parma, reprinted in New York: Musurgia Publishers, 1949. 
Hereafter refered to as: In DA.      
 
217 ST I-II 28, 6. 
 
218 ST I-II 22, 2 and 3; ST I-II 26,1. 
 
219 ST I-II 30.  
 
220 The natural appetite is that inclination which each thing has, of its own nature, for something; wherefore 
by its natural appetite each power desires something suitable to itself.    
 
Dicendum quod appetitus naturalis est inclinatio cuiuslibet rei in aliquid ex natura sua; unde naturali 
appetitu quaelibet potentia desiderat sibi convenines.  ST I 78, 1 ad 3; See also: ST I-II 26, 2.                              
 
221 ST I-II 94, 2.            
 
222 ST I 80, 1.          
 
223 ST I-II 26, 2.        
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generally speaking. But I have to move towards a particular food item in order to feed 
myself, for example towards a loaf of bread. My particular orientation towards bread is 
technically called love of bread. Because I have that love of bread, I desire bread.224 Here 
one must note that, while my love for bread may be constant, my desire for bread may 
come and go, depending on the level of hunger. My desire for bread follows from my 
love for bread, which is possible because I possess sensitive appetite, which causes me to 
pursue food, because I have a natural inclination to self-preservation, and to preserve my 
life I need nourishing food, according to my nature. Thus natural desires, like desire for 
food, follow from natural inclinations.        
When it comes to natural desires of sentient beings, and especially of humans, one 
has to contrast them with non-natural desires. Thomas distinguishes between “natural”, 
“non-natural”, and “unnatural”, and in case of humans the word “natural” can be 
understood in three ways. One can speak of something being “natural” to humans as 
rational beings, since reason is what makes us different from other animals. One can 
speak of something being “natural” to humans by contrasting it with reason and denoting 
desires which pertain to us qua animals.225 Finally, one can speak of something being 
“natural” to humans qua corporeal beings, or qua living beings and contrast it with that 
which is natural to us qua sentient beings, or animals.226 We have to judge from the 
context which meaning of “natural” is the correct one.  
                                                 
224 ST I-II 25, 2; ST I-II 26, 2.     
 
225 ST I-II 31, 7; ST I-II 30, 3. 
 
226 ST I 80, 1.  
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Our natural desires are those which are, generally speaking, characteristic of 
humans. By contrast, there may be desires which are unnatural, which are not in 
accordance with human nature. And here Thomas notes the distinction between the 
specific and the individual nature. He says: “For it happens in an individual that some one 
of the natural principles of the species is corrupted, so that something which is contrary to 
the specific nature, becomes accidentally natural to this individual.”227 Thus, a given 
individual’s nature may be such that by some accident, with respect to certain traits, it is 
contrary to the specific human nature. Unnatural desire may be caused by an illness, but 
in case of human beings who are endowed with reason, imagination and free will, such 
desires may be also developed at will. In this dissertation, we shall only consider natural 
desires. Natural desires then are desires which accord with the nature of a given animal, 
when that animal is in good health.  
The sensitive soul  
Aquinas contrasts natural inclinations which all natural things possess, with the 
inclinations which reflect the special needs of sentient beings. Sentient beings have some 
knowledge of their environment, and of other things besides themselves. Depending on 
what kind of beings they are, their knowledge may be more or less advanced, but all 
sentient beings are capable of knowing. And as they know something of their 
environment, they also react and move move towards or away from to the things they 
know.  
                                                 
 
227 Contingit enim in aliquot individuo corrumpi aliquod principiorum naturalium speciei; et sic id quod est 
contra naturam speciei, fieri per accidens naturale huic individuo. ST I-II 31, 7. 
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There are two kinds of operations which belong to the sensitive part of the soul, 
namely, perceptions and passions. In order to survive and thrive an animal needs to know 
its environment through perceiving things, and the animal needs to react to the things it 
perceives and those reactions are called passions.  
The sensitive appetite   
In order to react to things in their environment animals need to desire - in a 
positive sense of attraction, or a negative sense of aversion – what they perceive. Thus, 
they need the appetitive power in their souls, which is the source of desires. That power 
is the sensitive appetite. Thomas says:  
 
Therefore, as forms exist in those things that have knowledge in a higher 
manner and above the manner of natural forms; so must there be in them 
an inclination surpassing the natural inclination, which is called the natural 
appetite. And this superior inclination belongs to the appetitive power of 
the soul, through which the animal is able to desire what it apprehends, 
and not only that to which it is inclined by its natural form. And so it is 
necessary to assign an appetitive power to the soul.228      
                               
The sensitive appetite is a passive power, moved by things the sense apprehends.229 
Through this power, the animal experiences passions in response to the various 
phenomena happening around it. And the animal’s sensitive appetite is capable of 
coordinating and selecting those occurrences which are important to a given animal: 
“Natural appetite is the animal appetite, which follows the apprehension, and by which 
something is desired not as suitable to this or that power, such as sight for seeing, or 
                                                 
228 Sic igitur formae altiori modo existunt in habentibus cognitionem supra modum formarum naturalium, 
ita oportet quod in eis sit inclinatio supra modum inclinationis naturalis, quae dicitur appetitus naturalis. Et 
haec superior inclinatio pertinet ad vim animae appetitivam, per quam animal appetere potest ea quae 
apprehendit, non solum ea ad quae inclinatur ex forma naturali. Sic igitur necesse est ponere aliquam 
potentiam animae appetitivam. ST I 80, 1. 
 
229 ST I 80, 1. 
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sound for hearing; but simply as suitable to the animal.”230 The sensitive appetite 
allows the animal to respond to and to choose whatever is suitable to that animal. The 
sensitive appetite is divided into the concupiscible and the irascible powers, 
corresponding to attractions and aversions.  
Passions  
Operations of the sensitive part of the soul which allow the animal to react to its 
environment are called passions.231 Passions are the reactions of an animal to the things it 
perceives in the environment and the reactions are experienced as feelings such as 
attraction or aversion, fear, anger delight etc. Aquinas distinguishes two appetitive 
powers in the sensitive part of the soul, each power being the seat of certain kinds of 
passions. The two powers are the concupiscible appetite and the irascible appetite.232 To 
the irascible appetite, whose object is the good difficult to obtain, belong those feelings 
which allow the animal to defend itself from danger, for example, fear or anger. To the 
concupiscible appetite, whose object is the good of a given animal, belong those feelings 
which allow the animal to pursue the pleasurable goods. Passions of love, desire or 
delight belong to the concupiscible power of the sensitive part of the soul. Passions guide 
the animal to pay attention to certain things and not others, and to choose certain things 
and not others. Those three kinds of passions, i.e. love, desire and delight, are of 
particular importance to human pursuit of knowledge and the practice of contemplation.   
     
                                                 
230 Appetitus animalis consequens apprehensionem, quo appetitur aliquid non ea ratione qua est conveniens 
ad actum huius vel illius potentiae, utpote visio ad videndum et auditio ad audiendum; sed quia est 
conveniens simpliciter animali. ST I 80, 1 ad 3. 
 
231 ST I-II 22,1;  ST I-II 25, 1 and 2. 
 
232 ST I 81, 2.          
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Love  
All created things are endowed with natural appetites, which orient them to their 
proper good, and human beings are not an exception to that. All of a creature’s natural 
appetites help that creature to attain its ends, and especially its final end, which is the 
actualization of its potency.  
Aquinas uses the term “love” to describe creature’s natural attraction to certain 
objects. He sometimes uses the word “love” to denote attraction in general terms, which 
makes it synonymous with “natural appetite”, but sometimes he uses it to denote 
attraction to a particular good. Love as a passion is an attraction to a particular good, a 
particular object. That object belongs to a class of objects which accord with a given 
animal’s natural appetite, but it is a particular object, which is perceived by the animal 
and which is then recognized as useful, as an appetible good.  
An appetible good is desirable and may be desired at a given time. We do not 
desire what we love at every moment, but what we desire, must be something we love. 
For example, one may love chocolate, but one would not desire to eat it all the time, only 
sometimes. However, one would not want to eat chocolate at all, if one did not love it.233   
Desires 
In sentient beings, desires follow from natural appetites, and more precisely, they 
follow from love. All desires of a given creature altogether are supposed to help that 
creature to attain its final end. Human beings experience desires of several kinds, which 
arise in different parts of the soul. We do not speak of desires originating in the 
                                                 
233 The word “love” is used here in a technical sense; in a conversation it may be better to say that one likes 
chocolate.                
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vegetative part of the soul, since that soul is the origin of nutritive and generative 
powers, which are not under control of intellect and will and so there is no possibility of 
pursuit.234 Nevertheless, the physical processes controlled by the vegetative soul may be 
the direct cause of the kind of desires which originate in the sensitive soul and which 
motivate an animal to act. For example desire for food, i.e. hunger, is caused by the 
physiological phenomenon of the low level of sugar in the blood. A healthy animal would 
then feel hunger and that animal would be motivated to search for food. The sensitive 
part of the soul is the origin of the desires which follow from the the irascible appetite – 
such as the desire to flee danger - and of those which follow from the concupiscible 
appetite, - such as the desire for food.235 Desire for knowledge is a rational desire, 
originating in the rational soul.236                 
Desires are needed to make us act. It is obvious that the reason why we desire 
food, for example, is because our body needs nourishment, and so the fundamental cause 
of our desire for nourishment is found in the vegetative soul, even prior to the sensitive 
soul. It is the sensitive soul which makes it possible for us to be aware of the need for 
food, so that we can go and find it. Desire for knowledge causes us to wonder about 
things and search for answers.  
Desires which animals possess are necessary if they are to survive and thrive. We 
humans qua animals also possess desires that motivate us to feed ourselves, to flee danger 
                                                 
234 ST I-II 17, 8.  
 
235 ST I 81, 2; ST I-II 23, 1.     
 
236 ST I 80, 2 ad 2; ST I-II 94, 2; ST I-II 3, 8; ST II-II 180, 7.             
 88
etc. In sentient beings, desires follow from natural appetites,237  and all desires of a 
given creature, together help that creature to attain its final end. All created things, 
including humans, are endowed with natural appetites which orient them to their proper 
good.238 All of a creature’s natural appetites help that creature to attain its ends, and 
especially its final end, which is the actualization of its potency. Any and all our desires 
direct us to the end which is happiness.  
 According to Aquinas, all human desires, those of the rational part of the soul and 
those of the sensitive part,  belong to a human being as a whole, as a particular  kind of 
creature, i.e. a rational animal. Humans are endowed with certain kinds of desires, 
because all beings are endowed with desires proper to their kind. Furthermore, those 
desires incline each being to pursue its proper ends. Thus, human beings, like all animals, 
pursue what is good for them, according to their nature. Like all natural beings, they are 
endowed with natural inclinations, and like all sentient beings, they have natural desires 
which follow from these inclinations. They share with other animals passions, which 
derive from natural appetites. They share with other animals desires for food, for safety 
etc. which all animals possess, because in this way they can pursue what is good for 
them. Since humans are also rational beings, they have a desire for knowledge, which is 
natural to rational beings. Desire for knowledge, for truth, is natural to us qua rational 
beings. But it would be wrong to assume that desire for knowledge therefore functions 
separately from the other, obviously animal, desires. According to Thomas’s philosophy, 
desire for knowledge is but one of our natural desires and is interconnected with the rest 
                                                 
 
237 ST I 78, 1 ad 3.  
 
238 ST I-II 1, 2. 
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of our nature. Human desire for knowledge is interwoven with other kinds of desires, 
including animal desires, whose seat is the sensitive part of the soul. Our desire for 
knowledge is embedded among our other desires. And all our desires together orient us 
towards our good, our happiness. 
Delight 
 When we obtain our good, when our desire is satisfied, we experience delight.239 
Thomas says: “Pleasure [delectatio] is the repose of the appetite in some good.”240 He 
does distinguish between intellectual and sensible goods, and between their 
corresponding delights.241 Intellectual delights are greater that those of the sensible kind, 
he says. Thomas also identifies intellectual delight, which is not a passion.242 A human 
being is a creature composed of body and soul, a rational animal, and so even as we 
experience intellectual delight the animal side of our nature has to be somehow involved. 
Accordingly, a careful reading of what Thomas says about delight and contemplation 
reveals that the intellectual kind of delight is accompanied by the sensual kind of delight 
even when we engage in contemplation.243 One reason why sensual delight accompanies 
contemplation is the delight associated with study which leads to contemplation; another 
reason is the influence of the rational soul on the sensitive one. Even in heaven, after 
souls are reunited with their bodies, complete human beings will experience both 
                                                 
239 Latin delectatio is translated as ‘pleasure’ or as ‘delight’. ‘Pleasure’ and ‘delight’ are treated as 
synonymous.  
 
240 Delectatio est quies appetitus in bono. ST I-II 34, 2.        
 
241 ST I-II 31, 5.   
 
242 ST I-II 31, 4.    
 
243 ST I-II 4, 1; ST II-II 180, 7; ST I-II 31, 3; ST I-II 35, 2; SCG IV 85, 7 etc. 
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intellectual and sensual delight, according to Thomas.244 Delight of contemplation as 
experienced by humans is the delight felt by a rational animal, and not merely by a 
rational soul.  
Cognitive powers of the sensitive soul  
In order to desire anything, an animal must notice it and somehow judge its 
usefulness. For that, animals are endowed with sensory powers and with the inner senses, 
among which the estimative power allows them to judge the usefulness of things.  
According to Thomas, without sensory perceptions, an animal would not be able 
to possess any knowledge about its surroundings. Human beings likewise would not be 
able to possess any knowledge if they were deprived of sensory input.245 From sensory 
perception we derive the basic data which can be later processed, and which we humans 
may think about, argue about, and after reflecting on it arrive at understanding of some 
truth. But before we can contemplate, and even before we can form any concepts, we 
must have some data we receive via sensory perception. So, the operations of the rational 
part of the soul depend in the most basic way on sensory perceptions, which belong to the 
sensitive part of the soul.  
The animal must also recognize whether something is useful or dangerous. The 
irascible and concupiscible powers are to some extent moved by reason. In animals, the 
sensitive appetite is moved by the estimative power,246 which is an interior sense whose 
                                                 
 
244 SCG IV 85, 7; SCG IV 84, 14; ST I-II 4,1; ST Supplement 82, 4; ST I-II 3, 3 ad 3.   
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246 ST I 81, 3.  
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function is “the apprehension of intentions which are not received through the 
senses”,247 and which allows the animals to “estimate” the importance of what they meet 
with. Aquinas’s favorite example is that of a sheep who immediately and without any 
previous experience can recognize the wolf as a danger to itself.248  When Aquinas says 
that the sensitive appetite is moved by reason in the sense that it is moved by the 
estimative power he is not refering to the animal’s reasoning powers, but to the rational 
order found in the Order of Nature whose origin is the mind of God.249 So, an animal’s 
passions, which allow the animal to navigate through the world of useful or dangerous 
things, are part of the whole Order of Nature, and like the natural appetites of non-
sentient things, orient the animal towards its proper good and ultimately to its final end.  
In a human being, the estimative power is replaced by the cogitative power, since 
humans are able to judge and decide whether to act on their passions or not.250 In the case 
of humans, the sensitive appetite is moved not only by the reason found in the Order of 
Nature, but also by human reason. The cogitative power is correlate of the estimative 
power,251 but in a human being it is influenced by the intellect which other animals do not 
possess.252  Human passions and the cogitative power serve the same function as they do 
                                                 
 
247 Ad apprehendendum autem intentiones quae per sensum non accipiuntur. ST I 78, 4. 
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in other animals, i.e., they move humans towards their proper good, and ultimately 
towards their final end.  
Desire for Knowledge  
Thus, all natural beings are moved towards their ends, which are ordered 
according to their final end 253 Non-rational agents - inanimate natural objects, and all 
living things, like plants and animals - are moved by their natural inclinations. Thomas 
repeatedly stresses that even those non-rational things seek the good.254 Everything has 
an inclination to its proper end which is its proper good.255 An important distinction 
exists, however, between the non-rational and rational agents. Rational agents (human 
beings and angels) are characterized by rational appetite, which is the will.256 Will is the 
appetite for good that is apprehended by the intellect.257 Rational agents seek their good 
using their powers of intellect and will. The will is free in a sense that nothing can force it 
to will, yet even the will is oriented to will in accordance with the natural inclination.258  
                                                 
 
253 ST I-II 1, 2 and 6. 
 
254 He mentions it in many places and devotes a whole chapter of  Summa Contra Gentiles (Chapter 24 of 
Book III) to that argument. See also: QDV 22,1. 
 
255 Natural love is not only in the powers of the vegetal soul, but in all the soul’s powers, and also in all the 
parts of the body, and universally in all things…since each single thing has a connaturalness with that 
which is naturally suitable to it.   
 
Dicendum quod amor naturalis non solum est in viribus animae vegetativae, sed in omnibus potentiis 
animae, et etiam in omnibus partibus corporis, et universaliter in omnibus rebus…unaquaeque res habeat 
connaturalitatem ad id quo est sibi conveniens secundum suam naturam. ST I-II 26, 1 ad. 3.  
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257 ST I-II 8, 1; ST I-II 9, 1; QDV 22, 4. 
 
258 It is therefore evident that the will does not will anything necessarily with the necessity of force, yet it 
does will something with the necessity of natural inclination.    
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Rational beings who possess reason and free will also possess an inclination to 
seek the truth.259 Because of that inclination to truth, they have a natural appetite for 
knowledge, and a tendency to engage in contemplation. “Now contemplation of the truth 
befits a man according to his nature as a rational animal: the result being that all men 
naturally desire to know”260 Note that Aquinas mentions our animality when he says that 
it is natural for us to desire knowledge, even though it is in virtue of being rational, not in 
virtue of being animal that human being desires knowledge. But Aquinas refers here to 
human nature, and hence to a complete human being, not merely an intellect. Aquinas 
also lists the inclination to truth, which causes us to have desire for knowledge, among 
other inclinations, including those to preserve our lives and to procreate.261 So, Aquinas 
does not separate different aspects of our nature, except conceptually.   
“All men naturally desire to know” is the opening statement of Aristotle’s 
Metaphysics and Thomas, who wrote a commentary262 on that work clearly refers to that 
statement in this article, as he does in several other places in his writings, although in this 
place he does not explicitly cite Aristotle. The way Thomas explains that particular 
statement of Aristotle shows again how this desire for knowledge is embedded in human 
nature and in the Order of Nature, in which every thing is endowed with natural 
                                                                                                                                                 
Et ita non potest contingere ut voluntas aliquid coacte vel violenter velit, si aliquid naturali inclinatione 
velit. QDV 22,5.                                                      
 
259 ST I-II 94, 2. See also: ST I-II 2, 8 (what we desire is a universal truth and a universal good) and ST I 
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260 Contemplatio atuem veritatis competit homini secundum suam naturam, prout est animal rationale. Ex 
quo contingit quod omnes homines ex natura scire desiderant. ST II-II 180, 7.    
 
261 ST I-II 94, 2.             
 
262 Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics, Latin text: “Commentarium in XII libros 
Metaphysicorum,” in Opera Omnia, Parma, reprinted in New York: Musurgia Publishers, 1949.                                                                   
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inclinations by which it tends to its fulfillment. Thomas says that there are three 
reasons why people desire knowledge. First, each thing desires its perfection. Intellect 
actualizes itself and attains perfection through knowledge. Therefore, a human being, a 
creature endowed with an intellect, desires knowledge.263 Second, each thing has a 
natural inclination to perform its proper operation. The proper operation of an intellect is 
to understand. Therefore, a human being as an intellectual kind of being, is naturally 
inclined to pursue knowledge.264 Third, each thing desires to be united to its source, 
because in this way it can reach its perfection.265 By means of the intellect a human being 
can be – ultimately - united with God, who is the source of the human intellect. In the 
union with God, the human intellect will be perfected, as was discussed above. Therefore, 
it is natural for a human being to desire knowledge.   
According to Aquinas, we are endowed with natural inclination to pursue 
knowledge because in that way we can achieve our perfection and happiness in 
accordance with our nature. The emphasis here is on the intellectual side of our nature 
and the animal side is ignored. However, after giving us the three general reasons for 
pursuing knowledge, Aquinas compares our way of knowing to those of other animals. 
Not surprisingly, he concludes: “Therefore, just as the life of animals is ruled in a perfect 
way by memory together with activity that has become habitual through training, or in 
any other way whatsoever, in a similar way man is ruled perfectly by reason perfected by 
                                                 
 
263 In Met  I 1, 2.         
 
264 In Met  I 1, 3; The claim that  the natural operation of a human being is understanding is also found in 
Aristotle’s Function Argument in the Nichomachean Ethics and in Thomas’s Commentary on Aristotle’s 
Nichomachean Ethics: In NE Book I 10, 127.       
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art.”266 But he gets to this conclusion only after careful comparison between our type 
of sensory perception, our type of memory, and our type of prudence and those of various 
kinds of animals. Aquinas stresses our belonging to the genus animal, even as he points 
out our specific difference as the rational kind of an animal.    
  Our pursuit of knowledge, our desire for knowledge and truth, while characteristic 
of us qua rational beings, is not separated from our animality. Since we are by nature 
animals, nothing which is natural to us could be separated from our animality, even 
though it might not primarily depend on it. Human intellectual activites do not primarily 
depend on our animal features, yet secondarily they do, because humans have to function 
as integrated beings, not disconnected intellects. As we can see from the above discussion 
of natural inclinations, our natural appetite for knowledge is on a continuum with other 
natural appetites, such as our appetite for food, or for sex, or even our natural tendency to 
fall downwards. It is true that the human tendency to contemplate is the appetite which 
follows from our being rational creatures. Thomas does tell us that “tending to wisdom 
refers to the rational love”.267 However, he also says that “natural love is not only in the 
powers of the vegetal soul, but in all the soul’s powers, and also in all the parts of the 
body, and universally in all things…since each single thing has a connaturalness with that 
which is naturally suitable to it.”268 As it is natural for us to seek knowledge and to 
contemplate truth, our tendency to seek knowledge can be also regarded as a natural kind 
of appetite. Our appetite for knowledge which underlies our tendency to contemplate 
                                                 
 
266 Ideo sicut perfectum vitae regimen est animalibus per memoriam, adjuncta asuefactione ex disciplina, 
vel quomodolibet aliter, ita perfectum hominis regimen est per rationem arte perfectam. In Met  I 1, 16.   
        
267 ST I-II 26, 1 ad.1. 
 
268 ST I-II 26, 1 ad.3. 
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cannot be regarded as something separate from other appetites, even those which we 
share with the simplest of beings.  
Human beings are corporeal, living, sentient and rational. Therefore, humans 
possess appetites characteristic of beings which are corporeal (for example the inclination 
to fall down towards the center of the earth), living (for example the nutritive powers of 
the vegetative part of the soul), sentient (for example the passions belonging to the 
sensitive part of the soul) and rational, namely the appetite for knowledge. Since the 
reason is what differentiates us from other animals, we are defined as “rational animals”. 
And among the animals we are the only ones who have an inclination to truth and thus a 
tendency to contemplate.  
Contemplation as Fulfillment in Accordance With Our Nature  
We achieve our fulfillment, our perfection in the vision of Divine Essence, and 
that makes it seem that the animal aspects of our nature, such as the body or the passions 
or various animal kinds of appetites, are not essential to our pursuit of happiness and have 
little if anything to do with our desire for knowledge. But that would be true only if we 
were by nature separated intellects. Aquinas stresses our rationality when he talks about 
our achievement of perfection because rationality is what differentiates us from other 
animals and what constitutes the most important aspect of our nature. But it does not 
follow that rationality constitutes our whole nature, or that the animal aspects of our 
nature can be ignored in our pursuit of happiness. Rationality is our most important trait 
and desire for knowledge is characteristic of us qua rational beings, but qua animals we 
have other kinds of desires which also lead us towards fulfillment and perfection. Those 
desires lead us to attain perfection qua living or sentient beings, but they also move us 
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towards the acquisition of knowledge that perfects us qua rational beings. Even in 
heaven our perfect, eternal happiness includes the resurrection of our bodies and perfect 
functioning of all the parts of the soul, not only the intellective part.269 That is so, because 
otherwise we would not achieve the perfection proper to our nature.  
A human being is an integrated being in which the body and all three parts of the 
soul interact with one another, need one another, and influence one another. The rational 
part of the soul depends on the other parts and the body, for without them reason would 
not receive any information which allows it to make judgments, and there would be 
nothing to will.270 On the other hand, the rational part of the soul influences the sensitive 
part so that the operations of the sensitive soul in a human being i.e., perceptions and 
feelings, assume a different quality, a more noble quality than the same operations in 
other animals.271  Aquinas refers to that influence of the rational part on the “lower” parts 
as the “overflow.”272      
The “lower” parts also influence one another. The sensitive part of the soul is 
influenced by what happens in the body, ruled by the vegetative soul. The sensitive soul 
likewise can influence what happens in the body, since feelings are not just feelings in the 
soul but also physiological reactions.273       
                                                 
269 ST I-II 4, 5; SCG IV 81, 84, 86; ST Supplement 82, 3 and 4. 
 
270 ST I-II 9, 1. 
 
271 ST I-II 24, 1 and 3.         
 
272 ST I- II 3, 3 ad 3; ST I 78, 4 ad 5; ST I-II 30, 1 ad 1; ST I-II 31, 5; ST I-II 32, 8. 
 
273 ST I-II 22,1; ST I-II 28, 5; ST I-II 33,1; ST I-II 35, 4 ad 2 and 8; ST I-II 37, 2 and 4; ST I-II 44, 1,3 and 
4; ST I-II 48 2 and 4.                
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The rational part of the soul is also affected by the physiological processes of 
the body and thus, the vegetative soul. Aquinas often notes such connections. For 
example, he observes that perfection of the body is needed for happiness and specifically 
for success in contemplation274 That is so because bodily indisposition affects intellectual 
operation.275 And in general, Aquinas tells us that bodily perfection is necessary for 
happiness simply because we are composite creatures. Here he even disagrees with St. 
Augustine who claimed that “for the soul to be happy it must be severed from everything 
corporeal” and replies: “But this is unreasonable. For since it is natural to the soul to be 
united to the body; it is not possible for the perfection of the soul to exclude its natural 
perfection.” 276 Aquinas was an Aristotelian, and Aristotle’s hylomorphic theory would 
not allow him to dissociate mind from the body. Thus, according to Aquinas, a well 
functioning body is necessary for our proper moral and intellectual development and thus 
for the achievement of happiness, because what happens to the body influences the 
sensitive and even the rational part of the soul.  
 If the interaction between the vegetative part of the soul and other parts is 
important, interaction between the sensitive and the rational part of the soul is of even 
greater importance. In the pursuit of knowledge, we are guided by senses and by 
passions, both of which are traits of animal nature. Without sensory perception, we could 
                                                 
 
274 ST I-II 4, 6. 
 
275 ST I-II 4, 6 ad 2. 
 
276 Augustinus De Civit. Dei XXII…”sit beata anima, omne corpus fugiendum est” – Sed hoc est 
inconveniens. Cum enim naturale sit animae corpori uniri, non potest esse quod perfectio animae naturalem 
eius perfectionem excludat.  ST I-II 4, 6. Perhaps translating “inconveniens” as “unreasonable” is a little 
too strong, but it may be that the Dominican Fathers who have given us this translation thought that 
Aquinas really felt like that even if he chose a more polite expression. I would like to think that.  
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never acquire any knowledge. Without the cogitative power and without passions we 
could never recognize or focus our attention on things which are good, desirable and 
pleasant. Such things are suitable to us qua animals, but they are also suitable for 
studying, which studying might perhaps lead us to contemplation of some truth. Thus 
contemplation would be impossible for humans if they were not able to use their senses 
and were not led by animal appetites. On the other hand, Thomas says that there is also 
“overflow” from the rational part of the soul towards the “lower” parts,277 and thus 
through the perfection of the rational part, the lower parts are also perfected.278   
Operations of the sensitive soul designate the animal kind of a soul. These 
operations arise from animal inclinations and are designed to help the animal to pursue its 
proper good. Animal inclinations in turn follow upon the natural inclinations of living 
things and simply corporeal things, and are designed to help such things to achieve their 
proper good. All these underlie human activities, for we must function as corporeal, 
living and sentient beings if we are to function as rational human beings.  
Pursuit of our good as corporeal, animate and sentient creatures precedes and is 
necessary for the pursuit of our good as rational creatures. That is why Aquinas says that 
perfection of the body is needed for human perfection and happiness. That is why he says 
that some external goods are necessary for human happiness. Our feelings of attraction, 
our loves, desires and delights guide us towards what is good for us qua animals. What 
we study and contemplate must be something we find pleasant and desirable, and so our 
                                                 
 
277 ST I-II 3, 3 ad 3; ST I 78, 4 ad 5; ST I-II 30,1 ad 1; ST I-II 31,5; ST I-II 32, 8;  ST II-II 175, 4 ad 1; ST 
I-II 4, 5 ad 4. 
 
278 ST I-II 3, 3 ad 3. 
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animal attractions may be also necessary for our pursuit of knowledge, which is a 
good of a rational kind.  
 In order to gain knowledge and truth, we must first possess some good proper to 
us qua animals. Humans, like all beings, are moved towards their ends through their 
natural inclinations. Our natural inclinations mark us as corporeal, animate, sentient 
beings and rational beings. As rational beings, we possess reason and free will which 
allow us to make our own choices. But as corporeal, animate and sentient beings we are 
moved by our natural inclinations, from which follow all our natural desires except for 
the desire for knowledge. Desire for knowledge marks us as rational beings. But to 
pursue knowledge, we must first acquire some good, attain some ends, proper to us qua 
animals. Then we can also possess some knowledge.  
Thus, for the pursuit of knowledge and the practice of contemplation we depend 
on our senses and desires, which in turn depend on the proper functioning of the body. 
The pursuit of knowledge depends on the possession of the goods proper to us qua 
animals. Human desire for knowledge follows from our natural inclination to truth, which 
is the highest of our inclinations. But it is obvious that one cannot indulge in the pursuit 
of truth, unless one physically survives and thrives and thus, we need many other goods 
before we can pursue the good which is truth. Our natural inclinations direct us to 
acquiring all the goods which we need for our happiness, including truth. Contemplation 
is our fulfillment not in opposition to, but following the acquisition of other goods. In that 
way, operations of the sensitive part of the soul are necessary for happiness 
“antecedently”. At least, that is the case in earthly life.  
 101
In heaven, Thomas tells us, we shall be perfected by an “overflow” from the 
higher parts to the lower. He means by this that the perfection and delight of the 
intellectual part of the soul will affect the sensitive soul and even the body. The 
resurrected body will reflect the glory of the soul.279 Desires of a resurrected person will 
be perfectly ordered.280 The resurrected person will experience delight of a sensual nature 
as well as intellectual kind of joy.281 Even the cognitive powers of a human being will be 
perfected in accordance with our nature as rational animals.282 The glory and perfection 
of the intellectual part of the soul will “overflow” into the lower parts and perfect them, 
but not change their natural traits. Then, our fulfillment as rational beings will precede 
our perfection as animals. In that way operations of the sensitive part of the soul will be 
necessary for human happiness “consequently”. Even in heaven, according to Aquinas, 
our animal nature will be preserved, and so, our fulfillment, our happiness, will be the 
happiness of a composite being, a rational animal.  
Conclusion 
Human happiness, which is strictly defined as contemplation of God – whether 
here or in heaven – and which is therefore regarded as a rational activity is nevertheless 
not merely a rational activity. At every step, we are reminded of our animality. Thomas 
tells us that our happiness as complete human beings in heaven will be achieved after our 
bodies are resurrected. On earth, we cannot even begin to contemplate without sensory 
                                                 
279 SCG IV 86 1-3.     
 
280 SCG IV 86, 5.          
 
281 SCG IV 86, 4; ST I-II 4, 5 ad 4. 
 
282 ST I 89, 3;  ST II-II 175, 4 ad 1. 
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input, for we cannot think without phantasms and without receiving some data from 
our senses.  
 But the reason why we begin to contemplate is that we are creatures who possess 
a desire for truth and thus, for the pursuit of knowledge. Desire for knowledge is but one 
of many desires characteristic of us as humans, and together, with those other desires, it 
helps us to pursue and to achieve our final end, which is contemplation of God in heaven.  
 Desires follow from natural inclinations, and all beings possess natural 
inclinations appropriate to them. Natural inclinations orient creatures towards their proper 
good and make it possible for them to achieve their perfection. Humans likewise possess 
a number of natural inclinations among which there is an inclination to truth. The 
achievement of our earthly happiness depends primarily on our pursuit of and 
contemplation of truth, but secondarily, it depends on the pursuit of various other goods, 
to which we are also naturally inclined. Again, we are reminded of our animality, our 
sensitive soul, and our passions.  
The achievement of our perfect happiness in heaven depends on the development 
of moral virtues, which perfect our passions, and for which we even need some external 
goods. The enjoyment of our perfect happiness in heaven requires our animal bodies and 
sensations, not because contemplation of God requires such apparatus, but because we 
who would be contemplating God would need our bodies, senses and passions in order to 
be ourselves.   
 According to Aquinas’s view of human nature, all our natural inclinations orient 
us towards the achievement of our proper good, and that would include those natural 
tendencies to behave which are below the threshold of rational control. That would 
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include the acts of our vegetative soul, and most certainly, the acts of the sensitive 
soul, that is passions.  
In the chapters that follow, I shall examine more closely how the operations of the 
sensitive soul are necessary for human contemplation, how the sensitive soul participates 
in contemplation.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
 SENSATION AND CONTEMPLATION   
 In ST I-II q. 3 a. 3, Thomas Aquinas tells us that, while happiness is essentially an 
operation of the intellectual soul, operations of the sensitive soul belong to happiness in 
two ways.1  First, in this life, the intellect is dependent on the sensitive soul for the 
acquisition of knowledge. Second, in heaven, the sensitive soul will be perfected by the 
influence of the intellective soul. In the body of the article Thomas says:  
Nevertheless the operations of the senses can belong to happiness, both 
antecedently and consequently: antecedently, in respect of imperfect 
happiness, such as can be had in this life, since the operation of the 
intellect demands a previous operation of the sense; consequently, in that 
perfect happiness which we await in heaven; because at the resurrection 
… the body and the bodily senses will receive a certain overflow, so as to 
be perfected in their operations.2  
 
Since the ultimate happiness is contemplation of God in heaven and for that no senses are 
required, happiness cannot be said to essentially consist in the operation of the senses. 
However, in earthly life contemplation does require the operations of the senses as is 
noted in the Objection 1 to ST I-II 3, 3: “But in us the intellective operation depends on 
the sensitive: since we cannot understand without a phantasm.”3 Thomas’s answer to it is: 
                                                 
1 ST I-II 3, 3.  
 
2 Possunt autem operationes sensus pertinere ad beatitudinem antecedenter et consequenter. Antecedenter 
quidem, secundum beatitudinem imperfectam, quails in praesenti vita haberi potest; nam operatio 
intellectus praeexigit operationem sensus. – Consequenter autem, in illa perfecta beatitudine quae 
expectatur in caelo, quia post resurrectionem, fiet quaedam refluentia in corpus et in sensus corporeos, ut in 
suis operationibus perficiantur. Ibid.          
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“This objection proves that the operation of the senses is required antecedently for 
imperfect happiness, such as can be had in this life.”4 Furthermore, Objection 3 to the 
same ST I-II 3, 3 and the answer to it point to the attainment of perfection of the whole 
human being, which in this life proceeds from “the lower part” to the “higher part”, while 
in the life to come the “lower part” will be perfected by an overflow from the “higher 
part”.5 What that means is that in this life we need the operations of the sensitive soul in 
order to achieve the perfection of the “higher part”, i.e., the intellect, while in the life 
after resurrection perfection of the intellectual soul will be the cause of the perfection of 
the sensitive soul. Thus, the operations of the sensitive soul, while not essentially 
belonging to human happiness, nevertheless belong to it in a secondary way.  
We know that happiness, whether the perfect or imperfect one, consists chiefly in 
the activity of contemplation.6 In order to engage in contemplation, we must first acquire 
some knowledge of the thing we are going to contemplate. It is obvious that in order to 
get to the point of contemplating something, we must go through a process of learning, 
for which the operations of the sense are necessary. This means that the operations of the 
sensitive soul, in this case, the operations of the senses, are necessary in order to attain 
earthly happiness. Aquinas also tells us that in heavenly contemplation of God, our 
senses will be engaged again, although not because their operations are necessary for the 
                                                                                                                                                 
3 Sed operatio intellective dependet in nobis ab operatione sensitive, quia ‘non possumus intelligere sine 
phantasmate’ ST I-II 3, 3 ob. 1.  
 
4 Dicendum quod obiectio illa probat quod operatio sensus requiritur antecedenter ad beatitudinem 
imperfectam, quails in hac vita haberi potest. ST I-II 3,3 ad 1. 
 
5 Dicendum quod in perfecta beatitudine perficitur totus homo, sed in inferiori parte per redundatiam a 
superirori. In beatitudine autem imperfecta praesentis vitae, e converse a perfectione inferioris partes 
proceditur ad perfectionem superioris. ST I-II 3, 3 ad 3. 
 
6 ST I-II 3, 5. 
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contemplation of God, but because of the “overflow”, or the influence, from the 
higher (i.e. the rational) part of the soul. In this, way even the senses shall be perfected.  
In Objection 1 and the Reply to it, cited above, Aquinas refers to phantasms, i.e. 
similitudes of material things, which are necessary to enable us to think at all. Phantasms 
are produced in the sensitive part of the soul and are produced by all animals, making 
possible the animal kind of cognition. Aquinas thus points to our animality, in this case 
represented by the operations of the senses and the production of phantasms, as 
something required for earthly happiness, that is earthly contemplation and the steps 
leading to that contemplation.  
Aquinas’s reply to Objection 3 shows the overall dependence on the attainment     
of the intellective soul’s perfection on the operations of the sensitive soul, and vice-versa, 
the attainment of the sensitive soul’s final perfection through the influence of the 
intellective soul. All parts of the human soul are but the parts of the whole soul. The 
sensitive part of the soul helps the intellective part to achieve its perfection in this world, 
and in turn it is perfected by the “overflow” from the higher part, in heaven. In Aquinas’s 
discussion of human nature, we are always reminded of the unity of that nature. Because 
of that unity, not only the rational part of the soul, but also the animal aspects of human 
nature are necessary for the attainment and the enjoyment of happiness, both in this life 
and the next.  
In this chapter, I shall examine how the operations of the senses belong to 
contemplation “antecedently” in this world, and how they belong to contemplation 
“consequently” in the next world, insofar as human nature’s perfection demands it. I shall 
particularly focus on the inner sense of imagination or phantasia. Sensory perceptions 
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are, of course, necessary in the early stages of knowledge acquisition. I argue that 
phantasms, which are derived from sensory perceptions, function in all the intellectual 
operations, and particularly, in the act of contemplation itself. I will show that because 
we are animals, we have to rely on phantasms in our earthly learning and contemplation, 
and that even the saints in heaven will experience phantasms after their bodies are 
resurrected. Thus, aside from the fact that being animal implies dependence on sensory 
perception for the acquisition of knowledge, animal features of human nature also 
manifest themselves in the way humans contemplate. In this chapter I shall examine the 
way contemplation depends on sensory perception – or more precisely on the production 
of phantasms – whereas in the next chapter I shall examine the role of passions in 
contemplation.  
How the Rational Animal Progresses Towards Contemplation  
Being animals we have to rely on our senses and passions in our efforts to acquire 
knowledge and in our approach to contemplation. Although contemplation strictly 
speaking is the operation of the speculative intellect7 and in heaven contemplation of God 
will not require senses,8 on Earth intellection of God does require sense perception. That 
is so, because on earth, acquisition of knowledge begins with material things:  
Since the human intellect in the present state of life cannot understand 
even immaterial created substances, much less can it understand the 
essence of the uncreated substance. Hence it must be said simply that God 
is not the first object of our knowledge. Rather do we know God through 
creatures…while the first object of our knowledge in this life is the 
quiddity of a material thing, which is the proper object of our intellect.9  
                                                 
7 ST I-II 3, 5. 
 
8 ST I-II 3, 3.  
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Thus, before we can contemplate God on earth, we have to learn something about God 
through the study of created, material things. We learn about material things through our 
senses and we are guided in the pursuit of knowledge by our passions.   
 When Thomas writes about our contemplating yet not comprehending God while 
we still live on earth, he stresses the dependence of thinking on the operations of the 
sensitive soul, i.e. perception, sensation, and emotion. Although contemplation is an 
intellectual activity, we who are rational animals must rely on our animal capacities, i.e. 
the senses and the sensitive part of the soul, in order to acquire knowledge and to 
understand things clearly. The human intellect (unlike the angelic intellect) acquires 
intelligible truth from sensible objects: “The intellect of the soul acquires intelligible truth 
from sensible objects, and understands it by a certain discoursing of the reason.”10   
In earthly life, in order to arrive at some truth we might contemplate (whether it be some 
truth about God, or truth of metaphysics) we have to follow a laborious process of 
knowledge acquisition. We are equipped with the desire for knowledge, natural to us 
humans, so that we may arrive at a truth about God, or at least about God’s creation, 
which makes wonder about God. We may contemplate truth we have learned about God 
on earth and wish to contemplate God in heaven. That process of knowledge acquisition 
is complex and at every step it requires not only the operations of the intellective part of 
the soul, but also those of the sensitive part.  
                                                                                                                                                 
9 Dicendum quod cum intellectus humanus secundum statum praesentis vitae non possit intelligere 
substantias immaeriales creatas, ut dictum est, multo minus potest intelligere essentiam substantiae 
increatae. Unde simpliciter dicendum est quod Deus non est primum quod a nobis cognoscitur; sed magis 
per creaturas in Dei cognitionem pervenimus… Primum autem quod intelligitur a nobis secundum statum 
praesentis vitae, est quidditas rei materialis, quae est nostri intellectus obiectum. ST I 88, 3.  
 
10 Intellectus vero animae a sensibilibus rebus accipit inteligibilem veritatem; et cum quodam discursu 
rationis eam intelligit. ST II-II 180, 6 ad 2. 
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Progress from sensing objects to contemplation of abstract truths can be 
described in six steps. The first step is the operation of our senses in response to sensible 
objects, namely, abstraction of the sensible species,11 the second step is the formation of 
the intelligible species, the third is formulation of propositions, the fourth is engagement 
in an argument, the fifth step is grasping the conclusion. Finally, the sixth is 
contemplation of some truth we behold. Let us look at each step briefly and consider 
what if any role sensitive appetite plays at each step. 
Sensing and formation of phantasms  
The first thing we have to do is to observe12 the sensible objects in the world 
around us. Our acquisition of knowledge has to begin with the sensory perception. As 
was already mentioned, Aquinas tells us that the operation of the senses can belong to 
happiness antecedently because “the operation of the intellect demands a previous 
operations of the senses”.13 And he elaborates on that in his discussion of contemplation14 
and of powers of the soul.15 A person deprived of the function of her senses would be 
deprived of the possibility of thinking.16 There is the obvious evidence that persons 
whose sensory organs are not functioning properly have difficulty understanding things 
                                                 
11 One could also distinguish operations of the external senses, from the operations of the internal sense 
responsible for the abstraction of the sensible species, but for the purposes of my argument I treat those as 
one step.        
 
12 I am using the word ‘observe’ as if we are to observe various objects by sight, but, of course, our 
acquisition of knowledge involves any of the senses and their combined operations. The first step of 
contemplation does not preclude any mode of sensory perception.  
 
13 ST I-II 3, 3. 
 
14 ST II-II 180. 
 
15 ST I 84, 85, 86 and 88. 
 
16 ST I 84, 8; ST I 84, 6.  
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which relate to the function of these organs. For example, a blind person cannot 
understand colors. According to Thomas, the explanation is that a person who has never 
seen colors cannot imagine them and thus cannot understand them. According to 
Aquinas, without sensory input a human being would be unable to acquire knowledge. 
He says:  
As we have said above our intellect’s proper and proportionate object is 
the nature of a sensible thing. Now a perfect judgment concerning 
anything cannot be formed, unless all that pertains to that thing’s nature be 
known…But in the present state of life whatever we understand, we know 
by comparison to natural sensible things. Consequently it is not possible 
for our intellect to form a perfect judgment, while the senses are 
suspended, through which sensible things are known to us.17  
 
Thomas compares sensible objects to the tools used in making things, giving an 
example of a smith who cannot form a judgment about a knife unless he knows what a 
knife actually is. In the same way – Thomas says – a natural philosopher cannot form 
judgments about natural things, unless she knows sensible things.   
Thus, we begin our pursuit of knowledge with the senses. Our senses receive the 
sensible species of the objects which affect them.18  A sensible species is the 
configurational state representing the object one is sensing, which object is a composite 
of matter and form.19 The sensible species is the intentional form of a matter-form 
composite,20 which we might perhaps compare to a code signifying a given object. Our 
                                                 
17 Dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, proprium obiectum intellectui nostro proportionatum est natura rei 
sensibilis. Iudicium autem perfectum de re aliqua dari non potest, nisi ea omnia quae ad rem pertinent 
cognoscantur… Omnia autem quae in praesenti statu intelligimus, cognoscuntur a nobis per comparationem 
ad res sensibiles naturales. Unde impossibile est quod sit in nobis iudicium intellectus perfectum cum 
ligamento sensus, per quem res sensibiles cognoscimus. ST I 84, 8.  
 
18 In DA II, 24, 555 and 24, 553. 
 
19 ST I 85, 2 ; ST I 78, 4.  
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senses are characteristically affected by certain objects. For example, skin is affected 
by objects which have texture, temperature and weight; the ear is affected by sound, the 
eye by color etc. To say they are affected means that they undergo a certain change, 
which may be a physical change (for example the skin may become hot), but which must 
also be a formal change, meaning that the configurational state of the object will be 
registered by the sense organ. The form is received by the senses in a way that Aquinas 
calls “spiritual”, like a kind of a code. The senses are affected in a characteristic way 
because it is the form of a given sensible object which causes a change in the sensory 
power.21  
In order to perceive an object, however, it is not enough that animal’s sense-organ 
be stimulated; the received stimulation must be further processed. This is the step of the 
formation of phantasms. Phantasms preserve the sensible form, the sensible species, of a 
matter-form composite.22  Phantasms are similitudes, the immaterial representations of 
material things.23 Thomas locates production of the phantasms in the brain, which is a 
corporeal organ, and thus, part of animal body.24 Phantasms are produced by the inner 
sense called phantasia (also called imagination), which belongs to the sensitive part of 
the soul.25 Phantasms make the sensible species available to consciousness, that is to say 
                                                                                                                                                 
20 Stump, Eleonore, Aquinas, New York: Routledge, 2003, p. 249. 
 
21 For an extensive discussion of the relationship between the form of a sensible object and the organs of 
sense see Macdonald, Paul A. Jr., Knowledge and the Transcendent An Inquiry into the Mind’s 
Relationship to God. Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2009, Part II, chapter 3, 
especially p.86. 
 
22 ST I 79, 4; ST I 84, 7 ad 2; ST I 85, 1 ad 3.  
 
23 ST I 79, 4. 
 
24 ST I 85, 1 ad 3. 
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that without phantasms, we would not be able to realize what we are sensing. 
Phantasms, along with appropriate physiological mechanisms, make it possible for an 
animal to experience sensation.26 
All animals derive phantasms from the sensible species and thus come to know 
something about the objects in their environment. The power to produce phantasms is 
common to humans and to other animals,27 and belongs to the sensitive part of the soul. 
Phantasms need not be visual, though, given the fact that for humans the most important 
sense is sight, many of our phantasms are visual.  However, according to Aquinas, all 
animals’ souls produce phantasms.28 Thus, we begin our acquisition of knowledge with 
sensory perception of material objects, and our souls produce phantasms which are the 
basis of our knowledge of the world. Aquinas often repeats that the higher form 
encompasses what belongs to the lower form,29 and here we see that in our acquisition of 
                                                                                                                                                 
25 There are two operations in the sensitive part. One, in regard of impression only, and thus the operation 
of the senses takes place by the senses being impressed by the sensible. The other is formation, inasmuch as 
the imagination forms for itself an image of an absent thing, or even of something never seen.  
 
Dicendum quod in parte sensitiva invenitur duplex operatio. Una secundum solam immutationem, et sic 
perficitur operatio sensus per hoc quod immutatur a sensibili. Alia operatio est formatio, secundum quod 
vis imaginativa format sibi aliquod idolum rei absentis, vel etiam nunquam visae. ST I 85, 2 ad 3    
 
Also: If there is any movement caused by actual sensation it must resemble sensation, and imagining is the 
only activity of this kind.   
 
Quia si aliquis motus fit a sensu secundum actum, similes est motui sensus, et nihil aliud nisi phantasia 
invenitur esse tale. In DA III 6, 659 See also: ST I 78, 4.          
 
26 For more detailed discussion of  that see Stump pp. 256-262.  
 
27 ST I 84, 2 ad 1. 
 
28 Aquinas writes: All animals have imagination in some sense.  
 
Omnia animalia habent quodammodo phantasiam. In DA III 5, 644.  
 
Aquinas says that there is “imagination of sense” possessed even by the “imperfect animals,” i.e., animals 
generally lacking locomotion like oysters. In DA III, 16, 836-842.  
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knowledge, in the beginning we have to rely on the senses and on the production of 
phantasms. Our acquisition of knowledge begins with sensory perception because we are 
animals.       
Phantasms are retained in memory 30 from which they can be retrieved, and they 
can be also produced by the power of imagination.31 According to Aquinas, both memory 
and imagination are animal senses (so-called inner senses) and belong to the sensitive 
part of the soul.32 Although humans, who are rational animals, can use phantasms, 
memory and imagination in ways in which no other animal can, they must produce and 
store phantasms like any other animal, and can use only those which they have stored. 
Even new things we imagine must be put together from our already stored phantasms.33   
Thus, our learning, our acquisition of knowledge, begins, according to Thomas, 
with the observation of things using our senses. The human intellect has to derive 
knowledge from sensible objects.34 The external senses affect the internal ones, all of 
which are the powers of the sensitive part of the soul, which we share with other animals. 
Thus, we sense objects, form appropriate phantasms, store them in memory, and when 
needed, retrieve them through the power of phantasia (imagination).35 That gives us the 
                                                                                                                                                 
29 The more perfect form virtually contains whatever belongs to the inferior forms.  
 
Forma perfectior virtute continet quidquid est inferiorum formarum. ST I 76, 6 ad 1. See also ST I 77, 2, 4 
and 7; ST I 79, 8 ad 3; ST I 84, 2 ad 3. 
 
30 ST I 78, 4; ST I 79, 6. 
 
31 ST I 78, 4. 
 
32 ST I 79, 6; SCG II, 74, 1528; QDV 10, 2. 
 
33 Aquinas’s example is that of a gold mountain. See: In DA III, 4, 6333; ST I 12, 9 ad 2 and 78, 4.   
 
34 ST I 84, 2;  ST I 55, 3. 
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material for further mental processing. Up to that moment, according to Thomas, we 
are doing only what other animals are doing, for we are using the powers of the sensitive 
part of the soul. Should any of these powers seriously malfunction, we would not be able 
to think.  
Phantasms are also used by the estimative power – the correlate of which in 
humans is the cogitative power - which is cognitive in nature and which, like memory 
and phantasia, is an inner sense, a power of the sensitive soul. All inner senses allow an 
animal to acquire some knowledge about its environment. What a given animal may 
know depends on the nature of that animal. The senses of each animal are affected by 
those forms of sensible objects to which they are suited and these forms are processed by 
the inner senses in ways characteristic of each kind of animal. All these powers help the 
animal to achieve its proper ends.       
Abstraction of intelligible species  
The next step after the production of phantasms is the abstraction of the 
intelligible species from the phantasms. An intelligible species is analogous to the 
sensible species in that it is the immaterial form and a similitude of a given thing. But the 
intelligible species does not preserve the various accidents, various particular material 
characteristics of the thing it represents. The intelligible species only represents the 
thing’s nature. An intelligible species is the quidditative form of a material thing, i.e. that 
form which puts a thing in a given species or genus.36 That gives us the “quiddity” of that 
                                                                                                                                                 
35 ST I 78, 4. 
 
36 ST I 85, 1  See also: Stump p. 264. 
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thing, the understanding of what kind of a thing we are dealing with, or the nature of 
that thing. It is the function of the active intellect to abstract the intelligible species.37  
That abstraction of the intelligible species is, according to Aquinas, peculiarly 
human and not shared with other animals. It is not shared with other animals because it is 
an operation of the intellectual part of the soul, which other animals do not possess. It is 
not shared with other rational creatures either, because they do not derive their 
knowledge from the senses.38  This operation of the intellect marks us as boundary 
creatures, both rational and animal in nature.  
The active intellect abstracts the intelligible species from phantasms and presents 
it to the passive intellect, which receives and preserves it. The intelligible species is 
preserved in the passive intellect, and analogously to the way phantasms enable us to 
sense things, the intelligible species enables the intellect to understand things. The 
intelligible species actualizes the passive intellect’s potentiality for understanding.  
To abstract an intelligible species from a phantasm, the active intellect considers 
the universal nature of the particular represented by the phantasm by discarding any 
individual qualities represented in the particular.39 For example, the phantasm may 
represent Socrates, but the intelligible species signifies a human being, one of whom 
happens to be Socrates. A human being is corporeal and animal, and normally, possesses 
such features as face, four limbs, etc, but does not have particular body of Socrates. 
Thomas notes that: “The intellect…abstracts the species of a natural thing from the 
                                                 
 
37 ST I 84, 6. 
 
38 ST I 57, 1 ad 3. 
 
39 ST I 85, 1 ad 1. 
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individual sensible matter, but not from the common sensible matter.”40 He means 
that while the intellect abstracts from a particular body, the species of a human being has 
to include corporeality. The intelligible species represents the nature of a human being, 
but not the accidents which may belong to a particular human being.  
That is important, because Thomas says that in order to think, the intellect must 
turn to phantasms,41 and so there would be formed (by the imagination) a phantasm 
corresponding to our understanding of what is a human being and that phantasm would 
represent a corporeal, animal creature that is a human being. Thomas says: “Even after 
abstracting the intelligible species, the intellect, in order to understand, needs to turn to 
phantasms in which it understands the species.”42  Thus, to understand what a human 
being is, we need to have in the mind a phantasm which represents a ‘human being’ and 
which represents it as a corporeal being. But the intelligible species is not a phantasm.  
Intelligible species represents a universal nature, not a particular thing. So, in 
order to understand a particular thing, the intellect must turn to a phantasm. This is done 
in three steps. The intellect reflects on its own act of understanding, then on the 
intelligible species, and then on the origin of that intelligible species. Thomas explains it 
like this: “Thus, the mind knows singulars through a certain kind of reflection, as when 
the mind, in knowing its object, which is some universal nature, returns to knowledge of 
its own act, then to the species which is the principle of its act, and, finally, to the 
                                                 
 
40 Intellectus igitur abstrahit speciem rei naturalis a materia sensibili individuali, non autem a materia 
sensibili communi. ST I 85, 1ad 2. 
 
41 ST I 84, 7. 
 
42 Etiam postquam species intelligibiles abstraxerit, non potest secundum eas actu intelligere nisi 
convertendo se ad phantasmata in quibus species intelligibiles intelligit. ST I 86, 1. 
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phantasms from which it has abstracted the species. In this way, it attains to some 
knowledge about singulars.”43 First, the intellect understands that it understands.44 Then, 
the intellect knows that it understands something universal, for example, a human 
being.45 That universal idea corresponds to the intelligible species. But the universal idea 
of a human being is vague and confused: “Now it is evident that to know an object that 
comprises many things, without a proper knowledge of each thing contained in it, is to 
know that thing confusedly.”46 This is the way the intellect knows things at first, for at 
first we know the universal whole before we know something in greater detail. For 
example, Thomas says, the intellect knows what the animal is before it knows a human 
being, and that, before it knows Socrates. What the intellect abstracts is the intelligible 
species, which gives us the specific nature of a thing, for example, human, but not the 
nature of a given individual, for example Socrates. What the intellect knows is the 
universal, not the particular. In order to proceed from the universal to the particular, the 
intellect must recover the phantasm from which that intelligible species was abstracted. 
The intellect cannot know singulars directly, for they are the objects of sense knowledge, 
while the objects of the intellect’s knowledge are universals. The intellect then must 
                                                 
 
43 Et se mens singularis cognoscit per quamdam reflexionem, prout scilicet mens cognoscendo objectum 
suum, quod est aliqua natura universalis, redit in cognitionem sui actus, et ulterius in speciem quae est 
actus sui principium, et ulterius in phantasma a quo species est abstracta; et sic aliquam cognitionem de 
singulari accipit. QDV 10, 5.                  
 
44 ST I 87, 3. 
 
45 ST I 85, 3.  
 
46 Manifestum est autem quod cognoscere aliquid in quo plura continentur, sine hoc quod habeatur propria 
notitia uniuscuiusque eorum quae continentur in illo, est cognoscere aliquid sub confusione quadam. Ibid.  
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communicate with the interior senses of the sensitive part of the soul 47 and together 
form a combination of the intelligible species and phantasm.48 Through that combination 
of the intelligible species and phantasm, the knowledge of a singular thing existing in the 
real world becomes possible. In the real world the natures of things exist in the actual 
things. For example, there is no nature of a stone separated from actual stones, and that is 
why phantasms of particular things are needed in order to understand material objects. 
When the phantasm representing a particular thing is retrieved, the knowledge of that 
particular thing is made possible. Still, the intellect cannot know a singular thing directly, 
only indirectly as represented by a phantasm, and thus, it cannot know it completely.49  
When the intellect posseses the intelligible species, by which it can understand the 
universal nature, and the phantasm which is associated with that intelligible species, then 
the intellect forms a mental concept of that thing - for example ‘human being’ – which 
concept may be expressed by a word.50    
Aquinas tells us that we have to understand things through phantasms,51 because             
as rational animals we share some traits with both: the purely rational creatures (angels) 
and with other animals. We share with other rational creatures the ability to understand 
truths, for the understanding of which we need the intelligible species. We share with 
other animals the dependence on phantasms, even though we are capable of intellectual 
                                                 
47 QDV 10, 5 ad 2. 
 
48 Klubertanz, George P., S. J. The Philosophy of Human Nature, New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 
Inc., 1953, p.182.   
 
49 ST I 86, 1.    
 
50 ST I 85, 2 ad 3. 
 
51 ST I 85, 1 ad 5; ST I 85, 7; ST I 86, 1;  In DA III 12, and III 13, 791-794. 
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acts like contemplation.52 Perhaps this quote is the best summary of that dependence 
of human intellect on phantasms: “Our intellect both abstracts the intelligible species 
from the phantasms, inasmuch as it considers the natures of things in universal, and, 
nevertheless, understands these natures in the phantasms, since it cannot understand even 
the things of which it abstracts the species without turning to the phantasms.”53  
Thomas repeats again and again that in the present life at least we cannot 
understand anything without turning to phantasms, we cannot think without phantasms.54 
We need to turn to phantasms in order to understand and to explain things.55 Thomas 
appeals to our own experience of thinking and the way we form phantasms, that is 
examples of things we are trying to understand. He also appeals to our experience of 
learning and teaching: “For this reason it is that when we wish to help someone to 
understand something, we lay examples before him, from which he forms phantasms for 
the purpose of understanding.”56 Our thinking depends on the formation of phantasms, 
because to form concepts, any concepts, we have to rely on phantasms. To form concepts 
of material things we find in the world around us, we need phantasms first in order to 
abstract the intelligible species, and then in order to understand to what the abstracted 
species refers. Even in forming the concepts of mathematics or metaphysics we need to 
                                                 
 
52 ST I 85, 1. 
 
53 Dicendum quod intellectus noster et abstrahit species intelligibiles a phantasmatibus, inquantum 
considerat naturas rerum in universali; et tamen intelligit eas in phantasmatibus, quia non potest intelligere 
ea quorum species abstrahit, nisi convertendo se ad phantasmata. ST I 85, 1 ad 5. 
 
54 ST I 84, 7; ST I 85, 1; ST I 86, 1. 
 
55 ST I 84, 7. 
 
56 Et inde est etiam quod quando aliquem volumus facere aliquid intelligere, proponimus ei exempla, ex 
quibus sibi phantasmata formare possit ad intelligendum. ST I 84, 7. 
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use phantasms.57  The phantasms may be direct representations of material objects, or 
they may be formed by the imagination to represent the objects we have never 
experienced.58 The intellect abstracts the intelligible species from a phantasm, and then it 
commands the power of imagination to form the phantasm corresponding to the concept 
the intellect has formed.59 It may be said that our concepts are carried by phantasms.  
Formation of propositions   
After we have formed concepts, we may proceed to the operation of “composition 
and division”, that is, formation of propositions. As was explained above, the intellect 
knows things first in a general way, gradually refining its understanding of the nature of a 
given thing. First, the intellect knows generally, what a given object is, for example, that 
it is a man. Then the intellect gradually understands some of the object’s properties and 
accidents, for example, details of a given man’s appearance. As Aquinas tells us, we first 
apprehend the quiddity of the object, then, come to understand some of its properties and 
                                                 
 
57 ST I 85, 1 ad 2; ST I 86, 2.      
 
58 ST I 78,4; ST I  84,7 ad 3; ST I  86, 2. 
 
59 Hence, the possible intellect, before possessing the intelligible species, is related in one way to the 
phantasm which it needs, and in another way after receiving that  species; before, it needs that phantasm in 
order to receive from it the intelligible species, and thus the phantasm stands in relation to the possible 
intellect as the object moving the latter; but, after the species has been received into the possible intellect, 
the latter needs the phantasm as the instrument or foundation of its species, so that the possible intellect is 
then related to the phantasm as efficient cause. For by the intellect’s command there is formed in the 
imagination a phantasm corresponding to such and such an intelligible species, the latter being mirrored in 
this phantasm as an exemplar in the thing exemplified or in the image.  
 
Alio ergo modo se habet intellectus possibilis ad phantasma quo indiget, ante speciem inteligibilem: et alio 
modo postquam recepit speciem intelligibilem. Ante enim, indiget eo ut ab eo accipiat speciem 
intelligibilem: unde se habet ad in intellectum possibilem ut obiectum movens. Sed post speciem in eo 
receptam, indiget eo quasi instrumento sive fundamento suae speciei: unde se habet ad phantasmata sicut 
causa efficiens; secundum enim imperium intellectus formatur in imaginatione phantasma conveniens tali 
speciei intelligibili, in quo resplendet species intelligibilis sicut exemplar in exemplato sive in imagine. 
SCG II 73, 38.  
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then the relations between these properties and the essence.60 We do it by comparing 
and contrasting things. That comparing and contrasting is what Thomas calls 
“composition and division,” and we call “formation of propositions.”     
But, as Thomas keeps reminding us, to understand the quiddity of things, we must 
have phantasms which are derived from sensory experience. Even as we are already 
thinking in abstract terms and noting relations between whole classes of objects, we are 
still thinking by using phantasms. It takes time to form a proposition, it is not 
instantaneous, because we have to use phantasms. Thomas says: “Although the intellect 
abstracts from the phantasms, it does not understand actually without turning to the 
phantasms … And forasmuch as it turns to the phantasms, composition and division of 
the intellect involve time.”61 And so, again we find that we cannot think without 
phantasms, even at the stage at which we are forming propositions.  
Reasoning  
The next step is the phase in which we engage in reasoning, i.e., syllogizing, and 
also in further abstraction. Thomas calls it “discursive reasoning”. 62 We have formed 
propositions using the concepts we have acquired, and we know the First Principles.63  
Using our knowledge of both, we can derive certain conclusions, which we can use as 
                                                 
60 ST I 85, 5.    
 
61 Dicendum quod intellectus et abstrahit a phantasmatibus; et tamen non intelligit actu nisi convertendo se 
ad phantasmata …Et ex ea parte qua se ad phantasmata convertit, compositioni et divisioni intellectus 
adiungitur tempus. ST I 85, 5 ad 2. 
 
62 ST I 85, 5; ST I 90, 1; ST II-II 180, .6 ad 2. 
 
63 ST I 79, 12 c. and 12 ad 3; QDV10, 6 c. and 6 ad 6.  
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premises of the next argument, etc. In the process of reasoning we formulate 
judgments,64 for example, “Human being is a rational animal.” 
The process of reasoning through which we arrive at conclusions involves 
abstract thinking. It is a process fraught with danger of mistakes. There are many ways in 
which we can be mistaken in our conclusions, or in the formulation of propositions used 
in the argument.65 For example, we might be mistaken in our understanding of the 
various accidents of things and their relations. To use the example mentioned above, we 
might be mistaken regarding the height of the man we meet or the shape of his nose. 
Then our judgment that he looks like Socrates would be false. Even before we get to the 
step of forming propositions, our senses might be deceived regarding some accidental 
sensible properties. The intellect may be also mistaken with respect to the definition of 
the object. Aquinas here gives an example of a definition which includes incompatible 
features, i.e. a rational winged animal.  Thus, we may go astray in the process of 
reasoning. However, Aquinas tells us that when it comes to understanding the quiddity of 
objects we cannot be deceived, for the proper object of the intellect is the quiddity of 
sensible things. Also we cannot be deceived with regard to the First Principles, because 
we understand them as soon as we understand the terms involved.       
We engage in discursive reasoning because we are the lowest ranking of rational 
creatures. Angels understand everything at once; angels understand all the conclusions 
                                                 
 
64 ST I 16, 2. 
 
65 ST I 85, 6. 
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and the reasons for them, without the laborious process of reasoning.66 We humans 
have to syllogize, and before that, we need to form propositions, acquire concepts and 
receive data from our senses because our rational intellect is joined to the animal body 
and the non-rational parts of the soul. Because of that we depend on our senses to get the 
initial information about things, and we depend on phantasms in our thinking.  
We need phantasms not only at the beginning of the intellective process, as the 
material from which to abstract the intelligible species, but also at the end, to represent 
the judgment we have arrived at. There has to be unity in the judgment. Aquinas says:  
Many things, in so far as they are distinct, cannot be understood at once; 
but in so far as they are comprised under one intelligible concept, they can 
be understood together. Now everything is actually intelligible according 
as its image is in the intellect. All things, then, which can be known as one 
intelligible species, are apprehended as one intelligible object, and 
therefore are understood simultaneously.67  
 
What he means by that is that we cannot focus on several intelligible concepts at once, 
but only on one at a time. We may, of course, turn our attention from one intelligible 
concept to another, but we cannot hold all of those concepts in the mind and see each one 
of them distinctly at the same time. What we understand can be expressed in words, in a 
form of judgment, for example, “Human being is a rational animal.”68 That notion of a 
human being as a rational animal is a single idea and must correspond to an intelligible 
species.  Aquinas also says: “Now everything is actually intelligible according as its 
                                                 
66 ST I 58, 3.  
 
67 Multa secundum quod sunt distincta, non possunt simul intelligi; sed secundum quod uniuntur in uno 
intelligibili, sic simul intelliguntur. Unumquodque autem est intelligibile in actu, secundum quod eius 
similitudo est in intellectu. Quaecumque igitur per unam speciem intelligibilem cognosci possunt 
cognoscuntur ut unum intelligibile; et ideo simul cognoscuntur. ST I 58, 2  See also: ST I 85, 2.        
             
68 ST I 16, 2; ST I 85, 2.  
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image is in the intellect.”69 What is in the intellect is the intelligible species, and that 
intelligible species, in turn, has to correspond to a phantasm. In this life, we cannot 
understand anything unless we turn to phantasms which correspond to the ideas we 
understand.70 The phantasms corresponding to what we have come to understand and 
also, what we have contemplated, are produced by the imagination (phantasia),71 but this 
time not as a result of sensation, but as a result of a command of the intellect.                      
Thus, our process of reasoning brings us to the understanding of something, to the 
formulation of a judgment. The intellect produces the intelligible species, by which we 
understand something. The inner sense of phantasia, in turn, produces a phantasm, which 
represents the idea we have come to understand. Whatever is understood has to be 
represented by a phantasm. Thus the intellect needs to be assisted by the operation of the 
sensitive soul in order to understand. We need phantasms in order to understand.  
 
 
 
                                                 
 
69 Unumquodque autem est intelligibile in actu, secundum quod eius similitude est in intellectu.  ST I 58, 2.        
 
70 In the present state of life in which the soul is united to a passible body, it is impossible for our intellect 
to understand anything actually, except by turning to the phantasms.   
 
Dicendum quod impossibile est intellectum secundum praesentis vitae statum, quo passibili corpori 
coniungitur, aliquid intelligere in actu, nisi convertendo se ad phantasmata. ST I 84, 7.  
 
Also: We do not understand the things whose species are in the possible intellect without the presence of 
phantasms disposed for this purpose.   
 
Non intelligimus ea quorum species sunt in intellectu possibili nisi adsint phantasmata ad hoc disposita. 
SCG II 73, 40  See also: SCG II 73, 3.8.                                                
 
71 The inner sense of phantasia functions in a human being not only as a power producing phantasms in 
response to sensation, but also as a creative imagination, in response to the command of the intellect. See: 
ST I 78, 4.                     
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Arriving at conclusions  
The next step is the understanding of some truth which we have discovered 
through the process of reasoning.72 If we reason correctly, we would arrive at the 
understanding of truth about something. We reach a conclusion and know that it is so. 
Only a rational creature may possess that kind of understanding.   
It might seem at first that reaching the conclusion is identical with contemplation 
of that truth, but according to Thomas it is not. As was explained at the beginning of this 
chapter, contemplation goes beyond reasoning, for contemplation is “gazing upon” the 
truth we came to understand.                         
Contemplation  
The final step is the contemplation in which we become aware that the truth we 
are contemplating lies beyond our powers to comprehend. As was discussed in chapter 1, 
when we contemplate, we also realize that the object of our contemplation is always 
beyond our full comprehension, and this applies not only to God, but also to objects 
which belong to the created world. As for God, Thomas says:  
Now the contemplation of the divine truth is competent to us imperfectly, 
namely through a glass in a dark manner … hence it bestows on us a 
certain inchoate beatitude, which begins now and will be continued in the 
life to come; wherefore the Philosopher places man’s ultimate happiness 
in the contemplation of the supreme intelligible good.73  
 
Aquinas, of course, interprets Aristotle’s “supreme intelligible good” as God. In 
this life, we can contemplate only truths about God, not God’s essence, and thus we are 
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73 Nunc autem contemplatio divinae veritatis competit nobis imperfecte, videlicet per speculum et in 
aenigmate: unde per eam fit nobis quaedam inchoatio beatitudinis, quae hic incipit ut in futuro terminetur. 
Unde et Philosophus…in contemplatione optimi intelligibilis ponit ultimam felicitatem hominis. ST II-II 
180, 4.  
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able to contemplate divine truth only imperfectly. Even so, earthly contemplation of 
divine truth gives us a foretaste of the divine beatitude.  
As was mentioned above, Aquinas also says that we may contemplate objects 
other than God himself; that we may contemplate the created world because such 
contemplation eventually leads us to contemplation of God. As was discussed in chapter 
1, we cannot comprehend God, and even contemplation of metaphysical subjects other 
than God brings us to the limit of our understanding.  
When we reach contemplation, the soul, Thomas tells us,  has to withdraw its 
attention from external objects, reasoning must be laid aside, and all the soul’s operations 
must be concentrated upon the simple contemplation of truth, grasped by the speculative 
intellect.74 In contemplation, there is no error. Thomas also refers to contemplation as 
being “uniform,” by which he means that, unlike in the case of abstracting intelligible 
species from phantasms, and unlike reasoning in which we move from one step to 
another, contemplation is a uniform concentration on the truth.75 In saying that in 
contemplation there is no discursive reasoning and no error, Aquinas follows Dionysius 
and says: “Discursing must be laid aside and the soul’s gaze fixed on the contemplation 
of one simple truth. In this operation of the soul there is no error, even as there is clearly 
no error in the understanding of first principles which we know by simple intuition.”76 
Dionysius compares contemplation to the understanding of the first principles; however, 
                                                 
74 ST II-II 180, 6 ad 2. 
 
75 Ibid.       
 
76 Cessante discursu, figatur eius intuitus in contemplatione unius simplicis veritatis. Et in hac operatione 
animae non est error: sicut patet quod circa intellectum primorum principiorum non erratur, quae simplici 
intuitu cognoscimus. ST II-II 180, 6 ad 2. 
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that understanding is necessary at the beginning of the process of our coming to know 
something, whereas the contemplation comes at the end. Knowledge of the first 
principles is necessary if we are to correctly proceed with reasoning.77 Contemplation 
goes beyond discursive reasoning. In the steps leading to contemplation, we study the 
causes of the effects we observe. In contemplation, we do not engage in discursive 
reasoning, in connecting causes and effects. In contemplation we already understand the 
effects in relation to their cause.78 In the act of contemplation, we no longer engage in 
reasoning, for we know the truth.79  In contemplation we have an immediate grasp of the 
truth, we understand it. When we understand something, we know it for certain.80 We 
contemplate what we understand, and thus contemplation goes beyond reasoning and 
admits no error. In contemplation, we simply regard what we already know to be truth.81  
The truth we contemplate we may know because we have arrived at it after 
lengthy research, or we may know it because of a sudden realization of truth, or we may 
know it by God’s grace, but no matter by which path we have gained this truth, we just 
know it.82 At this point, we also become aware that we cannot fully understand the object 
we contemplate.83   
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79 ST I 79, 10 ad 2.       
 
80 ST I 79, 10.          
 
81 ST II-II 180, 3 ad 1, and 6 ad 2.         
 
82 ST II-II 180 3, 5 and 6. See also Pieper, Happiness and Contemplation, p.74. 
 
83 ST II-II 180, 3 ad. 3.                           
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Contemplation goes beyond study, reasoning, or judgment. Contemplation 
becomes possible only when we have come to understand the cause of something. 
Ultimately, the cause of causes is God, thus ultimately contemplation ought to be 
contemplation of God. But on earth, as was explained above, we cannot contemplate God 
directly, in an unmediated way, so, on earth, we must learn about God through His 
creatures.84 Hence, on earth, our object of contemplation is not God Himself, i.e., God’s 
essence, but some truth about God.     
What makes contemplation different from all other acts of the intellect is the fact 
that we go beyond any reasoning and are simply gazing upon the truth, which we know 
for certain.85 However, it is the whole human being who engages in contemplation, not 
only a separated intellect. A human being is a kind of an animal, and human way of 
contemplating also reflects our animal nature. Because qua animals we possess a 
sensitive soul, human thought processes require the use of phantasms.86 Phantasms figure 
in all our intellectual acts, including the formation of concepts, formulation of 
propositions, and reasoning. According to Aquinas, phantasms are also used by us when 
we contemplate:  
In the present state of life human contemplation is impossible without 
phantasms, because it is connatural to man to see the intelligible species in 
the phantasms…Yet intellectual knowledge does not consist in the 
phantasms themselves, but in our contemplating in them the purity of the 
intelligible truth: and this not only in natural knowledge, but also in that 
which we obtain by revelation.87  
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85 ST II-II 180, 6 ad 2.  
 
86 ST I 84, 7.        
 
87 Dicendum quod contemplatio humana, secundum statum praesentis vitae, non potest esse absque 
phantasmatibus: quia connaturale est homini ut species intelligibiles in phantasmatibus videat…Sed tamen 
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Of course, we do not contemplate phantasms; in contemplation, we concentrate on the 
truth we understand. However, while we do not focus on phantasms, we still need to use 
them as mental tools to help us to focus on the truth we are contemplating. Undoubtedly, 
those phantasms are different for each person, and reflect that person’s lifetime of 
experience and powers of imagination.88 According to Aquinas, humans are not capable 
of imageless thinking, because we are animals.89 Thus, in all acts of human intellect, even 
in contemplation, phantasms are used. In this way the sensitive soul participates in the 
acts of intellect, even in contemplation.     
Our Knowledge of Immaterial Things  
Objects fit for contemplation, according to Thomas Aquinas, are the truths of 
physics, mathematics, metaphysics and, above all, theology.While we begin our 
progression towards contemplation with the sensing of material objects, the truths we 
finally contemplate are theoretical ideas. The question arises what role the operations of 
the sensitive soul plays in our coming to know those truths.       
In order to contemplate being, goodness, etc. we have to derive those concepts 
from our knowledge of material things, which begins with the operations of the senses 
and the sensitive soul. As was mentioned before, according to Thomas, mathematical 
concepts such as infinity, and some metaphysical concepts, are derived from our 
                                                                                                                                                 
intellectualis cognitio non sistit in ipsi phantasmatibus, sed in eis contemplatur puritatem intelligibilis 
veritatis. Et hoc non solum in cognitione naturali, sed etiam in eis quae per revelationem cognoscimus.           
ST II-II 180, 5 ad 2.  
 
88 Wilhelmsen, Frederick D., Man’s Knowledge of Reality, Prentice-hall, Inc. 1956, pp.114-117.   
 
89 Among rational creatures only humans are animals. Angels are also rational creatures and they, of 
course, do not use phantasms, since they are not embodied. ST I 57, 1 and 2.  
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experience of material things.90 We learn about goodness on the basis of experience 
and our understanding of first principles.91 What we know of such concepts like ‘being’ 
or ‘unity’ we need to derive by reflection on various features of material things, even 
though we can consider immaterial beings.92 Concepts of physics, mathematics or 
metaphysics not only derive from but also pertain to material things. However, some 
notions, according to Aquinas, such as ‘soul’, ‘angel’, or ‘God’ pertain to immaterial 
entities.   
According to Aquinas, we do not know the quiddities of immaterial things. We 
cannot know them because the human intellect acquires knowledge by sensing and then 
abstracting the quiddity of material things, and it cannot do so with immaterial things. 
What we can know in this life we can only know by means of sense perception and the 
formation of phantasms: “But in Aristotle’s opinion, which experience corroborates, our 
intellect in its present state of life has a natural relationship to the natures of material 
things; and therefore it can only understand by turning to the phantasms … thus it clearly 
appears that immaterial substances which do not fall under sense and imagination, cannot 
first and per se be known by us, according to the mode of knowledge which experience 
proves us to have.”93 So, we cannot know the quiddities of immaterial substances, 
                                                 
 
90 ST I 85, 1 ad 2. Also, as was mentioned above, we form the concept of infinity empirically by 
considering that we can always add more to however many things there are. ST I 86, 2.  
 
91 ST I 77,1 2 ad 3 and ST I-II 94, 2. 
 
92 ST I 85, 1.  
 
93 Sed secundum Aristotelis sententiam quam magis experimur, intellectus noster secundum statum 
praesentis vitae naturalem respectum habet ad naturas rerum materialium; unde nihil intelligit nisi 
convertendo se ad phantasmata …Et sic manifestsum est quod substantias immateriales, quae sub sensu et 
imaginatatione non cadunt, primo et per se secumdum modum cognitionis nobis expertum, intelligere non 
possumus. ST I 88, 1. 
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because their quiddity is entirely different from the quiddity of material things, and it 
is the quiddity of material things that the human intellect is designed to know.94 And yet, 
Thomas is of the opinion that we may know something about immaterial things.   
Thomas says that we can have some knowledge of immaterial things on the basis 
of what we know of material ones. He says:  
Incorporeal things, of which there are no phantasms, are known to us by 
comparison with sensible bodies of which there are phantasms. Thus we 
understand truth by considering a thing of which we possess the truth; and 
God, as Dionysius says…we know as cause, by way of excess and by way 
of remotion. Other incorporeal substances we know, in the present state of 
life, only by way of remotion or by some comparison to corporeal things.95  
 
And again he says: “But we may have a scientific knowledge of them [immaterial 
things] by way of negation and by their relation to material things.”96 We may learn about 
immaterial substances by considering how they must differ from the material substances, 
i.e., what they are not. Immaterial things have no bodies, no size or shape etc. Thus, we 
realize that they are not composed of matter, that they have no extension, that they cannot 
be sensed. That does not tell us what they are (what is their quiddity), but it does tell us 
something about them, by way of negation. Thomas calls it the method of “remotion” or 
“negation”.             
                                                 
 
94 ST I 88, 2.  
 
95 Dicendum quod incorporea, quorum non sunt phantasmata, cognoscuntur a nobis per comparationem ad 
corpora sensibilia, quorum sunt phantasmata. Sicut veritatem intelligimus ex consideratione rei circa quam 
veritatem speculamur; Deum autem, ut Dionysius dicit, cognoscimus ut causam, et per excessum, et per 
remotionem; alia etiam incorporeas substantias in statu praesentis vitae cognoscere non possumus nisi per 
remotionem vel aliquam comparationem ad corporalia. ST I 84, 7 ad 3. 
 
96 Sed de eis nobis in scientiis documenta traduntur per viam remotionis et alicuius habitudinis ad res 
materiales. ST I 88, 2 ad 2  See also SCG I, 14. 
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What we know about God, aside from revelation, we know by considering 
what God is not, or by considering that God must be the most perfect of all things, or by 
reflection about causality. Those are the methods of “remotion” or “negation”, 
“preeminence” and “excess”. We gain some knowledge about God by the method of 
“remotion”, that is by considering what God is not and thus removing those features of 
corporeal objects we know, forming by this process an idea of God. He explains this in 
more detail in Summa Contra Gentiles,97 where he writes that: “Furthermore, we 
approach nearer to knowledge of God according as through our intellect we are able to 
remove more and more things from Him.”98 Thus, we can start by removing such features 
like corporeality, diversity, etc., and arrive at the conclusion that God must be a spirit, 
that He must be one, etc. We also learn something about God when we realize that in 
God there is a preeminence of goodness, being or beauty.99 For, if we consider that 
among all the things which are good there must be something which is absolute 
goodness, we realize that that ultimate good is God: “So that here is something which is 
truest, something best, something noblest, and, consequently, something which is 
uttermost being…Therefore there must also be something which is to all beings the cause 
of their being, goodness, and every other perfection; and this we call God.”100  This is the 
method of “preeminence”. The third method is that of “excess” and this refers to the 
                                                 
 
97 SCG I 14. 
 
98 Tantoque eius notitiae magis appropinquamus, quanto plura per intellectum nostrum ab eo poterimus 
removere. SCG I 14, 2.   
 
99 ST I 1, 3. 
 
100 Est igitur aliquid quod est verissimum, et optimum, et nobilissimum, et per consequens maxime ens; … 
Ergo est aliquid quod omnibus entibus est causa esse et bonitatis et cuius libet perfectionis, et hoc dicimus 
Deum. ST I 2, 3. 
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demonstration of God’s existence on the basis of causality. We consider God as the 
cause of being and goodness. Thomas gives us five ways in which we can prove God’s 
existence101 and all of them present God as the First Cause. To arrive at the conclusion 
that God is the First Cause and the Creator, we must reflect on the causes and effects we 
observe and by regress arrive at the conclusion that there must be a First Cause. Showing 
that God is the cause of being and goodness is, according to Thomas, the most important 
of our methods of gaining knowledge about God.102 Thus, although we are not capable of 
knowing God’s essence in this life, we can know something about Him.  
In the process of forming concepts, we must begin with sensory perception and 
phantasms. Thomas says: “And, therefore, when we understand something about these 
things, we need to turn to phantasms of bodies, although there are no phantasms of the 
things themselves.”103  To form a concept of immateriality, we have to start by 
considering material things to realize that there is the First Cause, we must reflect on 
causality of things observable to us. We can try to understand something about 
immaterial things only by reflecting on how they differ from the material ones, and how 
they relate to the material ones. In those reflections, we necessarily use our knowledge of 
sensible things, and thus, we also use phantasms, because, as was explained above, we 
cannot think without phantasms. To come to any knowledge about immaterial things, we 
must rely on our knowledge of sensible ones, and the laborious process of acquiring that 
knowledge. Again, our animality manifests itself in our dependence on the senses and the 
                                                 
 
101 ST I 1, 3.  
 
102 ST I 1, 3. 
 
103 Et ideo cum de huiusmodi aliquid intelligimus, necesse habemus converti ad phantasmata corporum, 
licet ipsorum non sint phantasmata. ST I 84, 7 ad 3.   
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fact that the human intellect is designed to know the quiddity of material things, the 
kind of things we can sense.  
Contemplation of God  
As was explained above, we cannot actually comprehend God. And as I argued, 
we cannot fully comprehend even those truths we may contemplate which pertain to 
God’s creation, and therefore indirectly, to God. So, what do we actually contemplate? 
It must be that in our earthly life, in ordinary contemplation, we can only contemplate 
some truths which we discover by the process of knowledge acquisition described above.  
Thomas says that in this life we cannot know God directly, but only in a mediated 
way, through the knowledge we gain about the created world: “Hence it must be said 
simply that God is not the first object of our knowledge. Rather do we know God through 
creatures.”104 As was discussed above, according to Thomas, we can find out some facts 
about God, just like we find out some facts about immaterial substances, by the method 
of “remotion”, i.e. by considering what God is not,105 by reflecting on the relative 
perfection of things and realizing that God must be perfection itself 106 or by considering 
causes and effects.107      
God is not material. As was mentioned above, the human mind cannot know 
immaterial substances, although it can derive some knowledge of them through the 
                                                 
104 Unde simpliciter dicendum est quod Deus non est primum quod a nobis cognoscitur; sed magis per 
creaturas in Dei cognitionem pervenimus. ST I.88, 3. 
 
105 SCG I 14;  ST I 84, 7 ad 3. 
 
106 ST I 1, 3. 
 
107 Ibid. 
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knowledge of material substances.108 Thus, it follows that when we try to learn some 
truth about God, we must study some material substances, some phenomena of this 
world, and by the process of reasoning arrive at the knowledge of some truth about God. 
In this way, what we learn about God are the attributes of God.  
Thus, in order to contemplate God, we must first learn about the world in which 
we live, and for that, we are equipped with the desire for knowledge which follows from 
the basic inclination to truth and leads us to explore the world around us. The acquisition 
of knowledge, i.e. learning and studying, is the first step to contemplation. As Thomas 
says: “Man reaches the knowledge of truth in two ways. First, by means of things 
received from another. In this way, as regards the things he receives from God, he needs 
prayer…while as regards the things he receives from man, he needs hearing, in so far as 
he receives from the spoken word, and reading, in so far as he receives from the tradition 
of Holy Writ. Secondly, he needs to apply himself by his personal study, and thus he 
requires meditation.”109 Thus, we are told that in regard to things received from man, we 
attain truth by the study of texts, and by personal study and meditation. A serious 
contemplative would have to study learned texts, and especially the Holy Writ. However 
nobody, not even the greatest philosopher, is born knowing how to read, or even knowing 
what these words mean. Before we can contemplate what the Bible can teach us, there is 
a lot more we need to learn. Also, whatever we learn about the world, we may use it in 
                                                 
 
108 ST I 89, 2.  
 
109 Dicendum quod homo ad cognitionem veritatis pertingit dupliciter. Uno modo, per ea quae ab alio 
accipit. Et sic quidem, quantum ad ea quae homo a Deo accipit, necessaria est oratio …Quantum vero ad ea 
quae accipit ab homine, necessarius est auditus, secundum quod accipit ex voce loquentis; et lectio, 
secundum quod accipit ex eo quod per scripturam est traditum. Alio modo, necessarium est quod adhibeat 
proprium studium. Et sic requiritur meditatio. ST II-II 180,3 ad 4.  
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our meditations and relate that knowledge to God. The study of any truth perfects 
human intellect.               
Contemplation of God and the Use of Phantasms    
In our studies, we search for causes, and that should eventually bring us to the 
consideration of the First Cause, which is God. We can know something about God only 
after we have done some investigation that leads us to conclusion that God is immaterial 
or that God is the First Cause, etc. By learning the attributes of God, we also come to 
realize that we cannot sense or comprehend God, and that there is no such thing as a 
phantasm of God. This presents us with a problem in the investigation of how humans 
contemplate God. Humans have to rely on phantasms for their thinking processes, yet 
there is no phantasm of God. The question is whether we need to use phantasms even at 
the stage of contemplation, even when we are contemplating God.    
Aquinas explicitly says that we do use phantasms while we are contemplating: “In 
the present state of life human contemplation is impossible without phantasms, because it 
is connatural to man to see the intelligible species in the phantasms.”110 We need 
phantasms in order to abstract the intelligible species and in order to use it for thinking. 
But he explains that we do not concentrate our attention on those phantasms, only on the 
intelligible truth we are contemplating. The phantasms are there, used like mental tools 
which make it possible for us to have thoughts.   
Aquinas’s texts reveal that our contemplation of God, while we are still living 
earthly life involves the use of phantasms, not in the sense that God is represented by a 
                                                 
110 Dicendum quod contemplatio humana, secundum statum praesentis vitae, non potest esse absque 
phantasmatibus: quia connaturale est homini ut species intelligibiles in phantasmatibus videat. ST II-II 180, 
5 ad 2. 
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phantasm, but in the sense that we use phantasms in our thinking about God. Our 
contemplation of anything, including God, must involve phantasms, because being 
animals we must use phantasms in our thinking processes.                                                 
In earthly life, when we say that we contemplate God, we really contemplate 
truths about God, which we express as judgments.111 For example, we might contemplate 
such truths like: “God is incorporeal,” or “God is powerful.” What we know about God 
we know by reflecting about causes, by reflecting about the highest degree of perfection 
and by reflecting about what God is not. Some of these ideas are expressed in negative 
judgments such as: “God is not corporeal,” or “nothing on earth is as perfect as God.” 
However, Aquinas says that we can also make claims about God, which are expressed in 
affirmative statements: “God is the First Cause,” or “God is powerful.”  When we 
consider these truths about God, just like in all our intellectual acts, we have to use 
phantasms. In the process of forming a judgment, for example, “God is omniscient,” we 
have to use phantasms.112 When we formulate a complete judgment, that judgment is also 
represented by a phantasm. Any affirmative statement, for example “God is powerful,” is 
represented by a phantasm.113 Aquinas also thought that negative judgments would 
likewise be represented by phantasms. He says:  
An image is the starting point of our knowledge, for it is that from which 
the operation of the intellect begins; not that it passes away, but it remains 
as the foundation of the intellectual activity, just as the principles of 
demonstration must remain throughout the whole process of science. This 
is because images are related to the intellect as objects in which it sees 
                                                 
 
111 ST I 13, 12; ST I 16, 2. 
 
112 ST I 85, 5 ad 2. 
 
113 ST I 84, 7; SCG II 73.     
 138
whatever it sees, either through a perfect representation or through a negation. 
Consequently, when our knowledge of images is impeded, we must be 
completely incapable of knowing anything with our intellect even about 
divine things. Clearly, we cannot know that God causes bodies, or 
transcends all bodies, or is not a body, if we do not form an image of 
bodies; but our judgment of what is divine is not made according to the 
imagination. Consequently, even though in our present state of life the 
imagination is necessary in all our knowledge of the divine, with regard to 
such matters we must never terminate in it.114      
 
Here Thomas says clearly that we must hold some image in the mind if we are to 
understand anything and that we must hold images in the mind even when we try to 
understand something about divine things. Then he gives us as the example the claim that 
God is not a body and says that we need image of bodies if we are to understand that 
claim. Aquinas warns us, however, that our knowledge of divine things goes beyond 
images, even though we must use images to advance in that knowledge.         
We use phantasms while we, creatures composed of soul and body, contemplate 
God. Since phantasms are produced by the sensitive soul, the operations of the sensitive 
soul must participate even in our contemplation of God by providing us with appropriate 
phantasms. Contemplation is an intellectual operation, but is supported by the operations 
of the sensitive part of the soul. Thomas does say that in contemplation the soul needs to 
withdraw itself from external objects 115 and all the soul’s powers must be concentrated 
                                                 
 
114 Dicendum quod phantasma est principium nostra cognitionis, ut ex equo incipit intellectus operatio non 
sicut transiens, sed sicut permanens, ut quoddam fundamentum intellectualis operationis: sicut principia 
demonstrationis oportet manere in omni processu scientiae, cum phantasmata comparentur ad intellectum 
ut objecta, in quibus inspicit omne quoe inspicit vel secundum perfectam repraesentationem, vel secundum 
negationem. Et ideo quando phantasmatum cognition impeditur, oportet totaliter impediri cognitionem 
intellectus in divinis. Patet enim quod non possumus intelligere Deum causam corporum esse, sive supra 
omnia corpora, sive absque corporeitate, nisi imaginemur corpora, non tamen judicium divinorum 
secundum imaginationem formatur. Et ideo quamvis imaginatio in qualibet divinorum cognitione sit 
necessaria secundum statum viae, numquam tamen ad eam deduci oportet in divinis.  In Boetii de Trin.6, 2 
ad 5.                               
                
115 ST II-II 180, 6 ad 2.  
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on the object of the contemplation.116 What he means by that is that we lay aside 
reasoning and simply concentrate on the truth we have come to understand. That is the 
act of the intellect. However, in a composite creature that is a human being, the sensitive 
soul cannot be “turned off” even when we concentrate all our powers on the 
contemplation of truth, even when we contemplate truth about God. Since we are 
animals, the operations of the sensitive soul must assist in all our intellectual acts, even 
contemplation by the production of phantasms.  
Aquinas also discusses the use of images and our understanding of God in relation 
to visions which people can have only by God’s grace. In these texts we find more 
evidence of human intellectual operations’ need for the assistance of the operations of the 
sensitive soul, especially the production of phantasms. Aquinas discusses our knowledge 
of God in Part I Question 12 of Summa Theologica, and also in the parallel texts in the 
Summa Contra Gentiles and in Truth. He tells us, as was mentioned before, that no 
created intellect can comprehend God,117  and that there is no similitude of God.118 Since 
God is incorporeal, God cannot be seen by the senses or the imagination.119 That much is 
obvious. But then Thomas considers whether there is some kind of imaginary vision of 
God. He says this: “The essence of God is not seen in a vision of the imagination; but the 
imagination receives some form representing God according to some mode of similitude; 
as in divine Scripture divine things are metaphorically described by means of sensible 
                                                 
 
116 Ibid.    
  
117 ST I 12, 1. 
 
118 ST I 12, 2. 
 
119 ST I 12, 3  
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things.”120 He seems to be saying that while we cannot have an image of God as such, 
we do form some kind of an image representing God, or perhaps an image representing 
some truth about God, just like we use images of sensible things to describe various 
divine things. The way we represent angels is a good example of that metaphorical use of 
the images of sensible things, since angels are typically imagined as beautiful people in 
flowing robes and possessing wings, while we know that angels have no bodies, no robes 
and certainly no wings. But imagining them as winged people helps us to think about 
them. Likewise people use images to help themselves think about God and His attributes.  
The reason why someone may need to form imaginary figures either in 
contemplation, or in the imaginary vision, is because human thought processes naturally 
depend on phantasms, i.e. images. Thomas says: “In the present state of life in which the 
soul is united to a passible body, it is impossible for our intellect to understand anything 
actually, except by turning to the phantasms.”121 The reason for it, he says, is that the 
power of knowledge is always proportional to the knower.122 Since the human intellect is 
naturally united to a body, it must derive its knowledge of incorporeal things from its 
knowledge of the corporeal ones.123 In Reply 3 of the same article Thomas says: 
“Incorporeal things, of which there are no phantasms, are known to us by comparison 
                                                 
 
120 Dicendum quod in visione imaginaria non videtur Dei essentia, sed aliqua forma in imaginatione 
formatur, repraesentans Deum secundum aliquem modum similitudinis, prout in Scripturis divinis divina 
per res sensibiles metaphorice describuntur. ST I 12, 3 ad 3  See also: SCG III 47, 3. 
 
121 Dicendum quod impossibile est intellectum secundum praesentis vitae statum, quo passibili corpori 
coniungitur, aliquid intelligere in actu, nisi convertendo se ad phantasmata. ST I 84, 7.  
 
122 ST I 12, 11; ST I 84, 7; ST I 85, 1. 
 
123 ST I 84, 7 ad 3.  
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with sensible bodies of which there are phantasms.”124 Here he mentions again the 
methods of remotion and of excess by which we learn something about God or about any 
incorporeal things, and then he says: “And, therefore, when we understand something 
about these things, we need to turn to phantasms of bodies, although there are no 
phantasms of the things themselves.”125 As was already discussed before, according to 
Thomas, we begin with gaining some knowledge of sensible things, then, by comparison 
with them or by reflecting about causality we figure out certain features of incorporeal 
things, or even of God, and then we turn to phantasms again, in order to use the images of 
sensible things to represent to ourselves what we have figured out.126 We would need to 
do it because as animals we need phantasms in order to think. That is the difference 
between us and other rational creature, i.e. angels, who do not need phantasms.127  
We may learn something about God by the use of natural reason, but higher 
knowledge of God is obtained by grace.128 Thomas mentions image-forming in Objection 
2 and Reply 2, of ST I 12, 13 where he considers whether we can know God as well by 
natural reason as by grace. He answers – as might be suspected – that we know God 
much better with the aid of grace. He mentions, however, the formation of images 
through which we come to know God. These images are used in both cases, when we 
                                                 
 
124 Dicendum quod incorporea, quorum non sunt phantasmata, cognoscuntur a nobis per comparationem ad 
corpora sensibilia, quorum sunt phantasmata. ST I 84, 7 ad 3. 
 
125 Et ideo cum de huiusmodi aliquid intelligimus, necesse habemus converti ad phantasmata corporum, 
licet ipsorum non sint phantasmata. ST I 84, 7 ad 3.       
 
126 ST I 84, 7.         
 
127 ST I 84, 7.            
 
128 ST I 12, 13. 
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learn about God through our own efforts, and when our efforts are aided by grace. He 
says: “From the images either received from sense in the natural order, or divinely 
formed in the imagination, we have so much the more excellent intellectual knowledge, 
the stronger the intelligible light is in man; and  thus through the revelation given by the 
images a fuller knowledge is received by the infusion of the divine light.”129  
Thomas tells us that when we receive knowledge of divine things by revelation, 
by grace, then images are formed in our minds. Sometimes, he says, those images are 
simply improved versions of what we ourselves might form on the basis of our 
knowledge of material things, while at other times, such images are formed not by us, but 
for us: “For the intellect’s natural light is strengthened by the infusion of gratuituous 
light; and sometimes also the images in the human imagination are divinely formed, so as 
to express divine things better than those do which we receive from sensible objects, as 
appears in prophetic visions.”130 Yet at other times, no mere images, but sensible things 
are miraculously provided for our education: “While sometimes sensible things, or even 
voices, are divinely formed to express some divine meaning; as in the Baptism, the Holy 
ghost was seen in the shape of a dove, and the voice of the Father was heard.”131 This 
                                                 
 
129 Dicendum quod ex phantasmatibus vel a sensu acceptis secundum naturalem ordinem, vel divinitus in 
imaginatione formatis, tanto excellentior cognitio intellectualis habetur, quanto lumen intelligibile in 
homine fortius fuerit. Et sic per revelationem ex phantasmatibus plenior cognitio accipitur ex infusione 
divini luminis. ST I 12, 13 ad 2. 
 
130 Nam et lumen naturale intellectus confortatur per infusionem luminis gratuiti. Et interdum etiam 
phantasmata in imaginatione hominis formantur divinitus, magis exprimentia res divinas quam ea quae 
naturaliter a sensibilibus accipimus; sicut apparet in visionimus prophetalibus. ST I 12, 13.  
 
131 Et interdum etiam aliquae res sensibiles formantur divinitus, aut etiam voces, ad aliquid divinum 
exprimendum; sicut in baptismo visus est Spiritus Sanctus in specie columbae, et vox Patris audita est;     
ST I 12, 13.  
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situation, of course, refers to miracles. Miracles are presented to us in the form of 
sensible things, to which we can relate as corporeal creatures.  
Another time when Thomas mentions imaginary forms is when he considers 
exalted states of prophetic visions and contemplation. He says: “A man is said in the 
Scriptures to see God in the sense that certain figures are formed in the senses or 
imagination, according to some similitude representing in part the divinity. So when 
Jacob says, “I have seen god face to face”, this does not mean the divine essence, but 
some figure representing God. …We may also say that Jacob spoke thus to designate 
some exalted intellectual contemplation, above the ordinary state.”132 Jacob’s “exalted 
intellectual contemplation” involved formation of images. In this case, God is 
communicating with Jacob by showing him these images. Prophetic vision goes beyond 
contemplation since we can reach a contemplative state by our own powers, but we can 
have prophetic visions only by God’s grace. However, the fact that even in such an 
exalted state of religious contemplation a person might see images shows that God’s 
                                                 
 
132 In Scripturis dicitur aliquis aliquae figurae, vel sensibiles vel imaginariae, secundum aliquam 
similitudinem aliquod divinum repraesentantes. Quod ergo dicit Iacob: “Vidi Deum facie ad faciem” 
referendum est, non ad ipsam divinam essentiam, sed ad figuram in qua repraesentabatur Deus.…Vel hoc 
dicit Iacob ad designandam quondam eminentiam intelligibilem contemplationis, supra communem statum.       
ST I 12, 11 ad 1. 
 
Another text in support of the use of images in prophetic visions is this one from Summa Contra Gentiles: 
“But that some men are spoken of in Sacred Scripture as having seen God must be understood either in 
reference to an imaginary vision, or even a corporeal one: according as the presence of divine power was 
manifested through some corporeal species, whether appearing externally, or formed internally in the 
imagination; or even according as some men have perceived some intelligible knowledge of God through 
His spiritual effects.”  
 
Quod autem in Sacra Scriptura aliqui Deum vidisse dicuntur, oportet intelligi hoc fuisse vel per aliquam 
imaginariam visionem; seu etiam corporalem, prout scilicet per aliquas corporeas species, vel exterius 
apparentes vel interius formatas in imaginatione, divinae virtutis praesentia demonstrabatur; vel etima 
secundum quod aliqui per spirituales effectus aliquam cognitionem de Deo intelligibilem perceperunt. SCG 
III 47, 3.   
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grace works with nature and not against it.133 As it is natural to us to use images in 
our thinking, so even in prophetic visions such images may be experienced.  
The closest a human may come to the vision of God while still living on earth is 
through rapture: “Consequently the highest degree of contemplation in the present life is 
that which Paul had in rapture, whereby he was in a middle state between the present and 
the life to come.”134 Rapture, according to Thomas, is a state in which a human being is 
so carried away by divine power as to attain the vision of God while still in a mortal 
body.135 This is contrary to our natural inclinations, and can be done only by the power of 
God (or by demons).136 Since God cannot be seen through the use of our senses, and in 
fact, our sensory perception, the formation of phantasms and the formation of intelligible 
species are impediments to seeing God as He is, so, in rapture, just like in the Beatific 
Vision, our intellect must receive the knowledge of the Divine Essence directly from 
God.137 And since phantasms are an impediment to seeing God, in rapture, a person is 
withdrawn from his senses: “Yet, this state remaining, actual conversion to phantasms 
and sensible objects is withdrawn from the soul, lest it be hindered from being uplifted to 
that which transcends all phantasms…Therefore it was not necessary that his [St. Paul’s] 
soul in rapture should be separated from the body as to cease to be united thereto as its 
form; and yet it was necessary for his intellect to be withdrawn from phantasms and the 
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134 Unde supremus gradus contemplationis praesentis vitae est qualem habuit Paulus in raptu, secundum 
quem fuit medio modo se habens inter statum praesentis vitae et futurae. ST II-II 180, 5. 
 
135 ST II-II 175, 1. 
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perception of sensible objects.”138 Even imagination is “turned off” in the state of 
rapture.139 Here we finally have a state of contemplation which does not rely in any way 
on phantasms. However, it is not natural.  
It is natural for a human being to use phantasms as well as intelligible species in 
all intellectual operations. That is so because a human being is a creature made of body 
and a tripartite soul. All the parts of the soul (and the body also) participate in all human 
actions and operations.140 If it were possible to dissociate various parts of a person, then 
we would have to say that by nature a human being is an accidental collection of parts 
which might be differently assembled and perhaps replaced with different parts. That 
would be a departure from the hylomorphic view of human nature, which Thomas 
adopted from Aristotle. Furthermore, if we allowed for the intellectual part of the soul to 
function independently of the other parts, that might imply that the soul is only 
accidentally associated with a given body (and perhaps could get another body) and also 
that the soul does not really need the body. But Thomas explicitly states that the body 
soul needs the body, because human intellect needs the assistance of the operations of the 
                                                 
138 Manente autem hoc statu, aufertur ab anima actualis conversio ad phantasmata et sensibilia, ne 
impediatur eius elevatio in id quod excedit omnia phantasmata…Et ideo in raptu non fuit necessarium quod 
anima sic separaretur a corpore ut ei non uniretur quasi forma: fuit autem necessarium intellectum eius 
abstrahi a phantasmatibus et sensibilium perceptione. ST II-II 175, 5. 
 
139 ST II-II 180, 5. 
 
140 When one operation of the soul is intense it impedes another, which could never be the case unless the 
principle of action were essentially one.  
 
Una operatio animae, cum fuerit intensa, impedit aliam. Quod nullo modo contingeret, nisi principium 
actionum esset per essentiam unum. ST I 76, 3.     
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sensitive soul in in the process of the acquisition of knowledge.141 Thomas also 
explicitly states that it is natural for the intellective part of the soul to rely on the 
phantasms: 
Hence it is as natural for the soul to understand by turning to the 
phantasms as it is for it to be joined to the body; but to be separated from 
the body is not in accordance with its nature, and likewise to understand 
without turning to the phantasms is not natural to it; and hence it is united 
to the body in order that it may have an existence and an operation suitable 
to its nature.142 
 
In rapture, there is no use of phantasms and no sensory perception. In rapture, the 
intellective soul’s natural interaction with the sensitive soul is blocked. That is 
what makes rapture unnatural.  
To make things more complicated, Thomas says that there are three ways in 
which someone may be rapt and one of those ways may involve “imaginary pictures” and 
still be a state of rapture.143 But the rapture of Paul did not involve any images. Paul saw 
God through His essence, and yet 
Nevertheless, by reason of the vision of the Word, certain likenesses of the 
things which he saw were imprinted on his understanding. And with these 
likenesses he could see afterwards the things which he had previously seen 
through the essence of the Word. Later, by applying these intelligible 
species to the individual intentions or forms which were stored in his 
memory or imagination, he could remember the things which he  
had seen previously, and this even through the activity of memory, which 
is a sensitive power.144     
                                                 
141 ST I 76, 5. 
 
142 Unde modus intelligendi per conversionem ad phantasmata est animae naturalis, sicut et corpori uniri; 
sed esse separatam a corpore est praeter rationem suae naturae, et similiter intelligere sine conversione ad 
phantasmata est ei praeter naturam. Et ideo ad hoc uinitur corpori, ut sic operetur secundum naturam suam.                           
ST I 89, 1. 
 
143 ST II-II 175, 3 ad 1. 
 
144 Tamen ex ipsa aspectione Verbi imprimebantur in intellectu quaedam rerum visarum similitudines, 
quibus post modum cognoscere poterat ea quae prius per essentiam Verbi viderat; et ex illis speciebus 
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Thus according to Thomas Aquinas, although there are some states of rapture in 
which a person may see God in His essence, afterwards things which that person has 
come to know would be in a manner of speaking translated into the way of thinking 
which is natural to a human being, and so involve phantasms. And we must remember 
that rapture is not natural. Ordinarily we would contemplate God without violating our 
nature as rational animals.  
There is one more passage to corroborate the claim that according to Aquinas we 
use images when we are contemplating things divine. He says:  
In the Scriptures, transport of mind, ecstasy, and rapture are all used in the 
same sense and indicate some raising up of the mind from sensible things 
outside of us toward which we naturally turn our attention, to things which 
are above man. This takes place in two ways. For at times, this transport 
from things outside is taken to refer to attention only, as  when someone 
makes use of the external senses and things about him, but his whole 
attention is engaged in contemplating and loving things divine.…Ecstasy 
or rapture or transport of the mind take place in another way.145    
 
Aquinas says here that, while in rapture we may be deprived of the use of senses 
and the imagination so as to be enabled to see God in his essence, in ordinary 
contemplation we continue sensing and using our imagination, but our attention is 
focused on some divine truth. In this way, when the powers of the intellectual soul are 
                                                                                                                                                 
intelligibilibus per quamdam applicationem ad particulares intentiones vel formas in memoria vel in 
imaginatione coservatas, postmodum poterat memorari eorum quae prius viderat, etiam secundum actum 
memoriae quae est potentia sensitiva. QDV 13, 3 ad 4. 
 
145 Dicendum quod excessus mentis, extasis, et raptus, omnia in Scripturis pro eodem accipiuntur; et 
significant elevationem quamdam ab exterioribus sensibilibus, quibus naturaliter intendimus ad aliqua quae 
sunt super hominem. Sed hoc dupliciter contingit. Quandoque enim intelligitur abstractio ab exterioribus 
quantum ad intentionem tantum, ut scilicet cum quis exterioribus sensibus et rebus utitur, sed tota sua 
intentio divinis inspiciendis et diligendis vacat…Alio modo…fit extasis aut raptus aut excessus mentis. 
QDV 13, 2 ad 9.  
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concentrated on the contemplation of divine truth, the lower powers must assist the 
intellect.146 And that is appropriate to a creature composed of many faculties. Thus, in 
ordinary contemplation, the intellect and the sensitive soul, both participate in the activity 
of contemplation. Contemplation is primarily the intellectual activity, but in a secondary 
way the sensitive soul also has to be involved. That is so, because a human being is by 
nature both, a rational and an animal.            
Thus there is textual evidence that Aquinas thought that contemplation of God by 
a human being involves phantasms. And it is not surprising, in view of everything else 
Aquinas tells us. We contemplate truths about God, or about the created world. Even if 
the object of our contemplation is not a corporeal object, we cannot empty our minds of 
phantasms, for we cannot think without phantasms.147 The things we think about or 
things we contemplate may themselves go beyond phantasms, but they can be formed, 
understood and thought about only through the use of phantasms.148 We can use our 
power of imagination to help ourselves to form or understand abstract concepts,149 to help 
ourselves to learn something about incorporeal entities150 and to help ourselves to learn 
something about God.151 We use phantasms because we have to think as composite 
creatures, not as separate intellects. Aquinas tells us that animals have cognitive powers 
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and that they engage in a sort of thinking.152 Since we are animals, we possess animal 
powers, and they do not cease to function just because we also use our intellectual part of 
the soul. Thus, it would make sense that the sensitive part of the soul must be also 
involved in our thought processes even though it does not dominate those processes. 
Aquinas does not regard the body or the sensitive part of the soul as a burden to the 
intellective soul or as superfluous to its operations.153  Likewise, he never says that we 
“disconnect” any of our parts, no matter what we might be doing. Aquinas’s view of 
human nature is that of a fully integrated being, in whom all the parts of the soul and the 
body are always influencing one another and working with one another. Thus, it is 
plausible to interpret what Aquinas says about phantasms and contemplation of God as 
the situation in which the formation of phantasms by the imagination helps us to 
contemplate God.  
We cannot form any phantasms of God, because we cannot sense or comprehend 
God. But we form phantasms which we use to represent our ideas of God. For that we 
turn to some objects which we perceive, remember, or imagine. For example, “God is 
good” is a truth about God which somebody might contemplate. That truth itself is not 
something of which there is a phantasm, but a human being cannot engage in imageless 
thinking.154 So, someone contemplating the idea that God is good, would need to use her 
power of imagination to produce some phantasms associated with that notion. In fact, one 
                                                 
 
152 ST I 78, 4; SCG III 35, 5; QDA 13, Aquinas, Thomas St., Questions On the Soul, tr. James H. Robb, 
Milwaukee, Wisconsin: Marquette University Press, 1984.   Latin text: Thomas Aquinas, “Quaestiones 
disputatae de anima,” in Opera Omnia, Parma, reprinted in New York: Musurgia Publishers, 1949. 
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153 ST I 76, 5. 
 
154 ST I 84, 7.     
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would probably have groups of phantasms associated with such notion, phantasms 
which would represent all of that person’s reflections on the subject of God and 
goodness.155 Thus, when we contemplate God we must be in fact looking at something 
else, which we use to help us know something about God. While we say that we 
contemplate God, in fact we have to focus on images derived from some objects we know 
from experience.  
It is interesting that, according to Aquinas, rapture is so unnatural that it does not 
correspond to the kind of experience which the blessed in heaven will enjoy for eternity. 
After death and before resurrection, since separated souls will be deprived of phantasms, 
they will “see” God, through grace, as the spirit.156 But that is not a natural condition for 
a human being. According to Thomas, these souls will be eventually reunited with their 
bodies and as complete human beings, they will attain their complete and eternal 
happiness. Then complete humans will experience phantasms again, even in connection 
with the vision of God, who is a spirit. Thomas says: 
After the resurrection, in the blessed who see God in His essence, there 
will be an overflow from the intellect to the lower powers and even to the 
body. Hence it is in keeping with the rule itself of the divine vision that the 
soul will turn towards phantasms and sensible objects. But there is no such 
overflow in those who are raptured.157  
 
                                                 
 
155 Wilhelmsen, pp.112-117.  
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157 Post resurrectionem in beatis Dei essentiam videntibus fiet redundantia ab intellectu ad inferiores vires, 
et usque ad corpus. Unde, secundum ipsam regulam divinae visionis, anima intendet et phantasmatibus et 
sensibilibus. Talis autem redundantia non fit in his qui rapiuntur. ST II-II 175, 4 ad 1. 
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Thus, it seems that even the Beatific Vision will somehow produce phantasms in us, 
not because there is a phantasm of God, but because it is natural for us to use phantasms 
in our intellectual acts.                        
After the resurrection, we need phantasms not for seeing God in the Beatific 
Vision, for God is not a sensible object, but we need phantasms in order to attain 
perfection according to our nature.  And while we are living on earth our contemplation 
of God has to involve phantasms because we are animals.   
What We Know as Separated Souls      
In his discussion of the human soul Aquinas also considers the condition of 
separated souls. According to Aquinas, the human soul is immortal.158 During the time 
between the death and the resurrection of the body the human soul exists as a “separated 
soul”. Separated souls are to be reunited with their bodies at the resurrection.159 The 
resurrection of bodies takes place on the day of the Last Judgment. On the Day of 
Judgment160 bodies will be resurrected by the power of God.161   
Naturally, Aquinas can only speculate about the condition of separated souls, 
since this is not something we can know while we are in this world. A complete 
discussion of this topic is beyond the scope of this dissertation. However, a quick look at 
what Aquinas says about the knowledge available to the separated souls, and also about 
the capacities returned to them after the resurrection, helps us to understand better the 
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emphasis he puts on the fact that we are composite beings, and that we are not merely 
separated intellectual souls encased in bodies.   
As was quoted above, Thomas says that the operations of the sensitive part belong 
to human happiness “consequently,” that is after the resurrection.162 But he does not say 
that the separated souls, before resurrection, are unhappy, because happiness is 
essentially a Beatific Vision, for the enjoyment for which we do not need senses. Thomas 
says: “Now the operation of sense cannot belong to happiness essentially. For man’s 
happiness consists essentially in his being united to the Uncreated Good, which is his last 
end …to which man cannot be united by an operation of his senses.”163 Since we do not 
need and cannot use the senses for the enjoyment of the Beatific Vision (because God is 
not a sensible object), one might wonder if in the next world we might be altogether free 
from dependence on our senses and on phantasms. According to Thomas, we are never 
completely free from dependence on our senses, for even beyond this world, we need 
them in order to obtain knowledge of natural things like other human beings,164 and thus 
we need sensory perception in order to enjoy our happiness as complete human beings.  
However, the sensitive part of the soul is not functional without the body, with the 
consequence that the separated soul cannot have a clear knowledge of natural things.   
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163 Essentialiter quidem non potest pertinere operatio sensus ad beatitudinem. Nam beatitudo hominis 
consistit essentialiter in coniunctione ipsius ad bonum increatum, quod est ulltimus finis…cui homo 
coniungi non potest per sensus operationem. ST I-II 3,3.   
 
164 ST I 89, 3 and 4.                         
 153
He considers what kind of knowledge is possessed by a soul separated from 
its body after death and not yet reunited with it by resurrection.165 In the separated soul 
only the intellectual part of the human soul, consisting of the intellect and the will, 
remains functional. The intellect is incorporeal,166 and thus, incorruptible.167 The 
operations of the sensitive and the vegetative parts depend on the body. So, after the body 
is destroyed, they are rendered inoperative.168 The human soul, as a whole, is the soul of a 
composite being: “Not the soul alone, but the composite, is the species.”169  The nature of 
human soul is such that it can be said to consist of three parts, all of which together 
constitute the principle of life, which is the act of a human body. Death of the body does 
not change the nature of the soul. However, the sensitive and the vegetative parts of the 
soul cannot operate until the time of the resurrection when their powers are restored 
again.170 The intellectual part of the soul, which continues to operate, retains its nature as 
a part of a human being, not as a whole human being, not even as a human soul with all 
its powers, for obviously some of its powers are in abeyance until resurrection.  
Thomas considers whether after death the soul would gain complete knowledge of 
all natural things, whether it would know what is happening on earth, or perhaps, instead 
of gaining knowledge, it would lose all the knowledge it had acquired on earth. In 
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answering such questions, he tells us more about the importance of the sensitive part 
of the soul. Separated human souls understand by the influence of the Divine light, by 
God’s grace.171 In fact, all intellectual creatures have intellective powers by the influence 
of the Divine light.172 With the help of the Divine light, separated souls understand by 
using the intelligible species, without the need to turn to phantasms.173 Separated souls 
have a perfect knowledge of other souls, because souls can be understood without turning 
to phantasms.174 The knowledge of natural corporeal things, however, requires the use of 
phantasms, while the separated souls cannot produce phantasms. In case of knowing 
corporeal things, the separated human soul knows by receiving intelligible species from 
the influence of Divine light and thus, it can acquire some knowledge about those things. 
Since there is nothing which could deceive or confuse the separated soul, its 
understanding is better and more clear compared with that on earth: “The separated soul 
is, indeed, less perfect considering its nature in which it communicates with the nature of 
                                                 
 
171 The separated soul does not understand by way of innate species, nor by species abstracted then, nor 
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the body; but it has a greater freedom of intelligence, since the weight and care for the 
body is a clog upon the clearness of its intelligence in the present life.”175   
However, it is not natural for the human soul to acquire knowledge only through 
the intelligible species. Normally, the human soul understands by turning to phantasms. 
Given that, Aquinas asks whether, after the death of the body and the destruction of 
sensory organs, the separated soul can know anything at all.176 His answer, in general, is 
that the separated soul can know many things since it understands whatever it 
understands through the intelligible species which belong to the intellect, and in that way, 
our thinking may be independent of sensory perception. Yet the separated soul is 
deprived of phantasms which belong to the sensitive part of the soul, and thus, the soul’s 
knowledge of things is limited. He says that because it is not natural for a human soul to 
gain knowledge through the intelligible species alone, that knowledge will be indistinct: 
“The soul apart from the body through such species does not receive perfect knowledge, 
but only a general and confused kind of knowledge. Separated souls, therefore, have the 
same relation through such species to imperfect and confused knowledge of natural 
things as the angels have to the perfect knowledge thereof.”177 By “confused and 
general”178 Thomas means that a soul deprived of sensory input and phantasms is able to 
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know a given thing’s generic or even specific nature, for example, ‘a cat’, but it 
would not be able to know that particular thing, for example that particular kitty, orange 
on top and white underneath, which is purring softly. If the person whose soul it is never 
met a cat in his/her life (perhaps because he/she lived in the arctic), then he/she might 
only be able to understand that it is an animal, or at most that it is some kind of small and 
furry animal. For a separated soul cannot see, hear or touch a cat. Without that sensory 
input, a person could acquire only a vague and general knowledge of the cat. Thus, a 
separated soul has a confused and general knowledge of particular natural things because 
it can use only the intellective part of the soul, and is missing the capacities of the 
sensitive part.  
Thomas compares us here to the angels in order to stress that it is not in our nature 
– as opposed to the angelic nature - to understand things without mediation of senses and 
phantasms, and therefore, when we are deprived of the senses, our knowledge must be 
vague and confused, in accordance with the Order of Creation. As was discussed in 
chapter 1, we hold a certain place in the Order of Creation, in accordance with which we 
possess a certain nature. That Order and our human nature do not cease, but continue 
even beyond this world. And so, the separated human soul is still the soul of a rational 
animal, not simply a rational being. That is why the rational soul deprived of its animal 
body is missing certain capabilities, for example, the ability to clearly understand natural 
things which normally we would investigate with our senses.179   
It is noteworthy that even as separated souls we can understand some kinds of 
things better than other kinds of things, namely, those towards which we had some 
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relation on earth, or towards which we have some natural aptitude: “whereas 
separated souls by these species know only those singulars to which they are determined 
by former knowledge in this life, or by some affection, or by natural aptitude, or by the 
disposition of the Divine order; because whatever is received into anything is conditioned 
according to the mode of the recipient.”180 Thus, the kinds of things we already knew 
something about are also more clearly understood by the separated souls, and likewise the 
kinds of things we loved or liked while in this life. Furthermore, it is interesting that 
Thomas mentions the natural aptitude, which indicates that we preserve our individual 
nature and aptitudes even beyond this world. That means that, for example, the separated 
soul of an engineer understands more clearly things like physical structures and 
mechanisms, and the separated soul of a musician understands more clearly music, even 
though the soul of an engineer does not see, and the soul of a musician does not hear.181 
Nevertheless, the souls of engineers, musicians and others retain their nature as souls of 
certain individuals, possessing certain abilities and affections, and also naturally 
possessing bodies and senses. In the case of someone who was a cat lover in life, that 
someone would have a better understanding of cats as a separated soul than someone who 
did not care for cats and did not learn much about them.  
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In view of the above, we can better understand why Thomas says that we 
retain much of the knowledge we have acquired on earth.182 Even though the sensitive 
part of the soul is destroyed with the body, most of our knowledge resides in the intellect, 
and the intellect survives the death of the body. And as far as memory is concerned, while 
simple memory of past events is in the sensitive part of the soul and is destroyed with it, 
intellective memory through which we retain the intelligible species is in the intellective 
part and is not destroyed.183 And thus, knowledge acquired on earth remains with us even 
while we are separated souls.184 Thomas notes that it is regrettable that those who are 
most knowledgeable are not necessarily the most saintly. Nevertheless, even though the 
more saintly will receive a greater reward in heaven, generally speaking, knowledge 
acquired on earth by the less worthy souls will remain with them.185 Otherwise, the Order 
of Creation would be violated.  
Natural things that separated souls have trouble knowing are generally found in 
this world (we do not know if there are any natural things in heaven). Therefore, Thomas 
asks whether the separated souls know what takes place on earth.186 They do not, or at 
least not by natural knowledge since to acquire knowledge of things on earth they need 
the senses. However, as was mentioned above, souls receive knowledge by the influence 
of Divine light and they have better understanding of those things to which they are 
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determined by some previous knowledge, affection or aptitude. Thus, they may 
receive some information about happenings on earth, if it be the will of God.  
Sensory Perception After the Resurrection 
Separated souls are, in a way, handicapped without bodies. Fortunately, according 
to Aquinas, they will be eventually reunited with their resurrected bodies. According to 
Aquinas, our bodies will be resurrected at the Last Judgment 187 and for the rest of 
eternity we shall exist as embodied persons. When Thomas says that we will be 
embodied he does not mean something which has the appearance of our bodies but is 
spiritual in nature. Thomas says that our resurrected bodies will be animal bodies:  
Again, in the definition of a natural thing which signifies the essence of 
the species, one includes the matter; necessarily, then, whenever the 
matter is varied in species, the species of the natural thing is varied. But 
man is a natural thing. If, therefore, after the resurrection he is not to have 
a body consisting of flesh and bones and parts of this kind as he has now, 
he who rises will not belong to the same species, but will be called man 
only equivocally.188  
 
Later in the same chapter, Thomas says: “There is more. The body of man when 
he rises must have the capacity to touch, for without touch there is no animal. But that 
which rises must be animal if it is to be man.”189 Thus, Aquinas clearly tells us that our 
resurrected bodies will be animal bodies, not some misty, spiritual kind, and that they 
will be composed of flesh and bone just like they are on earth. He also tells us that we 
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shall possess sensory perception, and especially a sense of touch, because without it 
we could not be animals, and whoever is human is generically an animal. We will 
continue to be animals in the afterlife.  
This claim that our resurrected bodies will be animal bodies is consistent not only 
with Thomas’s religious beliefs, but also his hylomorphic theory, which he adopted along 
with other features of Aristotelian philosophy. Aquinas reminds us that:  
The soul is, furthermore, united to the body as form to matter. Of course, 
every form has its determined matter, for there must be proportion 
between act and potency. Since, therefore, the soul is the same in species, 
it appears that its matter must be the same in species. Therefore, the body 
will be the same in species after the resurrection as before. And so it has to 
consist of flesh and bones and other parts of this kind.190  
 
Aquinas follows Aristotle in saying that the human soul is the form and the act of the 
body.191 In composite creatures, like humans, matter is what determines individual 
bodies, while the soul determines what kind of creatures they are, i.e. humans.192 The 
human soul is that of a rational animal, and because it is rational, it is also a self 
subsistent.193 Because it is rational, it is individual and immortal.194 But it is also the soul 
of a kind of an animal, and as such it is the form of animal body. And since the soul and 
its body form a unity, 195 there can be only one body associated with any given soul. 
                                                 
190 Adhuc. Anima unitur corpori sicut forma materiae. Omnis autem forma habet determinatam materiam: 
oportet enim esse proportionem actus et potentiae. Cum igitur anima sit eadem secundum speciem, videtur 
quod habeat eandem materiam secundum speciem. Erit ergo idem corpus secundum speciem post 
resurrectionem et ante. Et sic oportet quod sit consistens ex carnibus et ossibus, et aliis huiusmodi partibus.    
SCG IV 84, 4.  
 
191 ST I 75, 1,5; In DA II 1; In DA II 2, 241, 242. 
 
192 ST I 76,1;  In DA II 4. 
 
193 ST I 75,  2, 3, 6; Pasnau, p.49. 
 
194 ST I 75, 6. 
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Thus, the resurrected bodies of human beings will be animal bodies, made of flesh 
and bone, and with their characteristic organs, i.e. hearts and livers and such, just as they 
were in earthly life. They will be material and will take up space too.196 Since the human 
body has to be an animal body, it has to be material and passible, and has to possess a 
characteristic shape and cannot assume the traits of something like air or become a 
celestial body.197 Thus, the resurrected body will be an animal body.  
Since the operations of the sensitive soul depend on the body, when that body is 
restored, so will be the operations of the sensitive part of the soul. Before the 
resurrection, separated souls in heaven are happy because they already enjoy the Beatific 
Vision, but they are somewhat dysfunctional. After the resurrection of the body, we shall 
feel sensations again,198 phantasms will be produced again, and the intellect will again 
understand things clearly and perfectly, in accordance with its nature.199 Thomas says:  
A soul which is separated from its body does not possess the same mode 
of knowing that it had when it was in its body. A separated soul retains 
knowledge of things that it knows in a way proper to it, that is, without 
phantasms; but after it returns to its original state by being once again 
united with a body, it now knows these things in a way suitable to the 
union, that is, by turning to phantasms. And therefore those things which 
souls have seen intelligibly, they speak about imaginatively.200      
                                                                                                                                                 
195 ST I 76; In DA II 1, 234.    
 
196 SCG IV 87.    
 
197 SCG IV 84, 12-14.  
 
198 SCG IV 86,4 and IV 90; ST Supplement 82, 3 and 4. 
 
199 QDA 19 ad 18; ST II-II 175,4 ad 1. 
 
200 Anima separata a corpore non eundem modum habet cognoscendi et cum est in corpore. Eorum igitur 
quae apprehendit anima separata secundum modum sibi proprium absque phantasmatibus, remanet cognitio 
in ea postquam ad pristinum statum redit, corpori iterato conjuncta, secundum modum tunc sibi 
convenientem, scilicet cum conversione ad phantasmata. Et ideo quae intelligibiliter viderunt, 
imaginabiliter narrant. QDA 19 ad 18. 
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As complete human beings, we will be able to understand particular natural 
things, like cats, flowers, or mountains,201 because we will be able to sense them, because 
the capacity for sensation will be restored with the body.202 Of all the natural things, the 
most important for a human being are other human beings. There would be presumably 
many people in heaven, who would be loving, lovable and loved,203 and while it is good 
to understand that they are there, it is better to be able also to see and to touch them. A 
separated soul cannot give friend a hug, but a human being can.   
Not only would natural things cause us to produce phantasms (or experience 
delight) but even the Beatific Vision, that is God Himself, would produce in us 
phantasms by an overflow.204 In this way, the Beatific Vision is different from rapture. 
For although we cannot by our natural powers attain to the Beatific Vision, nevertheless 
when God grants it to us, he will grant it to us respecting our nature as rational animals.  
Thus, the operations of the sensitive part of the soul belong to human happiness    
consequently, that is after the resurrection, because the perfection of human nature 
requires it. Thomas’s concept of final happiness entails the perfection of the whole 
human being.205 Perfection of the body is necessary for the complete perfection of a 
                                                 
201 According to Aquinas, the plants and animals of this world will perish at the end of the world, (ST 
Supplement, 91, 5) but my point is that whatever sensible objects there might be, complete human beings 
will be able to understand them in a way natural to humans.  
 
202 ST Supplement 82, 3 and 4; SCG IV 86, 4. 
 
203 ST I-II 4, 8; ST II-II 26, 13.               
 
204 ST II-II 175, 4 ad 1. 
 
205 ST I-II 3, 2. 
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human being, because we are naturally creatures composed of souls and bodies.206 
Perfection of the body includes perfection of the operations of the sensitive part of the 
soul. Thus, after the resurrection, our bodies will be restored in perfect condition, and 
with the bodies, the operations of the sensitive soul. Heavenly happiness does not change 
human nature, but perfects it.  
Conclusion  
We can now see that the sensitive part of the soul does participate in 
contemplation, at least as far as sensory perception and the production of phantasms is 
concerned. To acquire knowledge, we need sensible objects, and in order to sense those 
objects, we need to produce phantasms. In order to really understand the concepts we 
have acquired by abstraction, we need to return to phantasms stored in our memory. In 
order to formulate propositions, we need phantasms. In order to learn about immaterial 
things, we need to use our knowledge of material things and to use phantasms. In order to 
learn about God and to contemplate God, we help ourselves with phantasms. Separated 
souls are not able to think clearly or to know certain things because they lack senses and 
phantasms. Resurrected persons, who will be granted knowledge and abilities beyond 
their earthly capabilities, will nevertheless use phantasms. Aquinas tells us that even the 
Beatific Vision will produce phantasms in us by “overflow”, that is by the influence of 
the rational soul on the sensitive soul. In accordance with the Order of Creation, each 
rational creature contemplates God in accordance with its nature, and since the nature of 
human beings is such that it requires the use of senses and phantasms, those traits will 
                                                 
 
206 ST I-II 4, 6. 
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also figure in the contemplation of God in heaven. Human beings never cease to be 
animals.  
We can now see why Aquinas says that the operations of the sensitive soul are 
necessary for human happiness consequently, that is after this life. He says: “The 
operations of the senses can belong to happiness, both antecedently and consequently 
...consequently, in that perfect happiness which we await in heaven; because of 
resurrection.”207 But the Beatific Vision itself does not involve sensory operations.208 So, 
according to Aquinas, operations of the sensitive part of the soul belong to heavenly 
happiness despite the fact that contemplation of God in itself is a purely intellectual 
activity, which is why happiness essentially consists in the operations of the intellective 
part of the soul. But the happiness of a separated soul is not the same as the happiness of 
a human being. The sensitive soul is needed for human happiness because it is natural for 
humans to have it,209 because by nature we are not separated intellects. It is natural for us 
to use phantasms when we are thinking.210 It is natural for us to enjoy sensations.211 
When we are deprived of what belongs to our nature, we are missing some perfection. 
We are also missing many delights associated with sensations. In a different passage, 
Aquinas also tells us that the body is necessary for happiness, even happiness in 
                                                 
207 Possunt autem operationes sensus pertinere ad beatitudinem antecedenter et 
consequenter.…Consequenter autem, in illa perfecta beatitudine quae expectatur in caelo, quia post 
resurrectionem... ST I-II 3, 3.    
 
208 ST I-II 3, 3.       
 
209 ST I-II 4, 6.                      
 
210 ST I 84, 7; ST II-II 175, 4 ad 1. 
 
211 ST I 78, 1; ST Supplement 82, 3 and 4; SCG IV 86, 4.   
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heaven.212 This provides us the clue to better understand what he says in the ST I-II 3, 
3 about the perfection of the lower part because of the overflow. Aquinas says that the 
body is necessary for happiness because we are composite creatures, made of body and 
soul, and thus, for a complete happiness, we must be complete as to our nature. Thus, we 
need a body for our complete happiness in heaven, and the body and the operations of 
vegetative and the sensitive parts of the soul which belong to the body are necessary for 
complete enjoyment of human happiness, even in heaven.  
And so we can see that the operations of the sensitive soul belong to human 
happiness consequently, because we are dependent on our senses, both outer and inner 
senses, in our acquisition of knowledge. And even in the act of contemplation itself, we 
are using phantasms. We contemplate God, and the truths of metaphysics or mathematics, 
because we are rational. But the way we arrive at the truth and even in the act of 
contemplation itself, we show ourselves also to be animals.  
                                                 
 
212 ST I-II 4, 5. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
DESIRE AND CONTEMPLATION 
In the previous chapter, I have shown that, according to Thomas Aquinas, in our 
pursuit of knowledge and even our contemplation, we manifest our animal as well our 
rational nature. It would be impossible to get to know anything without the input of 
sensory data, and it would impossible for us to sense if we could not produce phantasms. 
These are traits we share with other animals. The operations of the intellect and thus the 
rational part of the soul need to be connected to the powers of the sensitive part of the 
soul for we must abstract intelligible species from phantasms and then, Aquinas tells us, 
we cannot think without using phantasms. Separated souls in heaven are handicapped 
because they cannot produce phantasms, while after the resurrection, even the Beatific 
Vision will cause us to experience phantasms, not because there is phantasm of God, but 
because we are animals. After we are reintegrated again with all the parts of body and 
soul, it will be natural for the sensitive part of the soul to be influenced again by the 
intellective part of the soul, because we are always composite beings by nature, and that 
nature includes animality.  
The next thing I would like to consider is the role of animal inclinations, 
appetites, and passions in the human pursuit of knowledge. Thomas does not tell us about 
it explicitly, but he does provide us with clues to find the explanation of their role. We 
possess a natural inclination to truth in virtue of which we pursue knowledge and engage 
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in contemplation of truth. The truth we contemplate has to be truth derived from our 
knowledge of the world around us, beginning with the knowledge of sensible objects. In 
maneuvering through the world of sensible objects, we are guided first by our animal 
inclinations, animal passions and animal cognition before we can respond to these objects 
as rational beings. It is so because qua animals we must react to things as either useful or 
dangerous if we are to survive at all.  
The Need for Selective Attention   
Animal appetites and passions, together with the cogitative power, guide us in the 
choice of objects we pay attention to because we have to pay attention to them in order to 
live, or at least because these objects appear to us, as pleasant.1 These objects may 
eventually become the objects of our study and contemplation. Since Thomas tells us that 
even in order to imagine non-existent things we use the images of known things,2 the 
objects we study and perhaps contemplate are derived from our experiences. If our 
learning is to begin with sensible objects then we must notice some object, i.e. our 
attention must be drawn to it. We cannot simply receive all the sensory data from the 
world around us in a haphazard way; we must select and organize our perceiving.  
What we notice and select for further consideration must be something to which we have 
a natural attraction or aversion. We notice these objects because we possess senses, but 
possession of senses alone does not explain why we notice the particular objects which 
we do in fact notice. Our noticing a particular object is best explained by positing that the 
attention is a function of the sense appetites acting together with the cogitative power 
                                                 
1 Klubertanz, George, S.J. The Discursive Power, St. Louis: The Modern Schoolman, 1952, p.288-290. 
 
2 ST I 78, 4. 
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(estimative power in other animals). This is the argument of G. Klubertanz, who says: 
“Attention, therefore, in the sensory order is a function of sense appetite, which is 
determined by the judgments of the estimative or [cogitative] power.”3  
His argument is that in order to hold some object in the mind, the phantasm 
representing that object has to remain at rest. The intellect needs that phantasm to remain 
at rest, because the process of reasoning, of decision making, has certain duration. 
Klubertanz does not stop to consider other animals’ processes of making choices, but it is 
obvious that those processes also take time and also require the use of phantasms. The 
inner sense of phantasia, however, cannot account for the fact that phantasms remain 
stationary. The only thing that could account for keeping a given object in the actual 
apprehension for any length of time is love.4 Love causes an agent to desire and to pursue 
a good, and that clearly implies paying attention to a particular good, a particular object 
which is good.5 Since all passions follow from love, according to Aquinas, love is the 
foundation of all our attractions and our aversions.6 Passions, of which love is the most 
fundamental, are movements of the sensitive appetite.7 The movements of the sensitive 
appetite follow apprehension.8 Therefore, the movements of the sensitive appetite follow 
the apprehension of intentions, which is the function of the estimative power (in humans, 
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cogitative power). Therefore, attention follows from the sense appetite, which is 
determined by the judgment of the estimative (or cogitative) power.  
This is how we can account for attention on the sense level. Human beings are 
also capable of voluntary attention, which is be guided by the intellect and the will. 
However, the intellect depends for its operations on the input from the sensitive appetite 
and the cogitative power. Therefore, whatever we pay attention to as guided by the 
sensitive appetite and the cogitative power that is the very first thing we pay attention to, 
and thus the first thing presented to the intellect.     
What we pay attention to is first of all predetermined by our animal nature, since 
like all animals we are endowed with the powers of the sensitive soul in order to survive, 
and with the basic inclinations, which include animal inclinations. What we notice in our 
environment and the kind of feelings we then experience are to a large extent dependent 
on what kind of animals we are, even if our rationality may also have some influence on 
our behavior. We must select and organize the data we perceive and some of that 
selecting and organizing is determined by our animal inclinations.         
In order to pay attention to anything, animals in the natural world must have a 
natural tendency to turn their attention to a given object. As was discussed in chapter 1, 
animals have natural inclination to preserve their life as individuals and to preserve their 
species, and those natural inclinations are manifested in characteristic patterns of 
behavior. Since animals are creatures who are sentient and capable of locomotion their 
behavior generally consists in either pursuing things they find attractive or avoiding 
things which they find repulsive.9 For example, the sheep seeing a wolf runs away.  
                                                 
9 ST I 78, 1 and  4; ST I 80, 1.                     
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The sheep runs because of the inclination to self-preservation, because it instinctively 
recognizes the wolf as the enemy. The sheep then has a desire to run away. However, 
avoidance of a wolf is not characteristic of every kind of an animal. The wolf may be 
more or less noticeable and more or less important to different animals, and how it is 
regarded depends on those animals, not on the wolf. What these animals notice, what 
kind of feelings they experience and what is supposed to be their characteristic reaction 
depends on their kind, their species. In order to act in ways appropriate to their species 
and thus to survive, the animals are endowed with cognitive abilities, and with appetitive 
powers.  
Surviving and thriving is equivalent to achieving animal perfection, given 
animal’s proper good and proper end. The final end for human beings is contemplation of 
God in heaven and thus, the fulfillment of a human being as a rational creature. However 
among the proximate ends in human life on earth there is physical survival and thriving; 
qua animals we are oriented towards those ends like all other animals. In the pursuit of 
animal ends, we are oriented towards certain objects which then we might reflect upon 
and study as rational creatures. In that way, our animality predetermines the beginning 
stages of our pursuit of knowledge and eventually, the contemplation of what we come to 
know.  
Estimative Power  
In order for an animal to react to something in its environment, the animal must 
possess knowledge of the object towards which its appetites are directed. Knowledge, as 
was discussed in chapter 2, begins with sensory perception. But what an animal perceives 
according to its nature must be also organized with respect to its usefulness. The power of 
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the soul by which an animal can know something as good or bad for it is called the 
“estimative power”. The estimative power is one of the interior senses.10 By the 
estimative power an animal recognizes what it is supposed to seek or avoid. The animal is 
oriented towards or away from certain things because of its natural appetites, but the 
animal’s capacity for reacting follows also from the estimative power, which is cognitive 
in nature. It is by the estimative power that an animal seeks or avoids various things in its 
environment on account of advantages or disadvantages which those things offer to that 
animal. The estimative power is what allows an animal to maneuver itself through a 
dangerous world. It is by the coordinated operation of the estimative power and the 
sensitive appetite that an animal is enabled to pay attention to some phenomena and 
ignore other. Aquinas gives us examples of a sheep and a bird. The sheep picks out the 
wolf as a harmful thing in the environment, while the bird picks out straws as useful 
things. A sheep picks out the shape and the smell of the wolf from its environment and 
reacts to it as something dangerous while it ignores many other shapes and smells. A bird 
notices straws (of a correct shape and size) and perhaps other useful bits of nesting 
material while it ignores many other objects. Not every animal fears wolves, and not 
every animal is interested in little straws. Thus, the estimative power enables the animal 
to notice those things in the environment which are relevant to that particular animal.  
The estimative power is a cognitive power and represents the animal level of 
knowledge. In Questions on the Soul, Aquinas gives us a brief description of animal 
                                                 
10 ST I 78, 4; QDV 25, 2; QDA 13. 
 
 172
cognition. We can distinguish five elements in his description of the animal 
cognition.11 To start with, the exterior senses receive data from sensible things.12 A 
sensible object affects the proper senses and these senses are able to be affected by 
certain kinds of objects, according to the nature of a given animal. Secondly, the data 
                                                 
11 Now for complete knowledge, which would be adequate for an animal, five things are indispensable. 
First, that a sense power receive a species from sensible things, and this activity belongs to a proper sense 
(one of the external senses). Secondly, that there be a sense to discriminate among the sensible qualities 
perceived and to distinguish them from one another; and this action must be performed by a power in 
which all sensible perceptions terminate, and this power is called the unifying sense. Thirdly, that the 
species of sensible thing which have been received be retained. For an animal needs to know sensible 
things not only when they are present, but also after they are no longer present. And it is necessary that this 
activity be attributed to another power, because in corporeal things the principle which receives and that 
which retains are distinct; for that which is very receptive is sometimes poorly retentive. Now this power is 
called imagination or fantasy. Fourthly, a sense is required which might apprehend intentions that the other 
senses do not perceive, such as the harmful, the useful, and other notions of this sort. Now a human being 
arrives at a knowledge of these intentions by investigation and deliberation; but other animals possess this 
kind of knowledge by natural instinct, as, for example, a sheep naturally flees a wolf as being harmful. 
Hence in animals other than human beings a natural estimative power is directed toward this end, whereas 
in a human being there is a cogitative power, which compares these particular intentions; hence this power 
is called both the particular reason and the passive intellect. Fifthly, complete sense knowledge requires 
that things which were previously apprehended by the external senses and have been retained in the interior 
senses be once again summoned up for actual consideration. And this activity belongs to the power of 
recollection, which in animals other than human beings operates without investigation, but in human beings 
operates through inquiry and endeavor. Hence there is in human beings not only memory but also 
reminiscence. Now it was necessary that the power which is ordered to this end be distinct from the other 
powers, because the activity of the other sensitive powers involves a movement from the things to the soul, 
whereas the activity of the power of recollection involves a movement from the soul toward things.   
 
Ad perfectam autem sensus cognitionem, quae sufficiat animali, quinque requiruntur. Primo quod sensus 
recipiat speciem a sensibilibus; et hoc pertinet ad sensum proprium. Secundo quia de sensibilibus perceptis 
dijudicet, et ea ad invicem discernat; quod oportet fieri per potentiam ad quam omnia sensibilia perveniant, 
quae dicitur sensus communis. Tertium est quod species sensibilium receptae conserventur. Indiget autem 
animal apprehensione sensibilium, non solum apud eorum praesentiam, sed postquam abierint.  Et hoc 
necessarium est reduci in aliam potentiam; nam in rebus corporalibus aliud principium est recipiendi et 
conservandi; nam quae sunt bene receptabilia sunt interdum male conservativa. Huiusmodi autem potentia 
dicitur imaginatio sive phantasia. Quarto autem requiritur quod apprehendantur intentiones quas sensus non 
apprehendit, sicut nocivum et utile et alia hujusmodi. Et ad haec quidem cognoscenda pervenit homo 
inquirendo et conferendo; alia vero animalia quodam naturali instinctu, sicut ovis naturaliter fugit lupum 
tamquam nocivum. Unde ad hoc in aliis animalibus ordinatur aestimativa naturalis; in homine autem vis 
cogitativa, quae est collativa intentionum particularium; unde et ratio particularis dicitur et intellectus 
passivus. Quinto autem requiritur quod ea quae prius fuerunt apprehensa per sensus et interius 
conservantur, iterum ad actualem considerationem revocentur. Et hoc quidem pertinet ad rememorativam 
virtutem, quae in aliis quidem animalibus absque inquisitione suam operationem habet, in hominibus autem 
cum inquisitione et studio. Unde in hominibus non solum est memoria, sed reminiscentia. Necesse autem 
fuit ad hoc potentiam ab aliis distinctam ordinari, quia actus aliarum potentiarum sensitivarum est 
secundum motus a rebus ad animam; actus autem memorativae potentiae est e contrario secundum motum 
ab anima ad res.  QDA 13.  
 
12 Primo quod sensus recipiat speciem a sensibilibus; et hoc pertinet ad sensum propriam. QDA 13. 
 173
from various senses must be integrated by an interior sense called the “common 
sense”13 Thirdly, the forms of sensible things received must be retained: “For an animal 
needs to know sensible things not only when they are present, but also after they are no 
longer present.”14 This is accomplished by the production of phantasms by the interior 
sense called phantasia or imagination. Fourthly, an animal must apprehend the intentions 
as useful or harmful, and that belongs to the interior sense called the estimative power.15 
Fifthly, in order to have a complete sense knowledge, the animal must be able to recollect 
the intention it has previously retained.16 This capacity belongs to the interior sense called 
memory.  
To summarize the process of animal cognition: the proper senses are affected by a 
sensible object, the common sense unifies and integrates the information received by 
proper senses, the phantasms which represent the forms of the sensible objects are 
produced by the phantasia, and finally, these phantasms are interpreted by the estimative 
power as representing things useful or harmful to a given animal. These interpreted 
phantasms (called intentions) are retained in the animal’s memory. According to 
Aquinas, the estimative power represents the acme of the animal kind of knowledge.17 
                                                 
 
13 Secundo quia de sensibilibus perceptis dijudicet, et ea ad invicem discernat; quod oportet fieri per 
potentiam ad quam omnia sensibilia perveniant, quae dicitur sensus communis. QDA 13;  ST I 78,4. 
 
14 Indiget autem animal apprehensione sensibilium, non solum apud eorum praesentiam, sed postquam 
abierint. QDA 13. 
 
15 Quarto autem requiritur quod apprehendantur intentiones quas sensus non apprehendit, sicut nocivum et 
utile et alia hujusmodi. Unde ad hoc in aliis animalibus ordinatur aestimativa naturalis. QDA 13.  
 
16 Quinto autem requiritur quod ea quae prius fuerunt apprehensa per sensus et interius conservantur, iterum 
ad actualem considerationem revocentur. Et hoc quidem pertinet ad rememorativam virtutem, quae in aliis 
quidem animalibus absque inquisitione suam operationem habet. QDA 13.  
 
17 ST I 78, 4  See also: Klubertanz, The Discursive Power, p.274.                      
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What the animal knows is a particular thing; it is represented by a phantasm, which 
phantasm is interpreted by the estimative power as corresponding to a thing which is 
recognized as being useful or harmful in some way. If it is useful, the animal may pursue 
it; if harmful, it would avoid it.  
The estimative power is interpreted by scholars as providing instinctive 
knowledge.18 Thomas also uses the word “instinct” when talking of estimative power.19  
Instinctive knowledge is an innate kind of knowledge which is characteristic of a given 
species of animal and which is necessary for that animal’s survival and thriving. 
Instinctive knowledge is the cognitive aspect of its inclinations and enables the animal to 
pursue that animal’s proper ends.  
Cogitative Power 
Humans are also animals, and like other animals, we are guided by the equivalent 
of the estimative power, which in humans is called cogitative power.20 The cogitative 
power is an inner sense and is rooted in animal inclinations, since by that power the 
human animal is enabled to pursue its animal ends. The selection of things we notice and 
react to in the world around us is guided by that power, just like in case of other animals. 
                                                 
 
18 Klubertanz, The Discursive Power, pp.272, 273, 275. See also: Braun, William, “Instincts in Men and 
Animals According to St. Thomas Aquinas”, M.A. Thesis, The Catholic University of America, 1954.  
See also: Brennan, Robert E., O. P. Thomistic Psychology, The Macmillan Co.,1962, p.143-144. However 
Brennan points out that the estimative power corresponds only to the cognitive factor in instinct, and he 
claims that the sensitive appetite may be closer to our modern view of instinct. In my opinion, the 
estimative power and the sensitive appetite together account for instinctive behavior.    
     
19 Now a human being arrives at a knowledge of these intentions by investigation and deliberation; but 
other animals possess this kind of knowledge by natural instinct, as, for example, a sheep naturally flees a 
wolf as being harmful.   
 
Et ad haec quidem cognoscenda pervenit homo inquirendo et conferendo; alia vero animalia quodam 
naturali instinctu, sicut ovis naturaliter fugit lupum tamquam nocivum. QDA 13. 
 
20 ST I 78, 4.  
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However, in humans, the estimative power is called cogitative power, because it is 
influenced by our reason, by the overflow.21  
We all know from experience that human beings, unlike animals, are not 
determined to act in accordance with instincts, even though humans may have a tendency 
to act in certain ways in certain circumstances which might be interpreted as akin to 
instinct. But human beings are free to choose how they will act.22 Perhaps an example of 
such a situation might be those vague feelings we get in the presence of various things in 
our environment (for example a strange figure in a dark alley), which require us to make 
a quick decision (for example, a decision to run away). If we were like other animals, we 
could act only in a predetermined way (for example, a sheep runs away from the wolf). 
But we humans possess reason and free will. We may act in a way that is consistent with 
our vague feelings or contrary to them. We are free to ignore our impression, to ignore 
our fears. We do not have to act on those impressions of there being something harmful 
which ought to be avoided (or something pleasant which ought to be pursued) because we 
are rational creatures who can make decision according to the judgment of our own 
reason, while other animals, according to Aquinas, are guided by their natural 
inclinations only.23  
Even though our behavior is ultimately subject to our rational decisions, Thomas 
insists that cogitative power is functionally the same as the estimative power of other 
animals up to the point of recognizing objects as useful or harmful. It is by the cogitative 
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22  ST I 81, 3; Klubertanz, The Discursive Power, pp. 164, 202-203, 239; Braun, p. 24. 
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power that we recognize danger, and that happens in similar way other animals 
recognize danger by the estimative power.24 The estimative power which irrational 
animals possess the human animal also must possess for we do not loose animal powers 
just because we are rational. The cogitative power, which corresponds to the estimative 
power in other animals, is the inner sense which apprehends intentions, and enables us to 
recognize objects as either useful or harmful to us. In ST I 78, 4 ad 5 Thomas says that 
the cogitative and memorative powers of man are not distinct from their equivalents in 
other animals, but more perfect because of the affinity a human being has to the universal 
reason “which, so to speak, overflows into them.”25 What Thomas calls the “coalition of 
ideas” is the coalition of the instinctive knowledge with rational thinking.  
In humans the cogitative power is not pure instinct like it is in other animals, but 
something like a combination of an instinct with our reasoning abilities.26 Thomas says:  
Now, we must observe that as to sensible forms there is no difference 
between man and other animals; for they are similarly immuted by the 
extrinsic sensible. But there is a difference as to the above intentions: for 
other animals perceive these intentions only by some natural instinct, 
while man perceives them by means of coalition of ideas. Therefore the 
power which in other animals is called the natural estimative, in man is 
called the cogitative, which by some sort of collation discovers these 
intentions.27  
                                                 
 
24 First the sensible object affects the proper senses, the information is integrated by the common sense, the 
phantasm is formed by the phantasia, and the phantasm is interpreted by the estimative (or cogitative) 
power as representing something useful or harmful. 
               
25 Dicendum quod illam eminentiam habet cogitativa et memorativa in homine, non per id quod est 
proprium sensitivae partis; sed per aliquam affinitatem et propinquitatem ad rationem universalem, 
secundum quandam refluentiam. Et ideo non sunt aliae vires, sed eadem perfectiores quam sint in aliis 
animalibus. ST I 78, 4 ad 5.  
 
26 Thomas speaks of “coalition of ideas” quandam collationem. ST I 78, 4; See also: Klubertanz, The 
Discursive Power, pp.280-286.                 
 
27 Considerandum est autem quod quantum ad formas sensibiles non est differentia inter hominem et alia 
animalia; similiter enim immutantur a sensibilibus exterioribus. Sed quantum ad intentiones praedictas 
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Unlike in other animals who simply apprehend intentions, i.e., usefulness or harmfulness, 
in a human being there is further processing of what one apprehends: “In a human being 
there is a cogitative power, which compares these particular intentions; hence this power 
is called both the particular reason and the passive intellect.”28 The cogitative power can 
compare particular intentions, because in a human being the cogitative power 
communicates with reason: “The cogitative and memorative powers in man owe their 
excellence not to that which is proper to the sensitive part; but to a certain affinity and 
proximity to the universal reason, which, so to speak, overflows into them.”29 The 
universal reason “overflows” in a sense that the conclusion reached as a result of 
reasoning (very quick reasoning) modifies the notions of the estimative power, for 
example, changing the cognizance of something as fearful to the cognizance of 
something as playful. Thomas explains this like this:  
In man the estimative power…is replaced by the cogitative power, which 
is called by some the particular reason, because it compares individual 
intentions. Wherefore in man the sensitive appetite is naturally moved by 
this particular reason. But this same particular reason is naturally guided 
and moved according to the universal reason…Therefore it is clear that the 
universal reason directs the sensitive appetite…Anyone can experience 
this in himself: for by applying certain universal considerations, anger or 
fear or the like may be modifies or excited.30 
                                                                                                                                                 
differentia est; nam alia animalia percipient huiusmodi intentiones solum naturali quodam instinctu, homo 
autem per quondam collationem. Et ideo quae in aliis animalibus dicitur aestimativa naturalis, in homine 
dicitur cogitativa, quae per collationem quondam huiusmodi intentiones adinvenit. ST I 78, 4.  
 
28 In homine autem vis cogitativa, quae est collativa intentionum particularium; unde et ratio particularis 
dicitur et intellectus passivus. QDA 13. 
 
29 Dicendum quod illam eminentiam habet cogitativa et memorativa in homine, non per id quod est 
proprium sensitivae partes; sed per aliquam affinitatem et propinquitatem ad rationem universalem, 
secundum quandam refluentiam. ST I 78, 4 ad 5. 
 
30 Loco autem aestimativae virtutis est in homine…vis cogitativa, quae dicitur a quibusdam ratio 
particularis, eo quod est collativa intentionum individualium. Unde ab ea natus est moveri in homine 
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The universal reason, i.e., the intellect, influences the particular reason, i.e., the cogitative 
power and guides it in the evaluation of usefulness or harmfulness of various objects. We 
can experience this when we persuade ourselves to modify our feelings in accordance 
with the judgment of the intellect. Feelings are movements of the sensitive appetite, 
which in turn is moved by the cogitative power, and thus the operations of the cogitative 
power and the sensitive appetite together produce in us feelings. However, Thomas 
observes that the intellect does not have absolute control over feelings, only a “political” 
one,31 meaning that although the intellect may move the cogitative power, which in turn 
moves the sensitive appetite, it may nevertheless fail to move it. That is because the 
feelings and the instinctive knowledge belong to the animal side of human nature, which 
is subject to the eternal law, not to human reason.32 The intellect does not rule the 
sensitive soul, but communicates with it. That communication is what Aquinas calls the 
overflow. As a result of that overflow the initial recognition of something as harmful or 
useful may be modified.  
When I was a child of six, I came across a stuffed boar’s head in my friend’s attic. 
I remember that my first reaction was intense fear, simply fear, which caused me to stand 
motionless. Next, I was able to name the fearful object, for I recalled seeing something 
like that in books. Next, I realized that it was stuffed, and therefore, nothing to be afraid 
                                                                                                                                                 
appetitus sensitivus. Ipsa autem ratio particularis nata est moveri et dirigi in homine secundum rationem 
universalem…Et ideo patet quod ratio universalis imperat appetitui sensitivo…Hoc etiam quilibet experiri 
potest in se ipso; applicando enim aliquas universales considerationes, mitigatur ira aut timor aut aliquid 
huiusmodi, vel etiam instigatur. ST I 81, 3. 
 
31 Ibid.   
    
32 ST I-II 1, 2 and  ST I-II 93, 5. 
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of, but rather meant for entertainment. It took me perhaps two seconds to go from 
pure fear to the conclusion that I was looking at something like a large toy. In those 
seconds, I have manifested both, my animality (in that prelinguistic, intense fear of some 
large animal with tusks) and my rationality (in the process of reasoning which led me to 
conclusion that there was really nothing to be afraid of). That experience of mine is a 
good illustration of cogitative power as a combination of instinctive knowledge with 
rationality or the way the estimative power is influenced by the intellect.  
Instincts always orient animals towards their good, while reasoning is less 
reliable. For example, if we see some dark, scary figure in a dark alley, we may be 
inclined to run away. We instinctively recognize something as dangerous. We recognize 
danger by our cogitative power. But because we are rational, our reason affects the 
cogitative power and our behavior is finally determined by the intellect, not by the 
cogitative power. We may explain to ourselves that we are exaggerating the risk, decide 
to ignore our natural tendencies and move towards the strange figure rather than away 
from it. We do not have to act like a sheep, who would never move towards the wolf. But 
if we decide to ignore our fears, we may find out that we made the wrong decision as we 
get attacked. As this example shows, the cogitative power does not always serve us better 
than an estimative power. Nevertheless, we have to have cogitative power, because our 
behavior has to be more flexible than that of a sheep. Hence, in humans, animal 
knowledge is supplemented by reason.  
Instinctive knowledge that something is dangerous is a component of our 
thinking, but another component is rational thinking and decision making. The fact that 
we can reason and freely choose how to act does not mean that we do not possess the 
 180
inner sense which in other animals is called the estimative power. Like all animals, 
we have that inner sense. Also, to some extent we are passively moved towards our ends 
in accordance with our natural inclinations, because all animals are thus moved.33 But 
humans also possess the intellect which allows them to reflect on the kind of knowledge 
which might be called instinctive. Thus, human beings may act in accordance with the 
rational judgment rather than with that animal kind of knowledge. In humans, there is 
found a certain combination of instinctive, animal kind of knowledge and rational 
reflection, and that combination is called the cogitative power.   
The cogitative power also marks humans as boundary beings, between irrational 
animals and angels. On the one hand, one cannot equate cogitative power with reasoning, 
for reasoning belongs to the intellect, and the function of the cogitative power must be 
different than the function of the intellect. Indeed, the function of the cogitative power, 
like that of estimative power, is that instantaneous recognition of intentions, i.e. the 
harmfulness or usefulness of things around us. On the other hand, the cogitative power 
differs from the estimative power, for the recognition of intentions only provides humans 
with the first step of reasoning while by the estimative power an irrational animal 
possesses all the knowledge about a given object. In the cogitative power, the knowledge 
we possess as mere animals blends with the rational judgment of a creature endowed with 
reason.  
Because we are animals, we are equipped with the equivalent of the estimative 
power, the cogitative power, which allows us to sort the things we perceive into things 
which are either useful or harmful. They are useful or harmful to us according to what is 
                                                 
33 ST I-II 93, 6. 
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suitable to the kind of animals that we are. For example, we are instinctively afraid of 
large animals with tusks, because such animals tend to be dangerous to humans; on the 
other hand, we may be instinctively attracted to colorful fruit, because such fruit often 
turns out to be food fit for humans. We humans cannot completely rely on our instincts, 
but qua animals we have them, and they help us to pursue what is good for us and avoid 
what is bad. According to Thomas Aquinas, humans, just like other animals, maneuver 
through the world with the aid of their cogitative power. The cogitative power is one of 
the means by which we are naturally oriented towards our ends. It orients us to those ends 
by orienting us to particular things in our environment, things which naturally attract us 
or repulse us. We are forced to notice these particular things to which the cogitative 
power directs us. In the process of noticing these objects qua animals, we may also find 
among them objects which we wish to know more about qua rational beings. We might 
wonder about certain objects, about their causes, and we might decide to find out more 
about them. But we can only wonder about those objects to which we pay attention in the 
first place, and that depends on how our cogitative power guides us.34 In this way our 
cogitative power gives us the scope of things from which we might later choose some 
things for study, for the pursuit of theoretical kind of knowledge.  
Sensitive Appetite  
The estimative power is the cognitive power. Besides the estimative power, an 
animal’s behavior is also determined by the sensitive appetite. Animal inclinations, as 
was discussed in chapter 1, direct the animal towards the fulfillment of an animal’s ends, 
                                                 
34 “Attention, therefore, in the sensory order is a function of sense appetite, which is determined by the 
judgments of the estimative or discursive power. In man, the discursive power is of its nature subject to 
reason and will. Voluntary attention on the sense level is thus brought about in that reason and will direct 
the discursive power in its judgment.” Klubertanz, The Discursive Power, p.290. 
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towards its good and perfection. All beings tend to ends proper to them and for that 
reason are endowed with the appropriate powers. One of the powers which orient sentient 
beings, towards their ends is the appetitive power of the sensitive soul.35 An animal’s 
appetitive power, like estimative power, orients it either to the pursuit of its good, or to 
the avoidance of its evil. Aquinas tells us:  
It is necessary to assign an appetitive power to the soul. To make this 
evident, we must observe that some inclination follows every form … 
Now the form is found to have a more perfect existence in those things 
which participate in knowledge than in those which lack knowledge. For 
in those which lack knowledge, the form is found to determine each thing 
only to its own being – that is, to its nature. Therefore this natural form is 
followed by a natural inclination, which is called the natural appetite. But 
in those things which have knowledge, each one is determined to its own 
natural being by its natural form, in such a manner that it is nevertheless 
receptive of the species of other things … Therefore, as forms exist in 
those things that have knowledge in a higher manner and above the 
manner of natural forms; so must there be in them an inclination 
surpassing the natural inclination, which is called the natural appetite.36      
 
Several things must be noted here. In the above passage, Aquinas contrasts 
“natural” inclination (or appetite) with the “animal” inclination. In fact, both inclinations 
are natural in a sense that they are both natural to that kind of a being, and sometimes 
Aquinas uses the designation “natural” in that way. However, this is one of the passages 
in which he draws our attention to the difference between the inclinations an animal 
                                                 
 
35 ST I 80,1; QDV, 25 1.  
 
36 Dicendun quod necesse est ponere quondam potentiam animae appetitivam. Ad cuius evidentiam 
considerandum est quod quamlibet formam sequitur aliqua inclinatio; Forma autem in his quae 
cognitionem participant, altiori modo invenitur quam in his quae cognitione carent. In his enim quae 
cognitione carent, invenitur tantummodo forma ad unum esse proprium determinans unumquodque, quod 
etiam naturale uniuscuiusque est. Hanc igitur formam naturalem sequitur naturalis inclinatio, quae appetitus 
naturalis vocatur. In habentis autem cognitionem sic determinatur unumquodque ad proprium esse naturale 
per formam naturalem, quod tamen est receptivum specierum aliarum rerum; Sicut igitur formae altiori 
modo existunt in habentibus cognitionem supra modum formarum naturalium, ita oportet quod in eis sit 
inclinatio supra modum inclinationis naturalis, quae dicitur appetitus naturalis. ST I 80, 1. 
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possesses as a merely corporeal and living being and the inclinations it possesses as 
an animal, a sentient being. The difference between the animals and other kinds of beings 
is that animals are receptive of the forms of other things around them. Animals possess 
sensory organs and through them, they sense other things. Because they can sense the 
presence of other things, there must be in them some inclination which goes beyond those 
inclinations they already possess as mere physical objects, or even mere living beings. 
This animal kind of inclination is the sensitive appetite. “And this superior inclination 
belongs to the appetitive power of the soul, through which the animal is able to desire 
what it apprehends, and not only that to which it is inclined by its natural form. And so it 
is necessary to assign an appetitive power to the soul.” 37 Thus, Aquinas posits the 
existence of the appetitive power in the soul – the sensitive soul – which enables the 
animal to desire something which it senses and thus come to know in its environment.38 
Because of the appetitive power the animal feels desires and is motivated to act. Needless 
to say, humans qua animals also possess appetitive power in the sensitive part of their 
souls.                                 
The sensitive appetite is divided into the concupiscible and the irascible powers, 
or concupiscible and irascible appetites.39 These appetites are distinguished on the basis 
of their objects: the object of the concupiscible appetite is simply the good which the 
animal needs to pursue, while the object of the irascible appetite is the arduous good, a 
                                                 
 
37 Et haec superior inclinatio pertinet ad vim animae appetitivam, per quam animal appetere potest ea quae 
apprehendit, non solum ea ad quae inclinatur ex forma naturali. Sic igitur necesse est ponere aliquam 
potentiam animae appetitivam. ST I 80, 1 See also QDV 25, 1. 
 
38 ST I 81, 2.                      
 
39 ST I-II 23, 1.                                
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good which is difficult to obtain. Absence of the good, or the obstacles in the 
attainment of the good, is regarded as evil. Aquinas says: 
In order, therefore, to discern which passions are in the irascible and 
which in the concupiscible, we must take the object of each of these 
powers….the object of the concupiscible power is sensible good or evil, 
simply apprehended as such, which causes pleasure or pain….this very 
good or evil, inasmuch as it is of an arduous or difficult nature, is the 
object of the irascible faculty.40  
 
The concupiscible power enables the animal to pursue and enjoy the good or to 
reject the evil. The concupiscible power manifests itself in the emotion of love, desire and 
delight, and on the negative side in hate, aversion and pain.41 The irascible power enables 
the animal to deal with dangers or to face difficulties in the pursuit of the good. It enables 
the animal to struggle to obtain the good or to repel the evil.42 The irascible power 
manifests itself in the emotions of fear, anger, despair, and on the positive side in daring 
and hope.43  
When an animal apprehends something as useful, that is instrumentally good (like 
straws for building bird’s nest), the sensitive appetite manifested in the emotions causes 
the animal to be attracted to the good, to desire it and to pursue it, perhaps even to fight 
for it. Likewise, when an animal apprehends something as evil (like that wolf from the 
point of view of a sheep), the sensitive appetite manifested in such emotins like hate, fear 
                                                 
 
40 Ad cognoscendum ergo quae passiones sunt in irascibili, et quae in concupiscibili, oportet assumere 
obiectum utriusque potentiae.…obiectum potentiae concupiscibilis est bonum vel malum sensibile 
simpliciter acceptum, quod est delectabile vel dolorosum….ideo ipsum bonum vel malum, secundum quod 
habet rationem ardui vel difficilis, est obiectum irascibilis. ST I-II 23, 1.                
 
41 ST I-II 25, 1 and 2; ST I-II 23, 1. 
 
42 ST I-II 25, 1; ST I-II 23, 1. 
 
43 ST I-II 25, 3; ST I-II 23, 1. 
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and aversion causes the animal to flee from the evil. The sensitive appetite is 
coordinated with the instinctive knowledge which animals possess of useful and harmful 
things in their environment,44 and thus, the animal necessarily experiences the requisite 
emotions upon apprehending something as either simply good or as arduous good, and 
the animal acts in the ways dictated by the feelings experienced, i.e. it simply pursues the 
good or struggles to obtain an arduous good.       
In humans, likewise, there is the sensitive appetite in which we distinguish the 
concupiscible and the irascible powers. Since these powers belong to the human soul, 
they can be governed by reason to some extent, but they do not obey the reason 
completely.45 The powers of the sensitive part of the soul do not fully obey the reason, 
because the sensitive appetite is supposed to guide the animal to its good, to its proper 
ends. In humans the reason can override the sensitive appetite, although in humans, the 
sensitive appetite is also is supposed to orient the creature to its good.  
Integration of the Estimative Power and the Sensitive Appetite  
Thanks to the sensitive appetite, animals can pursue what is good for them. In 
case of the concupiscible appetite, what it causes a given animal to desire is not merely 
something which that animal is capable of sensing, but something which is actually 
useful to that animal. In case of the irascible appetite, it causes the animal to struggle 
against something which is harmful to that animal. As was discussed above, the 
estimative power enables the animal to apprehend things as suitable to it. The appetitive 
power governs the desires of the animal:   
                                                 
 
44 ST I 81, 3.      
 
45 Ibid.                     
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Each power of the soul is a form or nature, and has a natural inclination to 
something. Wherefore each power desires by the natural appetite that 
object which is suitable to itself. Above which natural appetite is the 
animal appetite, which follows the apprehension, and by which something 
is desired not as suitable to this or that power, such as sight for seeing, or 
sound for hearing; but simply as suitable to the animal.46  
 
Among the many objects in their environment that animals see, hear, smell etc. is what is 
important to them. What is good for a given animal is desired by it, and thus pursued, 
while what is bad for that animal is rejected and avoided.   
As was discussed above, the estimative power is a cognitive power. Aquinas tells 
us that by the estimative power “an animal apprehends intentions not received by the 
sense, such as friendship or hostility… It is accordingly in virtue of the estimative power 
that animals are said to have a sort of prudence.”47  By the estimative power, the animal 
interprets objects of perceptions as either useful or harmful. This apprehension affects the 
appetitive part of the animal soul, i.e., the sensitive appetite, which is comprised of the 
irascible and the concupiscible powers.                
Thomas speaks of cognition as preceding desires or aversions since we must 
know something first in order to affectively react to it.48 Thus, the estimative power 
which enables the animal to recognize objects as either useful or harmful also moves the 
sensitive appetite which enables the animal to experience appropriate feelings in regards 
                                                 
46 Dicendum quod unaquaeque potentia animae est quaedam forma seu natura, et habet naturalem 
inclinationem in aliquid. Unde unaquaeque appetit obiectum sibi conveniens naturali appetitu. Supra quem 
est appetitus animalis consequens apprehensionem, quo appetitur aliquid non ea ratione qua est conveniens 
ad actum huius vel illius potentiae, utpote visio ad videndum et auditio ad audiendum; sed quia est 
conveniens simpliciter animali. ST I 80,1 ad 3. 
 
47 Animal apprehendit intentiones non acceptas per sensum, ut amicitiam vel inimicitiam…unde ratione 
hujus aestimationis dicuntur animalia quamdam prudentiam habere. QDV 25, 2. 
 
48 ST I 80, 1 ad 3;  ST I 81, 1 and 3. 
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to those objects.49 The feelings must follow cognition, for otherwise they would not 
be directed to any particular object. However, in practice, the affective and the cognitive 
powers must work almost simultaneously in order to guide the animal through the world. 
Together, the sensitive appetite and the estimative power guide the animal to attain its 
proper ends and thus to reach its animal perfection.  
The motivation for pursuit or avoidance is provided by the sensitive appetite, 
from which particular desires are derived. The sensitive appetite and the cognitive powers 
of the animal follow from the animal’s nature, that is, from the form, as was explained 
above. Different animals have the ability to sense different things, and to regard different 
things as useful or not. What a human animal picks out of its environment also accords 
with the natural appetites proper to humans, and is picked out as something suitable to 
humans in general and to that person in particular. We are attracted to something by our 
appetitive power, manifested by feelings, because we are animals, because we perceive it 
as good and suitable. In the case of humans, as in the case of any other kind of animal, 
what seems good is also desired, but whether it is pursued depends on what a person 
decides to do because humans are rational animals. Moral decisions are not the subject of 
this dissertation. We must note, however, that the sensitive appetite together with the 
cogitative power provides humans with the range of objects one might consider pursuing 
or avoiding: the range of objects one must take notice of and must affectively react to.  
These objects necessarily become the first objects we are able to study.     
 
       
                                                 
 
49 ST I 81, 3.        
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Our Choice of Subjects of Study  
From all the above we must conclude that our choice of subjects for study is, in 
the beginning, guided by the cogitative power and the sensitive appetite. The acquisition 
of knowledge begins, as was discussed in the previous chapter, with sensory perception50 
and abstraction of phantasms.51 The cogitative power causes us to have an impression of 
either harmful or useful objects,52 and our sensitive appetite causes us to feel either 
attraction or aversion and the desire to act accordingly.53 Up to this point our process of 
knowledge acquisition follows the same pattern as it does in the case of other animals. 
Thus, when we consider how we come up with the subjects to study, we must realize that 
the animal kind of reaction to our environment must lie at the foundations of our choice 
of subject.  
On the one hand, the choice of topics for study should be made by the intellective 
soul, for the pursuit of knowledge is a rational activity. Of course, it is true that study, or 
research, not to mention contemplation, are intellectual activities and it is the intellect 
that must choose what it will think about. On the other hand, as was explained before, in 
order to even begin thinking, the intellect must have certain objects presented to it by the 
senses, which objects are identified as useful or harmful by the cogitative power, and as 
desirable or not by the sensitive appetite.54 Also, while it is true that when we consider 
contemplation of God we are not talking of an animal pursing something which an animal 
                                                 
50 ST I 84, 6 and 8.                
 
51 ST I 79,4; ST I 84,7; ST I 85, 1; QDA 13.                      
 
52 ST I 78, 4; QDA 13.             
 
53 ST I 81. 
         
54 ST I 78, 4 ad  4 and ad 5; ST I 80, 2 ad 3; ST I 81, 3.                          
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desires, the first step to contemplation is the noticing of sensible objects and reacting 
to them. Therefore, animal powers belonging to the sensitive part of the soul guide our 
choice of subject of study, from which eventually will be derived the object of our 
contemplation.  
When Aquinas says that “in the imperfect happiness,” we need to “advance from 
the perfection of the lower part to the perfection of the higher part,”55 this also applies to 
the starting point in our pursuit of knowledge. Operations of the sensitive soul are 
antecedent to the pursuit of knowledge, even though studying which leads us to truth is a 
rational kind of activity.  
Passions   
Thus, we are in the beginning guided in our choice of subject for study by the 
sensitive appetite and the cogitative power. However, the sensitive appetite and the 
cogitative power give us only a general direction, while what we pay attention to and 
perhaps study must be something particular. To choose the particular object of special 
interest to us, we must be guided by particular desires.          
By the estimative power, the animal knows what it is to seek or avoid. However, 
that is not yet enough to cause that animal to act on that knowledge. In order to act, to 
move, it must be motivated by the sensitive appetite not in a general way, but by feelings 
which arise from it.  
Animals, unlike other natural creatures, experience feelings. Feelings are 
technically called “passions” (passiones) by Aquinas. Passions arise in sentient beings, 
that is, animals, because of inclinations characteristic to their kind. The sheep’s 
                                                 
 
55 A perfectione inferioris partis proceditur ad perfectionem superioris.  ST I-II 3, 3 ad 3. 
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experience of passions (fear, hate) and desires (to run away) when it sees the wolf, 
appear because of the sheep’s inclination to self-preservation. In human beings, passions 
also follow inclinations. Passions follow sensitive apprehension of something in a way 
important to a given kind of an animal. Passions are reactions to the environment. An 
animal experiences certain kinds of passions according to the nature of that animal. 
Passions arise from the concupiscible and irascible appetites, both of which help the 
animal to preserve itself and its kind. According to Aquinas, passions are animal in 
origin, for passions are movements of the sensitive part of the soul.56   
Passions also require having a body for they are manifested not only by feelings, 
but also by bodily changes. Thomas says: “As stated above passion is properly to be 
found where there is corporeal transmutation. This corporeal transmutation is found in 
the acts of the sensitive appetite, and is not only spiritual, as in the sensitive 
apprehension, but also natural.”57    
Passions indicate a change, either for better or for worse. In general, it can be said 
that something is passive because it receives something.58 Thomas explains the 
phenomenon of passion by using the example of health and sickness. An animal’s body is 
passive insofar as, for example, it receives health and loses sickness,59 or vice-versa, 
loses health and receives sickness.60 Feeling sick is an example of what is most often 
                                                 
56 ST I-II 22, 2and 3. 
 
57 Dicendum quod, sicut iam dictum est, passio proprie invenitur ubi est trnsmutatio corporalis. Quae 
quidem invenitur in actibus appetitus sensitivi; et non solum spiritualis, sicut est in apprehensione sensitiva, 
sed etiam naturalis. ST I-II 22, 3. 
 
58 Ibid. 
 
59 ST I-II 22,1. 
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understood as passion, that is, suffering.61 However delight is also a passion on 
Thomas’s account.62 Passions are movements of the sensitive appetite.63 Passions qua 
feelings belong to beings who have a sensitive soul, namely, they belong to animals.64 
Thomas says: “It is evident that the passions of the soul are the same as affections. But 
affections manifestly belong to the appetitive, and not to the apprehensive part. Therefore 
the passions are in the appetitive rather than in the apprehensive part.”65  Thus, the 
passions belong to the sensitive appetite. Passions are associated with various bodily 
changes - for example, anger is said to be associated with the heating of the blood: 
“Wherefore the material element in the definition of the movement of the appetitive part, 
is the natural change of the organ; for instance, anger is said to be a kindling of the blood 
about the heart.”66 Passions are experienced as feelings which result from some change in 
the body.67 It is a property of matter that it can receive or lose something, so in order to 
experience passions our bodies must be affected. Also, since the sensitive soul requires a 
                                                                                                                                                 
60 Ibid. 
 
61 Ibid. 
 
62 ST I-II 25, 1 and 2.                         
 
63 ST I 81, 2.              
 
64 ST I-II 22, 2 and 3; ST I 78, 1; ST I 80, 1.            
 
65 Patet quod passiones animae sunt idem quod affectiones. Sed affectiones manifeste pertinent ad partem 
appetitivam, et non apprehensivam. Ergo et passiones magis sunt in appetitiva quam in apprehensiva. ST I-
II 22, 2 Sed contra. 
 
66 Unde in definitione motuum appetitivae partis materialiter ponitur aliqua naturalis transmutatio organi; 
sicut dicitur quod ira est ascensio sanguinis circa cor. ST I-II 22, 2 ad 3. 
 
67 ST I-II 22, 1 ad 1. 
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body of its operations,68 these movements of the sensitive appetite cannot happen 
unless there is a body. Thus, passions belong to beings composed of form and matter.69   
Thomas is clear that passions belong to the sensitive part of the soul and can be 
experienced by composite beings - like humans, for example - but they cannot be 
experienced by beings whose composition does not include matter. He tells us that angels 
do not experience passions.70 Angels are rational but incorporeal creatures and thus, they 
cannot experience passions which are found in the sensitive part of the soul and which 
involve bodily change. Passions, Thomas says, are not found in the intellectual appetite, 
which is the will.71 He says: “When love and joy and the like are ascribed to God or the 
angels, or to man in respect of his intellectual appetite, they signify simple acts of the will 
having like effects, but without passion.” 72 These quasi-passions associated with intellect 
and the will Aquinas calls joy (gaudium),73 sorrow (tristitia),74 love in the sense of choice 
(dilectio),75 and love in the sense of charity (caritas).76 All of these are movements of the 
will, which is the intellectual appetite, and they follow intellectual apprehension.   
                                                 
68 ST I 77, 8.              
 
69 Ibid.           
 
70 ST I-II 23, 3 ad 3. 
 
71 ST I-II 23, 3. 
 
72 Dicendum quod amor et gaudium et alia huiusmodi, cum attribuntur Deo vel angelis, aut hominibus 
secundum appetitum intellectivum, significant simplicem actum voluntatis cum similitudine effectus 
absque passione. ST I-II 22, 3 ad 3. 
 
73 ST I-II 31, 3. 
 
74 ST I-II 35, 2. 
 
75 ST I-II 26, 3. 
 
76 ST II-II 23, 1; 27,1. 
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Passions follow sensitive apprehension (seeing a wolf, for example), and are 
movements of the sensitive appetite, which is divided into the irascible and the 
concupiscible appetite.77 They are designated by the following names: love (amor), 
hatred (odio), concupiscence or desire (concupiscentia vel desiderium), delight 
(delectatio), joy (gaudium), hope (spe), despair (desparatio), pain (dolor) sorrow 
(tristitia), fear (timor), and anger (ira).78 Concupiscible passions incline an animal to 
recognize the good and to seek it, to desire it, and to delight in it when it is obtained. For 
example, a cat loves mice, seeks them out, desires them, and delights in them when it eats 
them.79 Irascible passions cause an animal to recognize the evil, to hate it, to fear it and to 
avoid it. For example, the sheep hates the wolf; it fears and avoids it.80 Hope keeps the 
cat patiently sitting at the mouse hole while despair (and pain) would be experienced by a 
sheep caught by the wolf.81 The passion of anger is experienced when there is a difficulty 
in either pursuing the good or avoiding the evil. Anger is most often manifested by a 
fight.82   
At this point one might object that humans cannot experience passions in the 
same way as other animals, for humans are endowed with intellect and free will. Aquinas 
would agree, for he does not say that humans experience passions exactly in the same 
                                                 
77 ST I-II 23, 1 and 2; ST I 80. 
 
78 ST I-II 26-48. 
 
79 ST I-II 25,2. 
 
80 ST I-II 25, 3. 
 
81 ST I-II 25, 1 and 3. 
 
82 Ibid. 
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way as other animals do. He only says that humans experience passions because they 
are animals. However, due to the fact that humans possess a rational soul, the human 
experience of passions is influenced by that rational soul. Aquinas often mentions 
“overflow” of the rationality into the sensitive part of the soul.83 Thus, he seems to say 
that human experience of passions derives from the sensitive appetite, but are somewhat 
modified by our rational understanding of events and our judgment regarding them. As 
we recall, in humans, the estimative power is called cogitative power because our 
instinctive feelings are modified by our rational understanding and judgment. Thus, it 
would follow that human loves, fears, desires etc. would differ from those experienced by 
cats or sheep. Nevertheless, given the fact that they belong to the irascible or 
concupiscible appetite and are movements of the sensitive part of the soul, it would also 
follow that our passions should have quite a lot in common with those experienced by 
other animals. However, to determine how much they have in common is well beyond the 
scope of this dissertation.  
Motivation to Act  
Passions are movements of the sensitive appetite which direct us to those objects 
which are suitable to us. As was discussed above, animal attractions and aversions are at 
the beginning of our pursuits of various ends. Afterwards, humans, who are equipped 
with the intellect and will and thus have the power to control their actions84, may choose 
not to follow their natural desires or to follow them in a modified way. Humans, unlike 
other animals, are also equipped with the intellectual appetite, which is the will. The will 
                                                 
83 ST I 78,4; ST I-II 3,3 ad 3; ST I-II 32, 8; ST I-II 35,5 ad 1; ST I-II 30 1, ad 1; ST II-II 175, 4 ad 1. 
 
84 ST Prologue I-II. 
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is free and our willing does not automatically follow any external events, unlike the 
lower appetites, i.e., the appetitive powers of the sensitive soul, which are passively 
moved by external objects. The will is moved by the intellect, and even though our 
thinking depends on sensory perception, the ideas on which we may decide to act are not 
mere phantasms.85 Because humans posses intellect and will, humans may desire 
immaterial things, such as knowledge or virtue, because intellectual appetite may tend to 
particular things as “standing under the universal”.86  
 And yet, there is only one motive power in a human being, and the foundation of 
it is the sensitive, not the intellectual appetite. First of all, Thomas dismissed the 
speculative reason as the motive power. He says: “The mind simply considered in itself 
(or the speculative reason) does not move anything because it prescribes nothing about 
pursuit or flight.”87 It is the practical reason that ordains pursuit or flight, because the 
practical reason ordains action with respect to a goal.88 However, the practical reason is 
not enough to move a human being to action either. In our moral actions, the intellect 
judges that something is the right action according to the general principles. But what 
moves a human being to action is not understanding of the principles, but a desire to act 
                                                 
85 For the appetitive power is a passive power, which is naturally moved by the thing apprehended: 
wherefore the apprehended appetible is a mover which is not moved, while the appetite is a mover 
moved…. Therefore, since what is apprehended by the intellect and what is apprehended by sense are 
generically different; consequently, the intellectual appetite is distinct from the sensitive.    
 
Potentia enim appetitiva est potentia passiva, quae nata est moveri ab apprehenso, unde appetibile 
apprehensum est movens non motum, appetibus autem movens motum …Quia igitur est alterius generis 
apprehensum per intellectum et apprehensum per sensum, consequens est quod appetitus intellectivus sit 
alia potentia a sensitivo.  ST I 80, 2.   
 
86 ST I 80, 2 ad 2.     
 
87 Idest ratio speculativa nihil movet, quia nihil dicit de prosequendo vel fugiendo. In NE VI 2, 1135. 
 
88 Ibid.  
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in a certain way. Thomas says: “A universal opinion does not move except by means 
of a particular opinion; and in like manner the higher appetite moves by the means of the 
lower: and therefore there are not two distinct motive powers following the intellect and 
the sense.”89 What this means is that in order to be moved to act, humans, like other 
animals, must be motivated by desire for some particular object, and not by a general 
principle alone. For example, we may know that it is good to eat vegetables. Then we 
come across a particularly fresh ripe tomato. We know that it is good to eat vegetables, 
that this tomato is a vegetable, and so, we know that it is good to eat this tomato. This is a 
valid inference, however, what motivates us to action i.e. reaching for the tomato and 
eating it, is not only understanding that this tomato, being a vegetable, is good to eat, but 
the sight and smell of the tomato. Nobody would be enthusiastic about eating 
‘vegetables’, but somebody might be enthusiastic about eating this tomato. In case of 
humans, such desires may be thwarted because of our understanding of the circumstances 
(for example, the fact that this tomato is someone else’s property), while in case of non-
rational animals, such desires are followed instinctively. But in both humans and other 
animals, the motivation for action is provided by the appetible object and the desire it 
elicits. As Aquinas tells us, all agents are moved by love (understood in the general sense 
as appetite or inclination) and love is the cause of desire: “Now the end is the good 
desired and loved by each one. Wherefore it is evident that every agent, whatever it be, 
does every action from love of some kind.90   
                                                 
89 Opinio universalis non movet nisi mediante particulari; et similiter appetitus superior movet mediante 
inferiori. Et ideo non est alia vis motiva consequens intellectum et sensum. ST I 80, 2 ad 3. 
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The formation of a “universal opinion” depends on our knowledge of 
particulars, which has to rely on the senses - because we have to perceive particulars - 
and on passions - because we have to select them from our environment as suitable to our 
nature and then as attractive or otherwise. As Thomas tells us, a thing constitutes our 
good in relation to us, not in and of itself. That is why we cannot desire some good 
regarded in theoretical and universal terms, but only a concrete good thing. We come to 
know particular good things through our senses, by the cogitative power we identify 
those things as good for us, and this in turn triggers in us the desire for those things, since 
the cogitative power moves the sensitive appetite. The intellect receives the information 
for the sensitive soul and judges whether a desired object is really good, in accordance 
with the universal principles. Without this input from the cogitative power and the 
sensitive appetite, the intellect would not be able to know anything about the availability 
of desirable objects, and so this is one way in which the judgment of the intellect and the 
subsequent consent of the will depend on the sensitive soul. But furthermore, the 
sensitive appetite can move one to action, regardless of the judgment of the intellect.  
As was explained above, the intellect may influence the cogitative power and the 
sensitive appetite. But the power of the intellect over the sensitive appetite is not 
absolute.91 Because the intellect cannot absolutely rule the appetites, people sometimes 
find themselves doing things they disapprove of, like eating excessive amount of sweets. 
Thomas considers this to be the evidence that the basic motive force is the sensitive 
                                                                                                                                                 
90 Dicendum quod omne agens agit propter finem aliquem…Finis autem est bonum desideratum et amatum 
unicuique. Unde manifestum est quod omne agens, quodcumque sit, agit quamcumque actionem ex aliquo 
amore. ST I-II 28, 6; See also: ST I-II 30, 2. 
             
91 ST I 81, 3 
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appetite. He says: “Appetition, on the other hand, can move to action independently 
of reason, as we see in the case of the concupiscible desire which is a sort of 
appetite.…Clearly, then, the motive principles are reducible to the one object of 
appetition…. Hence if we act amiss it is, in the last analysis, because we fall short of 
what we intellectually know; and our previous conclusion stands, that the final motive-
impulse comes from the object of desire.”92        
The good understood by the intellect is the universal good. But what is good for 
us is always a particular good. It is the cogitative power together with the sensitive 
appetite that enables us to identify and desire our good. Thomas says: “Yet not every 
good is desirable as a cause of action, but only the good-as-term-of-action, i.e., a good 
that is actually related to our actions. And precisely as such no such good is always good 
in the same way; for it must vary in relation to ourselves. That is why the ultimate and 
absolute good, regarded in its universality, does not as such, move us to act. Clearly, 
then, the final motive force derives from the soul itself acting through the appetitive 
power.”93 A particular good is what is good for us qua individuals, at a particular time 
and place. It is identified by the senses and we become aware of it as something we 
desire. Thus, it is the sensitive appetite that moves us to action first.                      
As human beings, we are capable of understanding the complexities of various 
situations and so after some deliberation we may perhaps will to act in a way contrary to 
                                                 
92 Sed appetitus movet sine ratione, sicut patet ex his quae es concupiscentia moventur. Concupiscentia 
enim est appetitus quidam….Et sic patet quod moventia reducuntur in unum, quod est appetibile….Et ideo 
in actionibus nostris contingit deficere a rectitudine secundum quod deficimus ab intellectu et ratione. Unde 
patet ex praedictis quod appetibile semper movet. In DA III 15, 826. 
 
93 Non autem omne bonum est appetibile et movens, sed bonum agibile, quod est bonum applicatum ad 
operationem; et hoc contingit aliter se habere, sicut omnia quae nostrae actioni subduntur. Unde bonum 
ultimum et necessarium in sua universitate consistens, non movet. Manifestum est igitur quod potentia 
animae quae dicitur appetitus, sit movens. In DA III 15, 827. 
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our desire,94 although on the other hand, we may succumb to the temptation and reach 
for what we desire. In the case of animals, motivation for action – towards or away from 
something – is provided by the apprehension of something as delightful or painful, and is 
not complicated by deliberations.95 While human beings have to grapple with moral 
choices regarding appetible objects, the starting point is always desire for the concrete 
object, and it is that desire that motivates us to act. The appetitive power is needed to 
motivate any animal to act and then the motive power enables the animal to actually 
move.  
Attractive Objects    
Motivation is provided by the sensitive appetite reacting to the presence of some 
object. The object may be regarded by us as either attractive or repulsive, and accordingly 
we may desire either to pursue or to avoid it. As was discussed above, our pursuit of 
knowledge has to begin with the reflection on the objects we notice and react to as 
animals, since this is the beginning of our knowledge of the world. If we talk of the 
pursuit of knowledge, then it is more probable that we would wish to study those things 
which we find attractive rather than those which we find repulsive. However, what is 
attractive as an object of study is relative to us, as subjects.  
Aquinas writes of study and also of contemplation as being associated with 
delight. He tells us that the desire for knowledge is one of the causes of delight.96  And he 
                                                 
 
94 We may act in a way contrary to our original desire. In the end, the intellect would have to influence the 
cogitative power and thus change the kind of desires we have. See: ST I 81, 3 and the discussion of the 
cogitative power above.                
 
95 ST I 80; QDA 13. 
 
96 ST I-II 32, 8. 
 200
also tells us that contemplation begins and ends with delight.97 Aquinas clearly 
regards study and contemplation as something delightful, and it is so because knowledge 
is a good and so our desire for it would be associated with the expectation of a delight 
and the attainment of a good should terminate in delight.  
One may wonder, however, about the cases when someone studies or 
contemplates something which is not in and of itself delightful or pretty, for example an 
illness, or Christ’s passion. Thomas addresses that problem in ST I-II 35, 5 “Whether 
there is any Sorrow Contrary to the Pleasure [Delight] of Contemplation?”98  His answer 
is that there is not. He acknowledges that the thing one contemplates may be something 
unpleasant, but the activity of contemplation is always delightful.99 Contemplation, as 
was discussed in chapter 2, has to begin with study, and study begins with our wondering 
about something which at the moment surpasses our understanding.100 Aquinas tells us 
that wonder is the cause of delight even if we study things which in themselves are not 
delightful. He says: “Also, representations of things, even of those which are not pleasant 
[delightful] in themselves, give rise to pleasure [delight]; for the soul rejoices in 
comparing one thing with another, because comparison of one thing with another is the 
proper and connatural act of the reason.”101 Thus, according to Aquinas, the pursuit of 
                                                 
 
97 ST II-II 180, 1 and 7. 
 
98 Utrum Delectationi Contemplationis Sit Aliqua Tristitia Contraria  ST I-II 35, 5.  
 
99 ST I-II 35, 5.  
 
100 ST I-II 32, 8. 
 
101 Et omnes repraesentationes rerum, etiam quae in se non sunt delectabiles; gaudet enim anima in 
collatione unius ad alterum, quia conferre unum alteri est prorpius et connaturalis actus rationis. ST I-II 32, 
8. 
 
 201
knowledge as an activity is delightful. However, the object we choose to study need 
not be generally regarded as delightful, it only needs to be found attractive by us, 
attractive in the sense of being interesting.  
We begin our pursuit of knowledge by noticing something which we find 
attractive. From among the things to which our attention is drawn by the cogitative power 
and the sensitive appetite, what we notice and select for further consideration must be 
something to which we have a natural attraction, because we see it as a good proper to 
us.102 Being rational creatures, we are also capable to wonder, and so we may also 
wonder about something we find attractive. Then we would be inclined to pay more 
attention to it, and to spend some time and effort in studying it. Thus, our motivation for 
action, even in case of pursuit of knowledge, is rooted in our sensitive appetite and our 
natural attraction towards particular things.103 The things we would be attracted to are 
those things which are suitable for us according to our nature. Technically speaking, 
those would be the things we love.  
Love   
 The extrinsic cause of our movement is some object which is attractive to us. We 
may have a general appetite of a certain kind, and general attraction to a certain class of 
objects, but it must be a particular object which moves us. According to Aquinas, we 
must have some natural affinity for that object so that the object in question affects our 
appetite, and that effect is what he calls love (amor): “Accordingly the first change 
wrought in the appetite by the appetible object is called love, and is nothing else than 
                                                 
102 In DA III 15, 827; ST I 80, 2; QDA 13.                                     
 
103 ST I 80, 2 ad 3.                       
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complacency in that object; and from this complacency results a movement towards 
that same object, and this movement is desire.”104 Thus, when we notice the appetible 
object, we feel love, and develop a desire for that object. We feel that attraction because 
we have a natural inclination to the objects of this sort, and this is one of them. 
Inclinations follow the form of a given kind of being. When we come upon an object that 
allows us to attain a greater degree of completion we are naturally attracted to such an 
object - we are inclined towards it. There is a certain fit between us and such an object. 
That fit is what Aquinas means by “complacency”.  
Thomas tends to use the word “love” (amor) when he talks of sentient beings, and 
especially of humans desiring and pursuing some good. As was explained in chapter 1, all 
beings possess natural inclinations, which are general tendencies to behave in certain 
ways, and which are also referred to as appetites. Sometimes Thomas also uses the word 
“love” (amor) interchangeably with “inclination”, or “appetite”. However, there are fine 
differences in the meaning of these terms. Inclination follows a form,105 which means that 
every natural being is endowed with certain inclinations, certain patterns of behavior, 
characteristic of its kind. That is true of all natural beings, even inanimate ones. The 
description of a thing’s set of inclinations would give us the description of a given thing’s 
nature. (Human beings are supposed to possess five basic inclinations.)106 Those natural 
inclinations are also sometimes called “natural appetites” or even “natural loves”. As was 
discussed in chapter 1, natural appetites orient each being towards its proper good. 
                                                 
 
104 Prima ergo immutatio appetitus ab appetibili vocatur amor, qui nihil est aliud quam complacentia 
appetibilis; et ex hac complacentia sequitur motus in appetibile, qui est desiderium. ST I-II 26, 2. 
 
105 ST I 80, 1. 
 
106 ST I-II 94, 2. 
 203
Natural appetite exists in all beings, but in case of non-rational beings, while they are 
subject to it, they do not understand it. They pursue their ends in accordance with the 
Order of Nature as created by God. “In the natural appetite the principle of this 
movement is the appetitive subject’s connaturalness with the thing to which it tends and 
may be called natural love.” 107 “Connaturalness” is Aquinas’s term to describe natural 
adaptation, a kind of fittingness, between the subject and its object of “love”. Thomas’s 
favorite example of natural love is that of stone’s natural tendency to fall to the ground, 
where its tendency to seek the center of the earth may be called “natural love”. There is 
connaturalness between the stone and the ground. A being as a whole is subject to natural 
love. “Natural love is not only in the powers of the vegetal soul, but in all the soul’s 
powers, and also in all the parts of the body, and universally in all things.”108    
“Appetite” also refers to an inclination, but more strictly, it is an inclination of an 
animal kind which requires sensory perception - a kind of knowledge - and actions on the 
part of an animal. That animal inclination belongs to the sensitive appetite and it enables 
an animal to desire what it perceives and what is suitable for that animal.109 An animal is 
capable of apprehending something as good, of desiring it, and of trying to obtain it. 
                                                 
 
107 In appetitu autem naturali principium huiusmodi motus est connaturalitas appetentis ad id in quod tendit, 
quae dici potest amor naturalis. ST I-II 26, 1. 
 
108 Dicendum quod amor naturalis non solum est in viribus animae vegetativae, sed in omnibus potentiis 
animae, et etiam in omnibus partibus corporis, et universaliter in omnibus rebus. ST I-II 26, 1 ad 3. 
 
109 ST I 80, 1. 
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Animal appetites are found in the sensitive part of the soul,110 and more precisely, in 
the concupiscible power.111   
Thus the sensitive appetite exists in animals and follows the apprehension of some 
good. In humans, the apprehension of a good is followed by a judgment and free choice, 
since we have reason and free will. The will is called the “intellectual appetite”.112 Will’s 
tendency to will the good presented to it by the intellect is the rational love: “In like 
manner the aptitude of … the will to some good, that is to say, its very complacency in 
good, is called…intellectual or rational love.”113  Rational love is the will’s complacency 
in something which the intellect understands to be a good worthy of pursuing. The 
intellect, of course, apprehends universal good while the sensitive apprehension of an 
animal pertains only to a particular and a concrete good. The term “love” may be used to 
designate any kind of appetite or inclination. Thomas explains it at the beginning of his 
discussion of love.114 He says: “Love is something pertaining to the appetite; since good 
is the object of both. Wherefore love differs according to the difference of appetites.”115 
Thus, love differs according to natural, sensitive or intellectual kind of appetite.   
                                                 
 
110 ST I 80, 1; 81,2; I-II 26,1. 
 
111 ST I-II 26, 1. 
 
112 ST I 80, 2. 
               
113 Et similiter aptatio appetitus…voluntatis ad aliquod bonum, idest ipsa complacentia boni, dicitur 
amor…intellectivus seu rationalis.  ST I-II 26, 1.     
 
114 ST I-II 26, 1. 
 
115 Dicendum quod amor est aliquid ad appetitum pertinens, cum utriusque obiectum sit bonum. Unde 
secundum differentiam appetitus est differentia amoris.  ST I-II 26, 1. 
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Love as a passion pertains only to the sensitive part of the soul,116 since 
rational part of the soul does not feel.117 Thus, the word “love” in reference to natural 
tendencies, i.e., “natural appetites,” or in reference to willing something good needs to be 
placed in context. The stone’s “love” for the ground is not a passion. However, love as a 
passion, a movement of the sensitive appetite, presupposes love as a natural inclination 
characteristic of non-sentient beings, because sentient beings must be also living and 
corporeal.          
Rational “love” may be more correctly called “dilection”, which implies a choice 
and not mere attraction: “For love has a wider signification than the others, since every 
dilection or charity is love (amor), but not vice versa. Because dilection implies, in 
addition to love, a choice (electionem) made beforehand, as the very word denotes; and 
therefore dilection is not in the concupisciple power, but only in the will, and only in the 
rational nature.”118 Thus, Aquinas uses the word “love” (amor) to cover a wide variety of 
meanings. Intellectual love, which is “dilection,” is not a passion. Dilection follows the 
judgment of reason and signifies the choice of the good. Love in the sense of passion 
simply follows the sensitive apprehension of a good: “And it [love] belongs to the 
concupiscible power, because it regards good absolutely.”119 In the case of human beings, 
sensitive apprehension of good would normally be followed by the judgment of reason 
                                                 
 
116 ST I-II 22, 3. 
 
117 ST I-II 22, 3 ad 3. 
 
118 Nam amor communius inter ea est; omnis enim amor dilectio est vel caritas, sed non e converso. Addit 
enim dilectio supra amorem electionem praecedentem, ut ipsum nomen sonat. Unde dilectio non est in 
concupiscibili, sed in voluntate tantum, et est in sola rationali natura.  ST I-II 26, 3. 
 
119 Et [amor] pertinet ad concupiscibilem, quia dicitur per respectum ad bonum absolute. ST I-II 26, 1. 
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and then, if the good seems to be worthy of pursuit, that pursuit may be willed, and 
that is called “dilection”.  
However, love (amor) has a “wider signification” than dilection, because in order 
to choose to will some good, and in order to understand it as a good, we must recognize it 
as good in the sense of being suitable to us according to our nature. That recognition 
depends on the cogitative power and the sensitive appetite, because it is their function to 
orient us towards our good. Therefore, recognizing what is our good belongs to love as a 
passion. It is the sensitive soul that is the seat of animal cognition and animal appetites, 
and is equipped to recognize good things in the world around us. As was explained 
before, our appetites orient us towards the good, and qua animals we recognize in our 
environment things which are good (or not good) for us, generally speaking.120 The 
intellect is supposed to consider various pieces of data presented to it by the senses and 
passions, and judge the situation according to the universal principles, but the intellect 
cannot in and of itself notice the good that might be pursued; the intellect has to receive 
that information from the sensitive part of the soul. Hence, the apprehension of the good 
in absolute terms must precede the judgment and free choice. That is why love as a 
passion belonging to the concupiscible power of the sensitive part of the soul precedes 
and encompasses dilection. This is why “rational love”, which is not a passion, 
presupposes sensitive love, which is a passion. And furthermore, love as a passion 
presupposes love as a natural inclination.  
                                                 
 
120 ST I 80, 1; ST I 78, 4. 
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As was repeated many times, we are motivated to seek God, and thus to 
contemplate God, because we want to know the essence of the First Cause.121 One might 
think that it is a reasoned understanding, and a moral choice, i.e. dilection, which drive us 
to it. Those certainly are present. However, Aquinas is of the opinion that we are really 
drawn to love God by love in the sense of amor, which is passion. He says: “But it is 
possible for man to tend to God by love, being as it were passively drawn by Him, more 
than he can possibly be drawn thereto by his reason, which pertains to the nature of 
dilection…And consequently love (amor) is more Godlike than dilection.”122 It is love of  
good, a basic inclination, which causes us to pursue our ends, which little by little ought 
to bring us closer to the knowledge of God, since our ultimate good is contemplation of 
God. Aquinas tells us that God is the last thing we come to know, and in this world we 
come to know something about God only through learning about other things:  
God is knowable and lovable for Himself, since He is essentially truth and 
goodness itself, whereby other things are known and loved: but with 
regard to us, since our knowledge is derived through the senses, those 
things are knowable first, which are nearer to our sense, and the last term 
of knowledge is that which is most remote from our senses.123                   
     
On the other hand, God is the first thing we love, in a sense that we love what constitutes 
our greatest good. That does not mean that we know what that greatest good is; it only 
                                                 
121 ST I-II 3, 8. 
 
122 Magis autem in Deum homo potest tendere per amorem passive quodammodo ab ipso Deo attractus, 
quam ad hoc eum propria ratio possit ducere, quod  pertinet ad rationem dilectionis, ut dictum est. Et 
propter hoc divinius est amor quam dilectio.  ST I-II 26, 3 ad .    
 
123 Deus est propter seipsum cognoscibilis et diligibilis, utpote essentialiter existens ipsa veritas et bonitas, 
per quam alia et cognoscuntur et amantur. Sed quoad nos, quia nostra cognitio a sensu ortum habet, prius 
sunt cognoscibilia quae sunt sensui propinquiora; et ultimus terminus cognitionis est in eo quod est maxime 
a sensu remotum. ST II-II 27, 4.                                                                                        
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means that we are naturally drawn to it.124 Thus, we love God first, and we know God 
last. At some point we may acquire enough knowledge to realize that God is our greatest 
good, and therefore that loving God is the right thing to do - that intellectual approval is 
dilection (dilectio). Dilection belongs to human intellect and will: “dilection is not in the 
concupiscible power, but only in the will, and only in the rational nature.”125 But love 
(amor) as a basic inclination to good and as a passion is a manifestation of God’s will for 
His creatures. Thus, love as amor is more divine than dilection. Love as amor is what 
drives us towards our final end and to all the proximate ends throughout our lives, in 
accordance with God’s plan. Thus, Divine Truth is loved intellectually, but it also must 
be loved with a passion, passively. Miner says that God’s power to draw people to 
Himself by sensible means exceeds our intellectual power, and he says: “Lacking the 
energy of the sensitive appetite, the amor intellectualis Dei will be weak.”126 I would say 
that without the sensitive appetite, which is necessary if we are to pursue our ends in 
accordance with our nature, intellectual love of God would be impossible. Our nature as 
boundary beings, both rational and animal, requires the engagement of passions as well 
as intellect in our love for God.  
One more thing needs to be made more precise. Thomas says that “sensitive love 
is in the sensitive appetite, just as intellectual love is in the intellectual appetite.”127 He 
                                                 
 
124 ST II-II 27, 4; ST I-II 1, 4 and 5.                             
 
125 Dilectio non est in concupiscibili, sed in voluntate tantum, et est in sola rationali natura. ST I-II 26, 3.                          
 
126 Miner, Robert, Thomas Aquinas on the Passions: a Study of Summa Theologiae 1a2ae 22-48, 
Cambridge University Press, 2009, page 121-122.  
 
127 Amor igitur sensitivus est in appetitu sensitivo, sicut amor intellectivus in intellectivo appetitu.  ST I-II 
26,1.    
 209
does not claim here that the “sensitive appetite” and “sensitive love” is the same 
thing, but rather that love (as passion) is in the appetite (as a tendency). It is so because 
love is the principle of movement whereas appetite is simply the tendency to engage in 
that kind of movement. Thomas says: “Now in each of these appetites, the name love is 
given to the principle of movement towards the end loved.”128 For example, my appetites 
include an appetite for food, which I need in order to stay alive, and which follows from 
my basic inclination for self-preservation. But I may have a more specific love for freshly 
baked bread. Love pertains to something particular, like bread. When I see and smell 
freshly baked bread, I desire it. It is my love for bread which is the cause of my desire. 
My love of fresh bread may then motivate me to “move towards the end loved”, that is, to 
desire that bread, and then I might act on that desire and reach for the bread. Thus, love 
for bread is the principle of my movement. If all goes well and I eat that bread, I 
experience delight. Thus love is the cause of desire, and desire may terminate in delight. 
In order to pursue anything, one must love it and then desire it. As was mentioned before, 
it is the sensitive appetite which moves us to act. But more specifically, it is love and the 
desire for the object we love that cause us to act. Love and the resulting desire are 
passions which belong to the concupiscible power of the sensitive appetite.  
Love is the fundamental passion, which is the cause of other passions. We love 
what is good, or at least what appears good to us. Thomas says that “Love is a cause of 
all that the lover does”.129 As we recall from chapter 1, every agent acts for an end, and 
                                                 
 
128 In unoquoque autem horum appetituum, amor dicitur illud quod est principium motus tendentis in finem 
amatum. ST I-II 26, 1. 
 
129 Amor sit causa omnium quae amans agit. ST I-II 28, 6. 
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the end is the good. Some particular good is loved and therefore desired by an agent. 
That good may be then pursued. (In case of repugnance or danger, love of self is the 
motivation of the agent’s avoidance of what is not good.) No creature pursues what it 
does not desire, does not love, and thus, love in a sense of passion is the motivation of all 
the sentient agent’s actions. Thomas says: “Now the end is the good desired and loved by 
each one. Wherefore it is evident that every agent, whatever it is, does every action from 
love of some kind.”130   
 Strictly speaking, contemplation ought to be contemplation of God, and the object 
of love of the contemplative ought to be God. But not all contemplatives may be able to 
achieve that at once; many may begin with loving and contemplating creatures. Aquinas 
tells us that while we love God first, as the final cause, we come to know Him last, after 
we study His creation. Thomas says:  
Since to love God is something greater than to know Him…it follows that 
love [dilectio] of God presupposes knowledge of God. And because this 
knowledge does not rest in creatures, but, through them, tends to 
something else, love [dilectio] begins there, and thence goes on to other 
things by a circular movement so to speak; for knowledge begins from 
creatures, tends to God, and love [dilectio] begins with God as the last 
end, and passes on to creatures.131  
 
We must note here that love begins with God as the last end, and that implies that we are 
predisposed to love things which lead us to that last end, which would be things of this 
world in which our good consists. That is consistent with the notion of natural 
                                                 
 
130 Finis autem est bonum desideratum et amatum unicuique. Unde manifestum est quod omne agens, 
quodcumque sit, agit quamcumque actionem ex aliquot amore. ST I-II 28, 6. 
 
131 Dicendum quod quia dilectio Dei est maius aliquid quam eius cognition …ideo praesupponit ipsam. Et 
quia cognitio no quiescit in rebus creatis, et per hoc ad alia derivatur, per modum cuiusdam circulationis: 
dum cognitio a creaturis incipiens, tendit in Deum; et dilectio, a Deo incipiens sicut ab ultimo fine, ad 
creaturas derivatur. ST I-II 27, 4 ad 2. 
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inclinations. Speaking of love, the word Aquinas uses here is dilectio and thus he 
refers to the rational kind of love, the love of choice. But, as was explained above, the 
intellectual love presupposes the sensitive love, especially if we are supposed to be 
motivated to study and contemplation. Thus, we are led to knowledge of God through 
knowledge of creatures, while by loving things which are our proximate ends, which take 
us closer to our last end, we are already loving God.     
Contemplation generally is preceded by study. As was described in chapter 2, the 
process leading to contemplation begins with perceiving things in the world around us 
and studying them. It ends when we reach some truth which we would simply behold, i.e. 
contemplate. Thus, we must begin our pursuit of knowledge with observation of 
something that is attractive to us, some concrete objects. It may be toads.   
Once I met a boy who was fascinated with toads and other amphibians, and who 
acquired an impressive amount of knowledge about them. The boy undoubtedly began 
with noticing a toad once upon a time and stretching his hand for it. But here we must 
notice that other people might have seen the same toad, or at least might have been able 
to see the same toad if they paid attention to the fact that it was present in their field of 
view, but they either ignored it or did not even notice it. That boy noticed it, because he 
had natural predisposition to notice toads. On the basis of our discussion so far we can 
say that the cogitative power which recognized a toad as something useful moved his 
sensitive appetite, causing the boy to desire the toad as his good.132 Also, we know that it 
is a particular good that moves us to action - it is something which is good relative to us, 
                                                 
132 ST I 78, 4; ST I 80, 1; ST I 81, 1 and 3.           
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individually, in a given situation.133 Thus we can say that a toad must be considered 
as that boy’s good. Indeed it is so, if the study of toads would perfect that boy 
intellectually and help him to realize the talents with which he is endowed. One of the 
basic human inclinations is the inclination to truth and the pursuit of knowledge,134 
which, like all inclinations, requires that we pursue a particular good. For that purpose he 
is endowed with the natural attraction to frogs and toads as objects of interest. 
Technically, we would say that he loved toads, and this is “love” in the sense of amor, or 
love of need. He wanted that toad.  
When we encounter the object we love (amor), we delight (delectatur) in it and 
our love increases.135 The boy who studied toads must have begun his studies of 
amphibians because he loved toads (and frogs) - he found them irresistibly attractive. As 
his knowledge of them increased, it seems that his love for them also increased, causing 
him to pursue further knowledge. As he knew more about them, he could better 
appreciate them when he looked at them, and thus, he would love them more. 
Thomas tells us that the contemplative life, while strictly speaking ought to be 
devoted to contemplation of God, may also pertain to consideration of any truth, because 
every truth leads us to God.136 Therefore, the study and contemplation of toads counts as 
pertaining to contemplative life. As was discussed in chapter 2, before we contemplate, 
we must engage in study, and we must begin with observation of sensible objects. The 
                                                 
 
133 In DA III 15, 827.                   
 
134 ST I-II 94, 2; ST I-II 32, 8.               
 
135 ST II-II 180, 7 ad 1. 
 
136 ST II-II 180, 4. 
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boy who loved toads undoubtedly began with noticing a toad once upon a time and 
stretching his hand for it. Barring cases of miracles and raptures, the road to 
contemplation of God begins with attractions, i.e., a love for sensible objects. The love of 
sensible objects is a passion belonging to the sensitive part of the soul.  
Love and contemplation – some final remarks 
Thus, the pursuit of knowledge and contemplation involves both, the intellective 
and the sensitive part of the soul. To choose some object for our study and then perhaps 
for contemplation, we must be directed by the appetitive part of the soul. There is the 
intellectual appetite, which is the will, and there is the sensitive appetite. It is the sensitive 
appetite which is the moving force of all our actions, albeit, being rational and moral 
creatures, we need to will our actions also.137 What we want to study - which study might 
eventually lead us to contemplation – is something which is attractive to us qua animals, 
and interesting to us qua rational beings. In both ways, we recognize it as good and 
pursue it. We desire the good both as rational beings and as animals.  
What we recognize as our good, we love: “And this very aptitude or proportion of 
the appetite to good is love”138 Love which is found in the intellectual soul is dilectio, 
which also includes choice. But love as dilectio must be also accompanied by love as a 
passion, love as amor. All other passions are a result of love.139 And love is the cause of 
everything we do.140       
                                                 
 
137 Note that willing is not enough. People who suffer from clinical depression will to do things, but lack 
the motive force, the desire to do them. And a desire is for particular things, the things we love.  
 
138 Ipsa autem aptitudo sive proportio appetitus ad bonum est amor. ST I-II 25, 2. 
 
139 ST I-II 27, 4. 
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What causes us to pursue knowledge and to engage in contemplation is love. 
We love the truth and we desire to know it; therefore, we seek wisdom and knowledge; 
therefore, we contemplate. We love truth and seek knowledge because we have a natural 
inclination to it qua rational beings. The pursuit of knowledge is fitting to us in 
accordance with our nature as rational animals, and therefore, we naturally desire to 
know.141    
Thus, we strive to attain knowledge. But, as was discussed earlier, we cannot ever 
know completely the object of our contemplation. Even in heaven, though we can see 
God, we cannot comprehend God, for we are only finite creatures. And on earth, we 
cannot comprehend God, although we can contemplate Him. Furthermore, we cannot 
even fully comprehend what we contemplate as God’s creation because we cannot ever 
comprehend their First Cause. Thus, our desire for knowledge leads to frustration. 
However, Aquinas tells us that we may love the object of our contemplation although we 
cannot know it perfectly: “Love [amor] is in the appetitive power, which regards a thing 
as it is in itself: wherefore it suffices, for the perfection of love, that a thing is loved more 
than it is known; since it can be loved perfectly, even without being perfectly known. 
This is most evident in regard to the sciences…The same applies to the love of God 
[amorem Dei].”142    
Contemplation begins and ends with love:  
                                                                                                                                                 
140 ST 28, 6. 
 
141 ST II-II 180, 7. 
 
142 Amor est in vi appetitiva, quae respicit rem secundum quod in se est. Unde ad perfectionem amoris 
sufficit quod res prout in se apprehenditur, ametur. Ob hoc ergo contingit quod aliquid plus amatur quam 
cognoscatur, quia potest perfecte amari etiam si non perfecte cognoscatur. Sicut maxime patet in 
scientiis…Et similiter est dicendum circa amorem Dei. ST I-II 27,2 ad 2. 
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And since the end corresponds to the beginning, it follows that the term also 
and the end of the contemplative life has its being in the appetite, since 
one delights in seeing the object loved, and the very delight in the object 
seen arouses yet greater love. … And this is the ultimate perfection of the 
contemplative life, namely that the Divine Truth be not seen but also 
loved.143  
 
Thus, although we cannot fully understand the Divine Truth, we can love it and be 
perfected by it according to our nature, and it is love, which causes us to contemplate.   
Desires  
As was discussed above, what an animal notices is something important to that 
kind of animal, and not merely something that can be seen or heard.144 If something 
seems to be good to a given animal, it may desire and pursue it. What we apprehend as 
good, we love, and love is the cause of desire.145   
Generally speaking, desires follow from natural inclinations, as was explained in 
chapter 1. Thus, the inclination to self-preservation is the basis of our desire to flee or 
fight, and also the basis for the emotions of fear or anger; the inclination to propagate our 
species is the basis of attraction to members of other sex and the emotion of love of a 
romantic kind; and the inclination to truth is the basis of seeking causes and explanations 
of the phenomena we observe. The inclination to truth is characteristic of rational 
creatures and follows from our nature just like other natural inclinations. Since natural 
inclinations direct every being towards its proper good, the desires must be coordinated 
                                                 
 
143 Et quia finis respondet principio, inde est quod etiam terminus et finis contemplativae vitae habetur in 
affectu: dum scilicet aliquis in visione rei amatae delectatur et ipsa delectatio rei visae amplius excitat 
amorem….Et haec est ultima perfectio contemplativae vitae: ut scilicet non solum divina veritas videatur, 
sed etiam ut ametur. ST II-II 180, 7 ad 1. 
 
144 ST I 78, 4; ST I 80, 1.                        
 
145 ST I-II 30, 1 and 2. 
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with the natural inclinations of a given kind of animal. That includes the human 
animal. Even desire for knowledge follows from our natural inclination to truth, and is 
coordinated with all our inclinations, as was explained in chapter 1.   
When an animal desires something, it pursues it and when the animal obtains 
what it desires, it rests. Aquinas says that the animal desires what it loves and what it 
apprehends as good, and when the animal obtains that good, it rests in the good, and that 
is called delight. Humans are also animals, so the sequence applies to humans as well: 
humans pursue what they love and apprehend as good, and when they obtain it, they 
delight in it.  
What we apprehend, love and desire is not something general like “the good”, or 
“nourishment” or “knowledge”, but something particular like the bread or the knowledge 
about the toad. If one happens to love toads, one pursues toads and desires them in some 
way. If such a toad lover caught the toad and studied it, he would be delighted. Here we 
must notice that the boy who studied toads and kept them in terrariums did so because he 
liked to look at them, touch them, observe them and generally study them. He didn’t eat 
them, didn’t make shoes out of them, he simply rejoiced in studying them. The boy with 
the toad sought knowledge about toads simply because he wanted to know them better. 
He possessed desire for knowledge, and specifically knowledge about toads.  
Aquinas distinguishes two types of desires: those pertaining to the rational and 
those pertaining to the sensitive part of the soul. He uses the word desiderium 146 when 
talking of desire for knowledge, but he uses the word concupiscentia when talking of 
desire as a particular passion, associated with animal desires and belonging to the 
                                                 
146 ST I-II 32, 8. 
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sensitive part of the soul.147 Aquinas considers the objection of someone who claims 
that concupiscence is not only in the sensitive appetite, but also in the intellectual, for one 
may have a desire for the commandments of God.148 Aquinas’s answer to it is that desire 
has a broader meaning than concupiscence and may pertain to both the higher appetite 
(i.e. the will) and the lower appetite, i.e. the sensitive appetite.149 Desire, Aquinas says, is 
“simply a movement towards the thing desired”.150 And the thing desired may be a 
sensible thing or not; thus, it may be only a “good of reason.”151 Concupiscence is the 
craving for an absent good of a sensible kind, and that craving pertains to the whole 
person, a composite being made of body and soul together. Thus, Aquinas is saying that 
the term desire (desiderium) includes desires for rational as well as sensible goods, while 
the term concupiscentia pertains specifically to the sensible kind of good.  
If one likes toads in the sense that one appreciates their beauty, (one likes the way 
they look, move about, etc.), then one likes them as a sensible good. Presumably, one 
would then love to and desire to possess toads and to look at them. That desire to possess 
and to enjoy some good in a sensory way would be a desire as concupiscentia.  We could 
also call it desiderium, but calling it desiderium would be calling it by a more general 
term and thus it would give us less information about that kind of desire. The term 
desiderium includes concupiscentia. Desire is simply “movement towards the thing 
                                                 
147 ST I-II 30, 1.    
 
148 ST I-II 30, 1 obj. 2.  
 
149 ST I-II 30, 1 ad 2. 
 
150 Simplicem motum in rem desideratam. ST I-II 30, 1 ad 2. 
 
151 Bonum rationis. ST I-II 30, 1 c. 
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desired”152 and that may pertain to either the higher or the lower appetite. A desire to 
acquire theoretical knowledge, perhaps knowledge about toads, is desiderium. That desire 
pertains to the higher appetite. Desire for sensory delights, like the delight of watching or 
touching toads, pertains to the lower appetite, but it is also a movement towards the thing 
desired, and so it is also desiderium. However, desire for sensory delights is usually 
called concupiscentia which indicates a desire for a sensible good. According to Aqunas, 
the term desiderium includes concupiscentia. So it seems that when we talk of desire for 
theoretical knowledge about toads, we also include the desire for toads as sensible 
objects. The reason why desiderium includes concupiscentia is that what happens in one 
part of the soul tends to affect other parts of the soul. Desire of a rational kind does not 
stay confined to the rational part of the soul but “overflows” into the sensitive part of the 
soul. Thomas says:  
The craving for wisdom, or other spiritual goods, is sometimes called 
concupiscence; either by reason of a certain likeness; or on account of the 
craving in the higher parts of the soul being so vehement that it overflows 
into the lower appetite, so that the latter also, in its own way, tends to the 
spiritual good, following the lead of the higher appetite, the result being 
that the body itself renders its service in spiritual matters.153   
 
Thus, here again we find a mention of the “overflow” from the rational to the sensitive 
part of the soul.154 This “overflow” takes place because a human being is a complex yet 
integrated being, composed of body and the tripartite soul, and all our parts are affected 
                                                 
152 Motum in rem desideratam  ST I-II 30, 1 ad 2.                     
 
153 Dicendum quod appetitus sapientiae vel aliorum spiritualium bonorum, interdum concupiscentia 
nominatur, vel propter similitudinem quandam, vel propter intensionem appetitus superioris partis, ex quo 
fit redundantia in inferiorem appetitum, ut simuletiam ipse inferior appetitus suo modo tendat in spirituale 
bonum consequens appetitum superiorem, et etiam ipsum corpus spiritualibus deserviat…ST I-II 30, 1 ad 1. 
 
154 Other places mentioned so far: ST I-II 3,3; ST I 78, 4 ad 5; ST II-II 175, 4 ad 1.  
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by whatever happens in other parts, with the final result of a completely integrated 
functioning.  
If the boy who loves toads desires to catch a toad, to play with it, and to learn 
something about it, the sensitive kind of desire (to catch, to look at, to touch) and the 
rational kind of desire (to learn more about the toad), while strictly speaking belong to 
different parts of the soul, influence one another. If that boy did not find toads attractive 
in a sensible kind of way, he would not have developed desire to study them. We can 
study only something which we notice because we find it attractive, and what we find 
attractive we love (in a sense of amor) and desire. Since the original attraction must be 
animal attraction, and love is a passion belonging to the sensitive part of the soul, desire 
which arises from that love must be desire for the sensible kind of good. But a human 
being as a rational creature does not have to stop with that kind of desire and may further 
develop a desire of a rational kind, a desire to know. Thus, concupiscence might be the 
beginning of a desire to learn something. That would be the influence of the sensitive part 
of the soul on the rational part. On the other hand, desire for knowledge and wisdom 
“overflows” to the lower part of the soul kindling desire as concupiscentia. That is the 
influence of the rational part of the soul on the sensitive part. Thus, both parts of the soul 
can influence one another.  
Desire has its roots in animal appetites, which allow the animal to pursue its 
proper ends. Thanks to these appetites, the animal feels attraction to something it 
perceives, something recognized as useful by the animal’s estimative/cogitative power. 
The attractive (i.e. appetible) object causes a change in the appetite, which change is 
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called love (amor). Love is a passion from which other passions arise, and desire is 
caused by love. 
 The above description pertains to animal desire. But humans are also animals and 
this description applies to humans as well, except that in the case of humans there is also 
the influence of the rational part of the soul. Because of that influence, human loves and 
desires may acquire a different quality, not to mention that from a sensible desire there 
may arise a desire for knowledge. Nevertheless, nobody can develop a desire for learning 
about things one never noticed and never experienced; nor can anyone truly desire to 
study a thing which one finds repulsive. Desire which belongs to the sensitive soul is 
therefore a prerequisite to forming a desire for knowledge.  
Wonder, Desire for Knowledge  
Desire for knowledge about causes of things is called “wonder” (admiratio).155 
The desire to know, or more precisely, to know more about something than we know 
already, is a rational desire, and is characteristic of us qua rational beings, not qua 
animals. Being rational, we desire to find out more simply for the sake of knowing. 
Thomas says: “Now wonder is a kind of desire for knowledge; a desire which comes to 
man when he sees an effect of which the cause either is unknown to him, or surpasses his 
knowledge or faculty of understanding. Consequently wonder is a cause of pleasure 
[delight], in so far as it includes a hope of getting the knowledge which one desires to 
have.”156 Knowledge is a rational good - it is a good which completes us qua rational 
                                                 
155 ST I-II 32, 8.   
 
156 Est autem admiratio desiderium quoddam sciendi, quod in homine contingit ex hoc quod videt effectum 
et ignorat causam, vel ex hoc quod causa talis effectus excedit cognitionem aut facultatem ipsius. Et ideo 
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beings. We desire that good and that completion. That desire is experienced as a 
desire for knowledge.  
The boy who liked toads engaged in the study of toads for the sake of knowledge, 
not for any utilitarian reason. That is what Aquinas and Aristotle tell us is the pursuit of 
wisdom, which culminates in the contemplation of truth.157  Wisdom goes beyond art and 
beyond any utilitarian concerns; wisdom is the knowledge of the first principles which 
we want to know simply because we possess natural desire to know. Wisdom is sought 
for its own sake. 158 The pursuit of wisdom begins with wonder. 
Ultimately, the object of our contemplation is God. But, as was discussed above, 
on earth we cannot contemplate God directly. On Earth, the intellection of God does 
require sense perception:  
Since the human intellect in the present state of life cannot understand 
even immaterial created substances, much less can it understand the 
essence of the uncreated substance. Hence it must be said simply that God 
is not the first object of our knowledge. Rather do we know God through 
creatures… while the first object of our knowledge in this life is the 
quiddity of a material thing, which is the proper object of our intellect.159 
  
As the discussion so far shows, to know creatures and to move on to knowledge of God, 
we need to rely on our animal characteristics, that is, on animal appetites, sensory 
perception, and passions.  
                                                                                                                                                 
admiratio est causa delectationis, inquantum habet adiunctam spem consequendi cognitionem eius quod 
scire desiderat. ST I-II 32, 8. 
 
157 In Met. I, 1. 
 
158 In Met I, 1, 33. 
 
159 Unde simpliciter dicendum est quod Deus non est primum quod a nobis cognosctitur; sed magis per 
creaturas in Dei cognitionem pervenimus…Primum autem quod intelligitur a nobis secundum statum 
praesentis vitae, est quidditas rei materialis, quae est nostri intellectus obiectum. ST I 88, 3. 
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We are capable of wonder because we possess the desire for knowledge, 
because of our natural inclination to truth. Our desire for truth is natural to us qua rational 
beings, but is embedded in our whole nature as rational animals. Our pursuit of truth, 
although driven by a desire characteristic of a rational creature, always has to begin with 
sensory perceptions, and be driven by desires characteristic of an animal, and 
specifically, the animal of our species Homo sapiens, since every creature is endowed 
with natural inclinations in accordance with its nature. Granted, when we consider human 
happiness which consists of contemplation of God – even in this world - we are not 
talking of an animal pursing something which an animal desires. Contemplation is not 
what a non-rational animal desires. But human beings can reach their ultimate goal only 
through a long and difficult road. And even in this life, the first step to contemplation is 
awareness of sensible objects.  
As we recall from previous chapters, we humans naturally have a desire for 
knowledge: “Because each individual delights in the operation which befits him 
according to his own nature or habit. Now contemplation of the truth befits a man 
according to his nature as a rational animal (italics mine): the result being that all men 
naturally desire to know, so that consequently they delight in the knowledge of truth.”160  
God gave us this natural inclination to truth and desire to pursue knowledge. The desire 
for knowledge follows from our basic inclination to truth in virtue of the fact that we are 
                                                 
160 Quia unicuique delectabilis est operatio sibi conveniens secundum propriam naturam vel habitum. 
Contemplatio autem veritatis competit homini secundum suam naturam, prout animal rationale. Ex quo 
contingit quod omnes homines ex natura scire desiderant et per consequens in cognitione veritatis 
delectantur. ST II-II 180, 7.  
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rational beings. But because we are also animals we possess animal inclinations from 
which follow animal interests and desires.  
Desire for knowledge may eventually lead us to the contemplation of God. On 
earth we can not contemplate God in an unmediated way, but only through God’s effects, 
i.e. creation. Aquinas tells us that, while strictly speaking the contemplative life consists 
in contemplation of God, nevertheless, contemplation of any truth, that is, contemplation 
of things in this world, also pertains to contemplative life. This is because all creation 
leads us back to God, because God is the First Cause of all.161 Thus it seems that Thomas 
would allow that even people who do not engage in theological contemplation – 
scientists, artists or philosophers – might also engage in contemplation of some truth, 
which might lead them to God. And there would be no adult scientists if there were no 
children who love to play with toads and such things. Josef Pieper claims that all forms of 
contemplation are fundamentally religious in nature because in all of them we are trying 
to pursue our eternal happiness and because we must be directed by love towards the 
object of our contemplation.162     
Therefore, someone who delights in finding an explanation for the effects he/she 
observes may not engage in the contemplation of God. That person may only study things 
found in the world around us and contemplate the truth about them. If one continues like 
that, and if someone also added some metaphysical reflections, one would eventually 
arrive at contemplation of God. Many people will not get that far in their earthly lives. 
                                                 
161  ST II-II 180, 4. 
 
162 Pieper, Happiness and Contemplation, pp. 80-81. 
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Nevertheless, any truth, good or beauty we find has its source in God 163 and in this 
way, even if indirectly, we get a glimpse of God. Thus, God shows us something of 
Himself in everything true, good and beautiful. Aquinas tells us that all creatures imitate 
God by their goodness and usefulness.164 All creatures have their beginning in God,165 
and their final end is likewise God.166 All goodness, beauty and truth derive from God. 
Whenever we encounter the good, the beauty or the truth, we get a glimpse of God, 
although we may not realize it.167 But the good has to be manifested to us on earth in 
sensible objects, for example, in toads. The pursuit of truth about any object, for example, 
about toads, eventually leads us to the realization that there is the First Cause,168 and thus, 
to the realization that there is God. Meeting the First Cause, who is God, is not possible 
in this world, but thinking about God, discovering God’s attributes, is possible. Thomas 
tells us: “Now in itself the very order of things is such, that God is knowable and lovable 
for Himself, since He is essentially truth and goodness itself, whereby other things are 
known and loved; but with regard to us, since our knowledge is derived through the 
senses, those things are knowable first, which are nearer to our senses, and the last term 
of knowledge is that which is most remote from our senses.”169 The “last term of 
                                                 
 
163 ST II-II 27, 4; ST I 6, 1; ST I 16, 1;  ST I 5, 4 ad 1; ST I-II 27, 1 ad 3. 
 
164 ST I 103, 4;  SCG III 24, 6.  
 
165 ST I 44, 1. 
 
166 ST I 44, 4. 
 
167 Further discussion of God as the good, the truth and the beauty is well beyond the scope of this 
dissertation.  
 
168 ST I 2, 3; ST I-II 3, 8;  ST II-II 180, 4. 
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knowledge” which is the most remote from our senses is, of course, God. We love 
God first, but come to know Him last. Thus, the study of God’s creation may lead us to 
the contemplation of God. And love of God causes us to love creatures, and through 
them, come to know and love God more.170    
Our nature as boundary beings, beings that are both rational and animal, is 
manifested in our capacity to wonder about things. We can only wonder about something 
we notice and find attractive. That depends on the operations of the sensitive part of the 
soul. We can only desire something we find attractive. Desire is a passion and belongs to 
the sensitive part of the soul. We may be moved to some actions regarding the appetible 
object because of the desire rooted in the sensitive appetite. However, all of the above 
operations of the sensitive soul occur under the influence of the intellective soul, because 
a human being is a composite being at all times. Perception of a toad as a useful object is 
determined by a cogitative power, which power is influenced in its functioning by the 
intellect. Human desires are also influenced by the intellect. Furthermore, an appetible 
object is regarded by a human being not only from the perspective of the practical reason, 
i.e. usefulness and pleasantness, but also from the perspective of the speculative reason, 
i.e. the effect whose cause is unknown. We want to know the cause. And that desire to 
know the cause is wonder. Wanting to know the cause is not a passion but an intellectual 
desire. In and of itself it is not a feeling. However, the thought of something attractive 
(which, of course has to be represented by a phantasm), might be associated with the 
                                                                                                                                                 
169 Est autem ipse ordo rerum talis secundum se quod Deus est propter seipsum cognoscibilis et diligibilis, 
utpote essentialiter existens ipsa veritas et bonitas, per quam alia et cognoscuntur et amantur. Sed quoad 
nos, quia nostra cognitio a sensu ortum habet, prius sunt cognoscibilia quae sunt sensui propinquiora; et 
ultimus terminus cognitionis est in eo quod est maxime a sensu remotum. ST II-II 27, 4. 
 
170 ST II-II 27, 4 ad 2. 
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feeling, i.e a desire, because that object is also the object of a sensual desire. Thus, the 
thought of that object is connected to the feeling caused by that object; a person’s desire 
to know more about a given object would be necessarily connected with the desire or 
desires of a sensual nature which are elicited by that appetible object. Thus, wonder is 
associated with passions in two ways: wonder can arise only in the presence of passions, 
and wonder may also be a cause of passion. Thomas Aquinas tells us that wonder is a 
cause of delight.171   
Aquinas says that there is a kind of “overflow” (redundantia) from the rational 
part of the soul to the sensitive part. Because of that overflow, the human equivalent of 
the estimative power is called the cogitative power. Because of that overflow, human 
passions acquire a special quality. And because of that overflow, rational desire 
influences the sensitive part of the soul causing the experience of desire to be felt even on 
the level of passions. Aquinas says: “The craving [for wisdom] in the higher parts of the 
soul being so vehement that it overflows into the lower appetite.” 172 Thus, the desire for 
some spiritual good, i.e. wisdom, “overflows” into the sensitive part of the soul.173 
Furthermore, Aquinas tells us: “In this way the body itself renders its service in spiritual 
matters.” 174 In this way, the desire for knowledge causes the feeling of desire in the 
                                                 
171 ST I-II 32, 8. 
 
172 Vel propter intensionem appetitus superioris partis, ex quo fit redundantia in inferiorem appetitum…         
ST I-II 30, 1 ad 1. 
 
173  Miner also mentions “overflow” of the rational desire into the lower appetite but does not discuss it in 
detail. Miner interprets it as meaning that by the overflow the concupiscence has been “reoriented and 
perfected”. Miner, p. 159.      
 
174 Et etiam ipsum corpus spiritualibus deserviat. ST I-II 30, 1 ad 1.  
 227
whole person. That may explain why the pursuit of knowledge may be described as 
“exciting”.  
Since the motivation for any kind of action must be provided by the sensitive 
appetite – and more precisely by passions – we must observe that merely a rational desire 
is not enough to motivate a person to any action. Investigation of causes and effects is 
also an action. This explains the dependence of our curiosity on our animal appetites. 
People suffering from depression do not desire much, do not notice much and are not 
interested in investigating things.  They may understand that it would be a worthwhile 
undertaking, but mere knowledge does not move anybody. We must feel like studying, 
we must be passionately interested in something. The desire for knowledge is necessary 
to lead us to contemplation – eventually, to the contemplation of God – but the rational 
desire for knowledge must be complemented by the experience of desire as a passion in 
order to move us. Thus, the “overflow” of the desire for knowledge into the non-rational 
part of the soul is crucial in making us act on that desire, in making us pursue knowledge.  
 Thomas also says that wonder is a cause of delight. The object of desire is 
something delightful.175 Knowledge is a rational kind of good, so in and of itself, it is not 
appropriate to speak of it as “delightful”. However, given all we know already about the 
passions accompanying the pursuit of knowledge and even the desire for it, we can see 
that delight might be also among the passions involved. I shall discuss delight in the next 
chapter.  
 
 
                                                 
175 ST I-II 30, 2 ad 1. 
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Conclusion 
The human desire for knowledge can arise only if there are animal desires. 
Animal appetites and animal passions are necessary for the development of the human 
desire for knowledge. We contemplate because we have a natural love of knowledge, 176 
because of our natural inclination to truth.177 All beings pursue what they love178 because 
love implies seeking what is good for a given being.179 Thus, we love truth and pursue 
knowledge because that is natural to us, qua rational beings. Ultimately, what we want to 
know is the First Cause, which is God.180 On earth, we can only know God through 
God’s effects,181 thus speculative sciences play an important role in our earthly 
contemplation.182 We need to pick particular topics in the speculative sciences to think 
about, and these topics have to come from our observation of and interaction with the 
world. Therefore, we focus our contemplation on things that attract our attention. But 
those things have to be attractive to us because they are sensible and delightful, since 
only what is sensible and delightful can be the cause of desire to get closer to them. Thus, 
the things we focus on must be things picked out by our senses and our passions, and 
those things appeal to us qua animals. But as our reactions are those of rational animals, 
we are not only attracted to delightful sensible objects but we think about them, and we 
                                                 
 
176 ST II-II 180, 7. 
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179 ST I-II 27, 1. 
 
180 ST I-II 3, 8. 
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182 ST I-II 3, 6; ST II-II 180, 4. 
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try to know them as rational as well as animal kind of beings. Thus, we search for the 
causes of what we observe, and eventually, that search may lead us to the First Cause. 
Thus, the operations of our sensitive souls are a prerequisite to our pursuit of truth. The 
object of our contemplation, i.e., what we actually concentrate on while we are 
contemplating, has to be derived from our sensory experiences and our natural desires.  
The contemplation of truth, which is our reward for the seeking of knowledge, 
begins with our natural attractions and aversions, and is guided by our natural appetites in 
accordance with our nature as rational animals. Thus, the choice of what we study and 
ultimately the choice of our objects of contemplation is guided by our animal nature. 
Thus, our natural appetites also guide us in our pursuit of knowledge, even though it may 
culminate in the contemplation of God. 
Furthermore, the desire for knowledge “overflows” into the sensitive part of the 
soul with the result that it may be felt by a whole person. That influence on the sensitive 
part of the soul is necessary for providing us motivation for actually pursuing knowledge.  
In our desire for knowledge and truth, we again show ourselves to be composite 
and integrated beings, made of body and tripartite soul. We desire knowledge as rational 
animals, but our pursuit of knowledge also involves the operations of the sensitive soul. 
Thus, we can see how “perfection of the lower” is needed for the attainment of the 
“perfection of the higher” parts, and how afterwards the “perfection of the higher” parts 
perfects the lower ones.   
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CHAPTER FOUR 
DELIGHT AND CONTEMPLATION 
The pursuit of knowledge begins with wonder, that is, wonder about causes and 
effects, and it ends with delight upon the discovery of the cause,1 especially when at the 
end of our pursuit we find the First Cause, which is God. All pursuit of knowledge - 
whether it is knowledge of humble or grand causes - begins with wonder and ends with 
delight. It ends with delight because delight is a rest in the good obtained.2 Truth is a 
good which is both lovable and delightful, says Aquinas.3  
The attainment of knowledge of the cause, and the contemplation of it, produces 
in the human soul intellectual delight. But in accordance with Aquinas’s view of a human 
as a composite and integrated being, that delight of contemplation is also accompanied by 
sensual delight. Sensual delight, as well as intellectual delight, accompanies the pursuit of 
knowledge and the practice of contemplation, because of the delights which belong to the 
process of learning leading to contemplation, and because of the influence of the intellect 
on the sensitive soul. The operations of the sensitive soul which are necessary for our 
attainment or enjoyment of happiness, include not only sensory perceptions and animal 
desires, but also the feeling of delight. In my reading of Aquinas I find textual support for 
saying that sensual delight is a powerful motivational factor in the human pursuit of 
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knowledge and in the practice of contemplation. Delight of both kinds, intellectual 
and sensual, is a reward for our efforts, for the achievement of an end. Sensual delight 
also accompanies the intellectual delight in the practice of contemplation. Furthermore, 
there is a sensual component not only in earthly contemplation, but even in the 
contemplation of God in heaven. Thus, I find in Aquinas’s texts that delight is a 
motivating factor, a reward, and the necessary accompaniment of the pursuit of 
knowledge and contemplation of truth, here and hereafter.  
What Delight Is 
 We begin our pursuit of knowledge because of our desire for something attractive, 
and therefore interesting, in our environment. The object of desire is something 
delightful,4 so delight5 belongs to our pursuit of knowledge. When we desire something, 
we anticipate delight. When we attain the object of our desire, delight follows. Both, the 
anticipated delight and delight as rest in the good attained pertain not only to the pursuit 
of sensible goods, but also to the pursuit of knowledge.   
 Aquinas distinguishes two kinds of delights: intellectual and sensual.6  
 Contemplation of truth and the study which leads up to it bring about intellectual delight, 
while sensual delight, of course, follows upon the attainment of sensible goods, like food, 
                                                 
4 ST I-II 30, 1. 
 
5 In discussing the general features of delight, Thomas Aquinas uses the word delectatio, which is 
translated as either ‘delight’ or ‘pleasure’. In ST I-II 31, translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican 
Province, the word delectatio is translated as delight in articles 1-4 and as pleasure in articles 5-8.      
Aquinas sometimes uses also the word voluptas if he talks about carnal pleasures and wishes to stress their 
carnality. However, even then he uses the word delectatio interchangeably with voluptas, for the word 
delectatio refers to any kind of a delight. (See: ST I-II 2, 6) In English translation, voluptas is rendered as 
‘pleasure’. But delectatio may be also translated as ‘pleasure’. Thomas Aquinas also uses the word 
delectatio when talking of intellectual delights. That is translated either as ‘delight’ or as ‘pleasure’. (See: 
ST I-II 32, 8; ST I-II 31, 5; ST II-II 180, 1 and 7)  In the present discussion, ‘delight’ and ‘pleasure’ will be 
used synonymously as equivalent to Latin delectatio.     
 
6 ST I-II 31, 4 and 5. 
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sex, etc. Intellectual delight is the movement of the will following apprehension of 
something by the reason, which belongs to the intellective part of the soul, while the 
sensual delight is a passion which is a movement of the sensitive appetite, and which 
must involve bodily change. Aquinas says: “Delight of the sensitive appetite is 
accompanied by a bodily transmutation, whereas delight of the intellectual appetite is 
nothing but the mere movement of the will.”7 That intellectual delight is called “joy” 
(gaudium).8  
 Sensual delight is a passion: “It is therefore evident that, since delight is a 
movement of the animal appetite arising from an apprehension of sense, it is a passion of 
the soul.”9  Thus, sensual delight is a passion which follows sensitive apprehension of a 
sensible good. What Aquinas means by sensitive apprehension, is the fact that animals 
are capable of perceiving their attainment of some good, and in that, they differ from 
non-sentient beings.10 The attainment of the good and the knowledge of it result in the 
feeling of delight. Aquinas also notes that the good attained must be appropriate to the 
nature of a given animal. He talks of animals being “established in the state becoming 
their nature” and “attaining natural perfection” as causes of delight.11 As was discussed in 
the first chapter, according to Aquinas, all beings pursue ends proper to their nature, and 
in attaining those ends, attain their own perfection. This achievement of some end, some 
                                                 
7 Delectatio appetitus sensibilis est cum aliqua transmutatione corporali; delectatio autem appetitus 
intellectivi nihil aliud est quam simplex motus voluntatis. ST I-II 31, 4. 
 
8 ST I-II 31, 4.          
 
9 Sic ergo patet quod cum delectatio sit motus in appetitu animali consequens apprehensionem sensus, 
delectatio est passio animae. ST I-II 31, 1. 
 
10 ST I-II 31, 1.               
 
11 Ibid.                                
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goal proper to a given animal according to that animal’s nature, brings about delight. 
And this applies to the achievement of the final as well as proximate ends, for every good 
proper to the animal’s nature completes it, or perfects it in some way, and delight 
accompanies the achievement of any degree of perfection.    
 Given the above, we feel delight when we achieve some good proper to our 
nature, because we are animals. We apprehend the fact that we have obtained some good, 
we are completed by it in some way, and we are capable of experiencing the passion 
known as delight, because we are animals. Intellectual delight, i.e. joy, follows the 
attainment of a rational kind of good, i.e. knowledge. However, joy attaches only to the 
morally right way of attaining knowledge, whereas sensual delight attaches to the 
attainment of sensory good, regardless of moral circumstances.12 In either case, delight 
follows when we have attained the good proper to us.  
Delight as Rest 
Because we love something, we desire it; and when we obtain it, we feel delight.13 
When we do attain some good, we rest in it. That rest is called delight: “Pleasure 
[delectatio] is the repose of the appetite in some good.”14 This pertains first of all to 
animals; thus, when they attain some good, for example a meal, they rest in the good and 
experience delight. This also means that when we humans attain a good, we feel delight.  
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14 Delectatio est quies appetitus in bono. ST I-II 34, 2. 
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According to Aquinas, delight perfects the activity.15 He explains it by saying 
that to the good which is the end achieved, there is another good added, which is delight, 
which is a rest of the appetite in that good, and thus, delight completes a given 
operation.16 Delight also perfects an activity in a second way, insofar, a person who finds 
a given activity delightful, is more enthusiastic about it, does it better, and with greater 
care.17 In the case of study and contemplation, Thomas says that delight, which is 
associated with those activities, improves the quality of the performance: “pleasure 
[delectatio] that arises form the use of reason, strengthens the use of reason.”18 The 
reason why delight perfects an activity is because the attainment of an end perfects to 
some extent the agent, and the agents who are capable of perceiving it are sentient agents 
(animals) who perceive it under the guise of delight.19 The feeling of delight is a signal to 
an animal that something is good, that something was done correctly. When we attain 
some good suitable to us according to our nature, one of the results is delight.20      
It is obvious that when we obtain a sensual good which is proper to us, this causes 
in us the feeling of delight. But Thomas also says that wonder is the cause of delight and 
that the contemplation of truth is delightful. All natural desires orient us towards our 
good. Our desire for the truth is also the desire for the good, since the truth is convertible 
                                                 
 
15 ST I-II 32, 1; I-II 33, 4;  In NE X, 4, 2025 – 2030.    
              
16 ST I-II 33,4.     
 
17 Ibid.                         
 
18 Delectatio autem quae consequitur actum rationis, fortificat rationis usum. ST I-II 33, 4 ad 1. 
 
19 ST I-II 31, 1.        
 
20 ST I-II 32, 10;  I-II 2, 6 ad 3.             
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with the good.21 Attainment of truth, which is an intellectual good, brings about 
delight, for attainment of any kind of good proper to us brings about delight. The delight 
of truth is primarily an intellectual kind of delight, but I will show below that there is also 
a sensual component in the enjoyment of truth.  
All natural desires which belong to a given creature must function within the 
context of that creature as a whole. Our animal desires direct us to preserve our lives, or 
to preserve our species, and that is good for us qua animals.22 Our desire for knowledge 
directs us to search for the First Cause that is God, and that is good for us qua rational 
beings.23 We might expect that our contemplation can only be practiced in a way which is 
integrated with everything else about us, including the sensitive soul, the vegetative soul 
and the body. All of our natural desires taken together help us to achieve perfection and 
happiness. According to Thomas, we naturally love truth and delight in it because it befits 
our nature qua rational beings.24 Thus, the pursuit of knowledge, that is, the pursuit of 
truth, is a desire for a kind of good, and the attainment of it brings about delight.  
Delight is not the highest good, but is the result of the attainment of a good and 
thus a necessary accident of that attainment. Delight also attaches to the attainment of the 
supreme good.25 Delight is required for happiness: “And in this way delight is necessary 
for happiness. For it is caused by the appetite being at rest in the good attained. 
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Wherefore, since happiness is nothing else but the attainment of the Sovereign Good, 
it cannot be without concomitant delight.”26 Delight thus accompanies happiness, both 
the ultimate happiness and the imperfect happiness on earth. If we do attain our eternal 
good and contemplate God in the Beatific Vision, delight will also attach to it as a 
necessary accident.  
Having obtained the object of desire, we rest, and then we experience delight. 
This, according to Aquinas, pertains both to sensual and to intellectual delight. Delight is 
rest in the good, and is considered as a kind of reward, since it rewards the effort 
involved in the pursuit of the good.27   
Delight as Motivation 
Delight is not only a reward, but also a motivating factor. First of all, the basic 
motive force of any action has to be in the sensitive appetite.28 The appetible thing is 
loved, and if absent, it is desired.29 And that thing is desired as something delightful. 
Aquinas tells us: “Concupiscence is caused by love and tends to pleasure [delectatio].”30 
Aquinas gives us a more detailed explanation of that process and links it with the notion 
of natural inclinations in his discussion of love (amor). He says:  
Now it is evident that whatever tends to an end, has, in the first place, an 
aptitude or proportion to that end, for nothing tends to a disproportionate 
                                                 
 
26 Et hoc modo delectatio requiritur ad beatitudinem. Delectatio enim caustur ex hoc quod appetitus 
requiescit in bono adepto. Unde cum beatitudo nihil aliud sit quam adeptio summi boni, non potest esse 
beatitudo sine delectatione concomitante. ST I-II 4, 1. 
 
27 Consequently, delight is included in the very notion of reward.  Unde in ipsa ratione mercedis redditae 
delectatio includitur. ST I-II 4, 1 ad 1.  
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29 ST I-II 30, 2. 
 
30 Concupiscentia causatur ab amore, et tendit in delectationem. ST I-II 30, 2.                        
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end; secondly, it is moved to that end; thirdly, it rests in the end, after having 
attained it. And this very aptitude or proportion of the appetite to good is 
love, which is complacency in good; while movement towards good is 
desire or concupiscence; and rest in good is joy or pleasure [delectatio]. 
According in this order, love precedes desire, and desire precedes pleasure 
[delectatio]. – But in the order of intention, it is the reverse: because the 
pleasure [delectatio] intended causes desire and love.31  
 
Thus, everything tends to an end and has a natural aptitude for that end. All agents - from 
the inanimate natural things to rational creatures – act for an end, and all agents have 
certain ends proper to them and a final end. For that purpose all creatures are endowed 
with natural inclinations. From natural inclinations, in the case of sentient creatures, 
follow appetites, which allow them to pursue the useful and avoid the harmful and which 
motivate them to pursue the useful. Thanks to these natural appetites, an animal has an 
aptitude for responding to a particular kind of a good, as the good which helps it to attain 
its proper ends. That aptitude is love (amor). In the presence of a particular good, love for 
that good causes the desire (concupiscentia) for it and motivates the animal to pursue that 
good. When that good is obtained, the animal rests in it and that rest is the delight 
(delectatio). Thus, tending to an end, natural inclinations, and then the love which 
follows, causes the desire. The satisfied desire causes delight. It is obvious that this 
process applies to sensual goods and delights. However, as will be shown below, it also 
applies to the pursuit of a rational good, i.e. knowledge and the joy and delight which 
                                                 
 
31 Manifestum est autem quod omne quod tendit ad finem aliquem, primo quidem habet aptitudinem seu 
proportionem ad finem; nihil enim tendit in finem non proportionatum; secundo, movetur ad finem; tertio, 
quiescit in fine post eius consecutionem. Ipsa autem aptitudo sive proportio appetitus ad bonum est amor, 
qui nihil aliud est quam complacentia boni; motus autem ad bonum est desiderium vel concupiscentia; 
quies autem in bono est gaudium vel delectatio. Et ideo secundum hunc ordinem amor praecedit 
desiderium, et desiderium praecedit delectationem. Sed secundum ordinem intentionis est e converso; nam 
delectatio intenta causat desiderium et amorem. ST I-II 25, 2.          
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follows from its attainment. That is so because the pursuit of knowledge also follows 
from the natural love, which is natural to a human being.  
We always act for the sake of an end. But someone might object that we are 
motivated simply by delight, that we pursue what we anticipate to be delightful without 
regard for whether or not it is good. Aquinas considers this objection.32 In reply Aquinas 
distinguishes the ends we pursue from the motivation which may lead us there, and 
delight provides motivation, although it is not the end itself. He says:  
It comes to the same whether we desire good, or desire delight, which is 
nothing else than the appetite’s rest in good: thus it is owing to the same 
natural force that a weighty body is borne downwards and that it rests 
there.…But if we denote the formal or rather the motive cause, thus 
delight is desirable for something else, i.e., for the good, which is the 
object of that delight, and consequently is its principle, and gives it its 
form: for the reason that delight is desired is that it is rest in the thing 
desired.33  
 
Thus, according to Aquinas, we do not really desire pleasure for its own sake. 
Animals, like all beings, pursue their proper good not because it is delightful, but because 
it leads to their perfection (and in the case of humans, to happiness). Delight is not the 
final end of any being. Aquinas does not claim that delight really is the final end we 
pursue, but that in pursuing delight, we would normally pursue our proper ends, for just 
as the stone has a natural inclination to fall to the ground, we have natural inclinations to 
pursue our proper ends and are made to do so by the feeling of delight. So, all things 
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33 Dicendum quod euisdem rationis est quod appetatur bonum, et quod appetatur delectatio, quae nihil est 
aliud quam quietatio appetitus in bono; sicut ex eadem virtute naturae est quod grave feratur deorsum, et 
quod ibi quiescat. …. Si vero dicat causam formalem , vel potius causam motivam, sic delectatio est 
appetibilis propter aliud, idest propter bonum, quod est delectationis obiectum, et per consequens est 
principium eius, et dat ei formam; ex hoc enim delectatio habet quod appetatur, quia est quies in bono 
desiderato. ST I-II 2, 6 ad 1.             
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considered, our pursuit of delight, sensual delight, ought perfectly to coincide with 
our pursuit of the good, of our proper ends; and the delight, which is a passion and the 
object of concupiscence, gives us the motivation to pursue our good. As we know, things 
are not always working as they should, but this is ideally how it should be.  
Animals (including humans) tend toward delight when they pursue what they 
desire. Aquinas distinguishes two ways in which delight relates to our actions: first 
delight motivates our actions, and secondly we feel delight after we have attained the 
good.  
Aquinas says:  
Now the nature of the motive power of the end or of the good, differs 
according as it is really present, or absent: because, according as it is 
present, it causes the faculty to find rest in it; whereas, according as it is 
absent, it causes the faculty to be moved towards it. Wherefore the object 
of sensible pleasure [delectatio] causes love, inasmuch as, so to speak, it 
attunes and conforms the appetite to itself; it causes concupiscence, 
inasmuch as, when absent, it draws the faculty to itself; and it causes 
pleasure [delectatio], inasmuch as, when present, it makes the faculty to 
find rest in itself.34  
 
A delightful object when absent causes love, which in turn gives rise to desire. We 
naturally desire and therefore pursue those things which we expect to bring us delight. 
Therefore delight – anticipated delight – motivates our actions. Present delightful object 
causes delight when the appetite rests in the good.  
Delight can motivate the animal to action. The motivation is the anticipated 
delight of the object not yet possessed. The motive power of the animal is the sensitive 
                                                 
34 Est autem alia ratio virtutis motivae ipsius finis vel boni, secundum quod est realiter praesens, et 
secundum quod est absens; nam secundum quod est praesens, facit in seipso quiescere; secundum autem 
quod est absens, facit ad seipsum moveri. Unde ipsum delectabile secundum sensum, inquantum appetitum 
sibi adaptat quodammodo et conformat, causat amorem; inquantum vero absens atrahit ad seipsum, causat 
concupiscentiam; inquantum vero praesens quietat in seipso, causat delectationem.  ST I-II 30, 2.                              
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appetite by which the animal reacts to the presence of useful things in its 
environment. Delight (delectatio) is the impression made on the appetite35 by the desired 
object and it is this impression that actually motivates the animal to pursue that object. 
The object of desire is something delightful, and as such, it motivates the animal to move 
towards it. The animal’s reactions are passions, i.e. feelings, such as the passion of love 
from which arises desire for a given object. That object is desired (and therefore pursued) 
by the animal as something delightful. This is the anticipated delight. This delight is what 
motivates animals to pursue what is naturally good for them, such as the nourishing food. 
The anticipated delight provides the motivation for action. After the animal attains the 
object of desire, it delights in it, and that delight is a “repose” of the appetite.  
But delight (delectatio) already experienced causes the animal to desire more of 
the same delight.36 Aquinas tells us that this may happen in two ways, and in both cases 
the delightful thing possessed is not possessed perfectly. In one way, because the nature 
of the thing possessed is such that one cannot possess it as a whole at once, but can only 
obtain possession of it successively. The example of that successive coming into 
possession is the delight of eating. If we start eating some delicious food, we desire the 
rest of it. One bite of delicious food causes us to desire more of it, because it gives us 
delight.37 This is the way all animals, including humans, may desire more of a given 
delight.  
                                                 
 
35 ST I-II 31, 1 ad 2. 
  
36 ST I-II 33, 2. 
 
37 This happens through the thing possessed one obtains possession of it successively, and while taking 
pleasure in what one has, one desires to possess the remainder…In this way nearly all bodily pleasures 
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Another way a delight may cause us to desire more of it is when the thing 
possessed is perfect in itself, but the possessor cannot possess it perfectly. Aquinas here 
gives as an example Divine knowledge, which is perfect in itself, but we cannot possess it 
perfectly in this life. This is a delight we do not share with other animals. Intellectual 
delights shall be further discussed below.  
Finally, the memory of a delight can cause us to desire to experience it again.38  
Inasmuch as an animal is capable of remembering things, it is capable of desiring more of 
the past delight. There is no doubt that humans share that feature with other animals. 
Thus, delight – anticipated delight - is a motivating factor before an animal obtains the 
object of the desire, and – the delight of enjoyment - is a motivating factor after the 
animal comes to possess the object it desires, if that object cannot be possessed all at 
once. Even remembered delight may motivate the animal to seek it again.  
Delight as motivation in intellectual pursuits 
 As in the case of bodily delights, intellectual delights also cause desire for more 
of themselves. The ways in which this happens mirror the ways sensual delight motivates 
an animal to pursue the sensible goods. In discussing how any delight causes thirst for 
                                                                                                                                                 
cause thirst for themselves, until they are fully realized, because pleasures [delectationes] of this kind arise 
from some movement: as is evident in pleasures of tHe table.  
 
Eo quod res habita non est tota simul; unde successive recipitur, et dum aliquis delectatur in eo quod habet, 
desiderat potiri eo quod restat…Et hoc modo omnes fere delectations corporales faciunt sui ipsarum sitim, 
quousque consummentur, eo quod tales delectationes cosequuntur aliquem motum, sicut patet in 
delectationibus ciborum. ST I-II 33, 2. 
 
38 Lastly, if we consider pleasure, not as existing in reality, but as existing in the memory, thus it has of 
itself a natural tendency to cause thirst and desire for itself: when, to wit, man returns to that disposition, in 
which he was when he experienced the pleasure that is past.   
 
Si vero consideretur delectatio prout est in memoria et non in actu, sic per se nata est causare sui ipsius 
sitim et desiderium, quando scilicet homo redit ad illam dispositionem in qua erat sibi delectabile quod 
praeteriit. ST I-II 33, 2. 
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itself Aquinas tells us that it may be due to the thing we delight in, or due to the 
possessor.39 It is due to the delightful thing if that thing cannot be possessed at once, but 
only successively. He gives the example of hearing the first part of a verse, which causes 
us to desire to hear the rest of it. Delight may cause desire for itself, also because the 
possessor is not able to possess it completely. Divine knowledge, perfect in itself, cannot 
be completely possessed by us in this life, but a faint perception of it causes us to desire 
more of it. Thomas also observes that the more intense our enjoyment of whatever we 
may perceive of Divine knowledge, the more ardent will be our desire for it, and this is in 
contrast to bodily delights, which pall on us when they reach the point of perfection. 
Contemplation never palls on us; although due to the weakness of the human body we 
may become tired of study and contemplation, contemplation itself is never tiring or 
distasteful. Thus, even as corporeal delights tend to cause desire for more such delights, it 
is even more so in the case of intellectual delights, for contemplation offers an unending 
delight. Thus, in all these ways, delight awakens desire for more delight.40   
Wonder is a cause of delight, and motivation to get more such delight: 
“Consequently wonder is a cause of pleasure [delectatio], in so far as it includes a hope 
of getting the knowledge which one desires to have.”41 Hope and anticipation of 
something delightful is itself a delight.42 It is not only the attainment of knowledge which 
is delightful, but even the research itself, for it proceeds from a desire to know what we 
                                                 
 
39 ST I-II 33, 2. 
 
40 ST I-II 33, 2. 
 
41 Et ideo admiratio est causa delectationis, inquantum habet adiunctam spem consequendi cognitionem 
eius quod scire desiderat. ST I-II 32, 8. 
 
42 ST I-II 32, 3. 
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do not yet know, and according to Thomas we find the greatest delight in learning 
something for the first time.43 It is so, because then we are more aware of having 
achieved knowledge and therefore a greater perfection. Delight which attaches to the 
intellectual operations perfects that operation, just like delight which attaches to the 
operations of the sensitive soul perfects those operations.44   
Briefly summarizing, delight is repose in the good attained - the good proper to us 
and consistent with the pursuit of our ends. In the case of humans, there are two kinds of 
delight - intellectual and sensual. Both are the appetite’s repose in the good, for in human 
beings there is the rational as well as the sensitive appetite. Delight is also a motivating 
factor, because we naturally pursue our ends by pursuing delight, and because delight 
causes desire for more of itself. Thus, delight is the rest in the good possessed, and a 
motivation to pursue a good not yet possessed.    
Two Kinds of Delight  
The delight of intellectual pursuits 
Thomas distinguishes between two forms of delight - sensual and intellectual. It is 
obvious that when we are talking of sensible goods, such as food, obtaining those goods 
brings about the feeling of delight. But according to Aquinas, wonder, i.e., desire for 
knowledge, is also a cause of delight: “Wonder gives pleasure [delectatio], not because it 
implies ignorance, but in so far as it includes the desire of learning the cause, and in so 
far as the wonderer learns something new, i.e., that the cause is other than he had thought 
                                                 
 
43 ST I-II 32, 8 ad 2. 
 
44 ST I-II 4, 1 ad 3;  33, 4;  32, 8 ad 3. 
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it to be.”45 Finding out the causes of things, according to Aquinas, gives us delight, 
and the research and study of the causes of things eventually leads us to the discovery of 
certain truths and to contemplation.    
The desire for knowledge is natural to human beings and follows from our basic 
inclination to truth. Truth is a rational good and when we obtain it, we achieve a greater 
degree of perfection. Of course, when we obtain a sensible good we also achieve a 
greater degree of perfection. Just as in the case of obtaining a sensible good, obtaining a 
rational good is the cause of delight. Thomas says this about our natural love of truth: 
“Each individual delights in the operation which befits him according to his own nature 
or habit. Now contemplation of the truth befits a man according to his nature as a rational 
animal the result being that all men naturally desire to know, so that consequently they 
delight in the knowledge of truth.”46 Truth befits our nature and is thus a cause of delight. 
This is the same pattern which we see in case of obtaining any other good that befits our 
nature. For this reason Thomas counts delight associated with contemplation among other 
kinds of delights.47 When we acquire knowledge we also acquire something good, and we 
experience delight.48 Thus, delight, which is the rest in the good, also follows rest in the 
good of a rational kind. Delight which attaches to intellectual operation, perfects that 
                                                 
45 Dicendum quod admiratio non est delectabilis inquantum habet ignorantiam, sed inquantum habet 
desiderium addiscendi causam, et inquantum admirans aliquid novum addiscit, scilicet talem esse quem 
non aestimabat. ST I-II 32, 8 ad 1. 
 
46 Quia unicuique delectabilis est operatio sibi conveniens secundum propriam naturam vel habitum. 
Contemplatio autem veritatis competit homini secundum suam naturam, prout est animal rationale. Ex quo 
contingit quod omnes homines ex natura scire desiderant et per consequens in cognitione veritatis 
delectantur. ST II-II 180,7. 
 
47 ST I-II questions 31, 32, 33, 34 and 35. 
 
48 ST I-II 32, 8.  
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operation.49 And delight is also one of the rewards of our pursuit of knowledge: 
“Consequently, delight is included in the very notion of reward.”50  
Joy and delight 
We find two words referring to delight of some kind: ‘delight’ (delectatio), 
synonymous with English ‘delight’ (or English ‘pleasure’) and ‘joy’ (gaudium). Thomas 
reserves the word ‘joy’ (gaudium), for those acts of the intellect which are also approved 
by the will as good. He says: “And accordingly, in the intellectual appetite or will there is 
that delight (delectatio) which is called joy (gaudium), but not bodily delight (delectatio 
corporalis).”51 There are two kinds of appetites: sensitive and intellectual. We feel 
passions because of the sensitive appetite found in the sensitive soul. The intellectual 
appetite is the will, found in the intellectual soul. The intellectual soul has no feelings, 
and thus, joy is not a passion, a feeling, but rather a kind of intellectual satisfaction that 
we have willed the right action. When we are engaging in contemplation of God and are 
doing it in the right way and for the right reasons, it is understandable that we would also 
find joy in that contemplation. This is what we have in common with angels. He says: 
“Accordingly we have delight (delectatio), not only in the sensitive appetite, which we 
have in common with dumb animals, but also in the intellectual appetite, which we have 
in common with the angels.”52 Sensual delight is a passion which is accompanied by 
                                                 
 
49 ST I-II 4,1 ad  3. 
 
50 Unde in ipsa ratione mercedis redditae delectatio includitur. ST I-II 4, 1 ad 1. 
 
51 Et secundum hoc in appetitu intellectivo, sive in voluntate, est delectatio quae dicitur gaudium, non 
autem delectatio corporalis. ST I-II 31, 4. 
 
52 Et ita in nobis est delectatio non solum in appetitu sensitivo in quo communicamus cum brutis, sed etiam 
in appetitu intellectivo in quo communicamus cum angelis. ST I-II 31, 4 ad 3. 
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bodily change, whereas joy, which belongs to the intellectual appetite, is a simple 
movement (i.e. willing) and is not accompanied by any bodily changes.53  
According to Thomas, “Delight extends to more things than does joy”.54 Joy is the 
delight which is also understood by us to be morally good, and which is in accordance 
with the mean of virtue:  
For we take delight both, in those things which we desire naturally, when 
we get them, and in those things which we desire as a result of reason. But 
we do not speak of joy except when delight follows reason; and so we do 
not ascribe joy to irrational animals, but only delight….And accordingly 
delight extends to more things than does joy.55  
 
According to Thomas’s classification, joy is to delight as species is to genus.56 Thus 
when Aquinas talks of intellectual delight he may be simply using a broader term, which 
includes joy. Every joy is also a delight, but not vice-versa. Thus, one might be speaking 
of joys or intellectual delights and mean the same thing. But it would not follow from it 
that when we experience joy we also feel sensual delight, which is a passion.  
We experience joy (gaudium) only in those situations where we rationally 
understand and approve of a given activity. Joy accompanies any type of activity, 
including contemplation, as long as we engage in it in a virtuous way. But we may 
engage in contemplation in a morally wrong way. (Morally wrong approaches to study 
                                                 
 
53 ST I-II 31, 4. 
 
54 Delectation est in his plus quam gaudium. ST I-II 31, 3. 
 
55 Delectamur enim et in his quae naturaliter concupiscimus, ea adipiscentes, et in his quae naturaliter 
concupiscimus secundum rationem. Sed nomen gaudii non habet locum nisi in delectatione quae 
consequitur rationem; unde gaudium non attribuimus brutis animalibus, sed solum nomen delectationis. … 
Et secundum hoc patet quod delectatio est in his plus quam gaudium. ST I-II 31, 3. 
 
56 Accordingly sorrow is a species of pain, as joy is a species of pleasure.  
 
Sic igitur tristitia est quaedam species doloris, sicut gaudium delectationis. ST I-II 35, 2.       
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and contemplation are discussed under the heading of the vice of “curiosity”.)57 Thus, 
joy would be experienced when we contemplate in a virtuous kind of way. But we might 
engage in contemplation in a vicious way, and then joy would not be appropriate, but 
delight (delectatio) might still be felt.58 The fact that delight, generally speaking, may be 
associated with a desirable intellectual activity devoid of intellectual delight, i.e., joy, 
raises the possibility that there is also sensual delight present in our intellectual pursuits.  
The object of contemplation is delightful             
In general, delight results from the fulfillment of a desire, and thus, from the 
attainment of some good.59 It is natural for us to desire knowledge and truth, and when 
we obtain that good, i.e. truth, our desire is fulfilled and we feel delight. Wonder, which 
is desire for knowledge, causes delight when it is to some extent satisfied - when we 
come to understand something.60 The immaterial good, which is possession of truth, 
causes in us the experience of joy, but in addition to that joy it also causes a sensual 
delight.     
  Thomas says that contemplation is “the simple act of gazing on the truth”61 He 
also says that we delight in the object we contemplate, because we love that object. He 
says: ”Secondly, contemplation may be delightful on the part of its object, in so far as one 
contemplates that which one loves; even as bodily vision gives pleasure, not only because 
                                                 
57 ST II-II 167 (the vice of curiositas). 
 
58 ST II-II 167, 2 ad 1. 
 
59 ST I-II 30, 2; 25, 2.  
 
60 ST I-II 32, 8. 
 
61 ST II-II 180, 3. 
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to see is pleasurable in itself, but because one sees a person whom one loves.”62 But 
what do we exactly gaze upon or behold with love? We behold whatever it is that we like 
to study and contemplate, whatever we find attractive.  
Before we contemplate, we must engage in research. Aquinas tells us that 
research, the seeking of knowledge, begins with wonder, and that wonder is the cause of 
delight.63 It is the cause of delight, because it gives us hope of getting knowledge, which 
is connatural to us. Aquinas also tells us that the objects of study are delightful and give 
rise to delightful associations. He says: “For this reason whatever is wonderful is 
pleasing, for instance things that are scarce. Also, representations of things, even of those 
which are not pleasant in themselves, give rise to pleasure; for the soul rejoices in 
comparing one thing with another.”64 Thus, objects of study and of contemplation are 
delightful.  
We study and contemplate what we find delightful because that follows from the 
natural process of the human pursuit of knowledge. The fact that we try to learn about the 
causes of things, and that we contemplate, follows from our natural inclination for truth. 
We have that natural inclination to seek truth, that appetite for knowledge, and from this 
follows desire to know the causes of things we encounter, which desire is called 
‘wonder’. We desire what we love. Love is an attraction to something particular, while 
                                                 
 
62 Thomas says: “Alio modo contemplatio redditur delectabilis ex parte obiecti, inquantum scilicet aliquis 
rem amatam contemplatur: sicut etiam accidit in visione corporali quod delectabilis redditur no solum ex eo 
quod ipsum videre est delectabile, sed ex eo etiam quod videt quis pesonam amatam.” ST II-II 180, 7. 
 
63 ST I-II 32, 8. 
 
64 Et propter hoc omnia admirabilia sunt delectabilia, sicut  quae sunt rara, et omnes repraesentationes 
rerum, etiam quae in se non sunt delectabiles; gaudet enim anima in collatione unius ad alterum.  ST I-II 
32, 8.  
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natural inclination orients us towards our good in general. What we love and desire 
must be suitable for us according to our nature, that is, that object must be our good and 
must perfect us in some way. In the case of study, research and contemplation of what we 
desire are subjects which are suitable for us. Those are the subjects for which we have a 
natural aptitude. For example, some people have a natural aptitude for engineering, or 
poetry, or metaphysics, etc. Study of those subjects completes and perfects those who 
have appropriate talents. As a result, study of suitable objects also gives people delight. 
Should we attempt to study something not suitable for us, not in accordance with our 
nature, we would find it difficult, frustrating and unpleasant. According to Thomas, we 
might also be guilty of a sin of curiosity,65 and perhaps of presumption.66 Under normal 
circumstances, we would wonder about things for which we have natural aptitude and 
thus study, and eventually contemplate something which perfects us and therefore gives 
us delight. And thus, the object of contemplation must be (under normal circumstances) 
something delightful for the person who contemplates. Delightful objects are the objects 
we desire, pursue and try to possess, and thereby, they are also the objects we study.  
The most delightful of all objects is, of course, God. God is the most lovable and 
delightful object of contemplation.67  In earthly contemplation we cannot actually see 
God, but earthly contemplation must involve the use of some phantasms. In earthly 
contemplation we focus on something regardless of whether we are contemplating God, 
or something created. Let us consider ordinary contemplation of some earthly object. 
                                                 
65 ST II-II 167.   
 
66 ST II-II 130.  
 
67 ST 27, 4; ST I-II 4, 1and 2; ST II-II 180, 7.      
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Aquinas doesn’t mention toads; however, it follows that if one loves a toad and 
contemplates it as a beloved object, then the sight of the toad gives one delight. It would 
be so especially if one possesses knowledge about toads so as to be able to understand 
their nature and appreciate them. The boy I met in the park certainly was able to see the 
goodness and beauty of the toad. Thus, he could delight in it as he contemplated it. If one 
proceeded to contemplate more exalted subjects, the objects of contemplation might be 
even more delightful.  
Two kinds of delights   
In considering the causes of delight we must look at the way we experience 
delight, as well as the object which is the good obtained. We experience delight 
differently with regard to the sensible and the intellectual goods. In his discussion of 
passions, Thomas asks whether sensible delights are greater than spiritual or intellectual 
ones;68 thus indicating that there are different kinds of delight, associated with two kinds 
of goods. 
Sensible goods 
Delights caused by sensible objects themselves are immediate and may be intense. 
Thomas says that intellectual delights are in a way greater than sensible ones, yet the 
sensible delights are more vehement and more intense.69 We literally feel sensible 
delights more, because as passions they produce alteration in the body, and in that sense 
they are greater delights. Also, sensible things are more known to us than the intelligible 
                                                 
 
68 ST I-II 31, 5. 
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things,70 because our knowledge of the intelligible things is derived from our 
knowledge of the sensible ones.    
Phantasms       
Our pursuit of knowledge begins with sensory experience of a delightful kind. 
Even though intellectual operations as such cannot be described as delightful - for delight 
is a passion and the intellect feels no passions - the objects we are studying, and the 
memory of them are supposed to be delightful.71 In the intellect, these sensible objects are 
represented by phantasms. As Aquinas tells us many times, we cannot think or 
contemplate without phantasms, although our knowledge goes beyond phantasms: “In the 
present state of life human contemplation is impossible without phantasms, because it is 
connatural to man to see the intelligible species in the phantasms.”72 That pertains even to 
contemplation of God.73 On earth we cannot contemplate God directly, only the divine 
effects, i.e. the creation.74 Thus, when we engage in contemplation on earth we have to 
concentrate on some image. Even while we contemplate God, we have to use some 
phantasm. In ordinary contemplation which follows study, we would certainly use 
phantasms. Phantasms belong to the sensitive part of the soul, thus we have here the 
involvement of that part of the soul. Phantasms are not passions; however, phantasms 
                                                 
 
70 ST I-II 27, 2; 31,5. 
 
71 Memory and hope are also causes of delight. See: ST I-II 32, 3. 
 
72 Dicendum quod contemplatio humana, secundum statum praesentis vitae, non potest esse absque 
phantasmatibus: quia connaturale est homini ut species intelligibiles in phantasmatibus videat. ST II-II 180, 
5 ad 2. 
 
73 ST II-II 180, 5 ad 2.               
 
74 ST I 88, 3; I-II 3, 6 and  8. 
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may evoke passions.75 Presumably we would choose something delightful for a 
subject of our contemplation, and then the images and memories associated with that 
particular thing would be delightful for us.76 Contemplation on earth necessarily involves 
phantasms, imagination and memory of some objects we find lovable and delightful. 
Thus, phantasms which necessarily must be used in contemplation might be at least one 
of the causes of delight we find in contemplation.  
In that way, sensual delights would enter into contemplation. The phantasm used 
in contemplation, however, is a highly processed image in the case of those objects of 
contemplation which in reality are immaterial or spiritual. The delight caused by such 
images would not be very intense. What we know by understanding we know by the 
intelligible species, while what we know by sense we know by phantasms. But while 
phantasms may be the causes of delight, intelligible species cannot be.  
Intellectual goods 
Nevertheless, Thomas says that intellectual delights are greater than the sensible 
ones. Thomas says: “For a man takes much more delight (delectatur de hoc) in knowing 
something by understanding it, than in knowing something by perceiving it with his 
sense.”77 He states that intellectual or spiritual delights are greater than the sensible 
kind.78 This is so, because intellectual delight results from: “the good which is brought 
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76 Ibid.      
 
77 Multo enim magis delectatur homo de hoc quod cognoscit aliquid intelligendo, quam de hoc quod 
cognoscit aliquid sentiendo. ST I-II 31, 5.  
 
78 ST I-II 31, 5. 
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into conjunction, that to which it is conjoined, and the conjunction itself.”79 The good 
in this case is some truth, perhaps truth about God, and that is in itself a greater good – 
far greater – than, for example, a piece of cake. The thing to which it is conjoined is the 
human intellect, which is more noble than the sensitive soul and the body. The 
conjunction itself is greater for three reasons, according to Aquinas. First, it is more 
intimate because what we know through our senses are only accidents, whereas what we 
can know through the intellect is the very essence of things. Second, it is more perfect, 
because the sensible delights are not all perceived at once, but pass away even as we 
experience them, while intellectual delights are perceived all at once. Finally, the 
conjunction is more firm because sensible things are corruptible, whereas intellectual 
goods are immaterial and thus incorruptible and eternal.80 So, intellectual delights are 
greater than the sensible one.  
Delight of Contemplation  
The nature of delight of contemplation 
Aquinas tells us that there is delight in contemplation.81 He tells us that there is 
delight in our pursuit of knowledge,82 in earthly contemplation,83 and in contemplation of 
God in heaven.84 The question is what kind of delight it is. First of all, delight of 
                                                 
79 Bonum coniunctum, et id cui coniungitur, et ipsa coniunctio. ST I-II 31, 5. 
 
80 Est etiam firmior, quia delectabilia corporalia sunt corruptibilia, et cito deficiunt; bona vero spiritualia 
sunt incorruptibilia. ST I-II 31, 5.  
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contemplation is a delight of an intellectual kind. Contemplation is the intellectual act 
of regarding the truth already known; it is the “gazing on the truth”.85 The intellectual 
delight is possible only for rational beings. However, there is evidence that Aquinas also 
includes sensual delight in the delight of contemplation, albeit in a secondary way.  
Thomas tells us that both the pursuit of knowledge and the contemplation of the 
already known give us delight.86  There is delight in contemplation because we delight in 
the operation which is suitable to us, and since we are rational beings we delight in the 
knowledge of truth.87 Contemplation of truth befits our nature as rational animals, and the 
stress here is on our rationality and spiritual delight. However, Aquinas mentions the 
appetitive power, saying that the contemplative life begins in the appetite and what 
motivates it is love (amor).88 What motivates us to action, any action, is desire for 
something we love, and the possession of the object of our love is accompanied by 
delight. Thomas says: “And since everyone delights (delectatur) when he obtains what he 
loves (amat), it follows that the contemplative life terminates in delight (delectatio), 
which is seated in the affective power, the result being that love (amor) also becomes 
more intense.”89 Thus love and desire motivate a person to the practice of contemplation, 
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87 Ibid.                                   
 
88 ST II-II 180, 7 ad 1. 
 
89 Et quia unusquisque delectatur cum adeptus fuerit id quo amat, ideo vita contemplativa terminatur ad 
delectationem quae est in affectu: ex qua etiam amor intenditur. ST II-II 180, 1. 
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and the contemplation is accompanied by delight. The contemplative life and the 
contemplation, pertain not only to the intellect, but also to affections.90  
As was discussed above, such passions like ‘love’ and ‘concupiscence’ 
accompany their intellectual equivalents, i.e. dilectio and desiderium. Dilectio 
presupposes love as amor, while desiderium includes desire as concupiscentia.  Love of 
any kind presupposes love as a passion (amor), and desire of any kind includes the 
passional desire (concupiscentia). Likewise, delight of any kind includes sensual delight 
(delectatio), although we may be also experiencing joy (gaudium), which is a purely 
intellectual kind of delight. Gaudium is a species of delectatio.91 The reason why the 
experience of delight (and also of love and desire) always includes the sensual 
component is because human beings are composite beings and their intellectual activities 
cannot be dissociated from their bodies and the operations of the sensitive soul.  
In the delight of contemplation there are intellectual and sensual components. 
There are several reasons for the presence of sensual delight. First, we recall that the 
objects of contemplation are regarded as delightful,92 that in contemplation we must 
make use of phantasms,93 and that phantasms also may evoke in us passions.94 All of the 
above contribute to the delight of contemplation, and specifically to the sensual delight. 
But the sensual delight found in contemplation is also caused by the overflow, in an 
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analogous way to the one in which desire for knowledge causes the sensual desire in 
the sensitive soul.95 After we obtain the object of desire and start rejoicing in the truth, 
this joy overflows into the sensitive appetite.  
Overflow 
There are two kinds of delights - intellectual and sensible ones, of which the 
intellectual are more delightful, even though the sensual ones are more vehement.  
Thomas says that sensible delights are felt more strongly because they are passions which 
cause bodily transmutation whereas “this does not occur in spiritual pleasures, save by 
reason of a certain reaction of the superior appetite on the lower.”96 This is the 
“overflow” or influence of the rational part of the soul on the sensitive part.  
 This mention of influence of the rational on the sensitive soul was found in the 
discussion of cogitative power, in the discussion of wonder, and it is here again when 
Aquinas talks of intellectual delights. Thomas refers to this kind of overflow in the 
experience of delight or pain on several occasions; for example, he tells us that the 
morally right and compassionate actions of others done for us are a cause of delight to 
us,97 and that when we are doing something good for others, it is also a cause of delight to 
us.98 In the case of others being good to us, we may benefit by receiving sensible goods, 
but it is chiefly because their actions make us better appreciate our own worth and 
                                                 
 
95 ST I-II 30, 1 ad 2.  
 
96 Quod non contingit in delectationibus spiritualibus, nisi per quandam redundantiam a superiori appetitu 
in inferiorem. ST I-II 31, 5. 
 
97 ST I-II 32, 5. 
 
98 ST I-II 32, 6. 
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recognize the love of friendship which motivates such actions.99 That knowledge is 
not a sensible good, yet it is supposed to be the cause of our delight (delectatio). Our 
doing good to others certainly is not equivalent to our receiving some sensible good, and 
yet it is supposed to be a cause of delight (delectatio) to us.100 In both cases, love is the 
cause of delight. But love is also the cause of delight in contemplation.101 In all those 
cases it seems to be an immaterial kind of good which is the direct cause of our delight. 
Immaterial kind of evil is also listed as a cause of passion. Anger should accompany our 
understanding that some injustice was perpetrated.102 Yet injustice is an intellectual 
concept, just like our understanding that someone is good to us or that we are good to 
them requires intellectual understanding. According to Aquinas, our understanding of 
moral phenomena ought to be accompanied by passions.103 Thus, Aquinas seems to be 
talking of delight and pain caused by other feelings or knowledge of things, and not 
necessarily by direct contact with sensible objects. As he tells us, the movement of the 
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will is necessarily followed by a movement of the lower appetite, that is, by 
passion.104 Thus, he points to the influence of the rational part of the soul on the sensitive 
part.  
 In fact, he also points to the connection between the body, the rational soul and 
the sensitive soul. Aquinas tells us that anger and fear cause – or may cause – bodily 
illness.105 But sorrow (tristitia), which is to pain as joy is to delight,106 and which 
therefore pertains only to the intellectual appetite, may cause the most grievous illness 
and even death.107 Today we would call these effects “psychosomatic”. Thus, Aquinas 
tells us that our states of mind affect our body. It might be interpreted as influence limited 
to passions, which are in the sensitive soul and which cannot be separated from the body. 
However, that would not explain Aquinas’s view of the effects of sorrow, or the nature of 
cogitative power, or his persistent use of the word delectatio.  
As it is, it would be more consistent to interpret Aquinas’s view of the relation 
between the intellect and other parts of the soul and body as a relation of parts which 
form an integral whole and which necessarily interact with and affect one another. The 
interpretation which stresses the interaction between the intellect and the sensitive soul 
and the integrity of the whole person is also consistent with Aristotle’s hylomorphic 
theory, which Thomas accepted. According to Thomas, body and soul are completely 
integrated; the soul affects the body and the body affects the soul, and all the parts of the 
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soul affect one another. For example, the vegetative soul insures the proper 
functioning of the body, i.e. health, without which the operations of the sensitive soul and 
even those of the intellect are not possible.108 The rational soul has the power to override 
the desires or pain, which direct us to act in a certain way.109 The passions of the sensitive 
soul are manifested in the bodily changes, and at the same time have the power to affect 
the intellect and the will.110 Thus, what happens in the sensitive soul, affects the intellect 
and vice-versa. And Thomas says so. For example, the passions may affect the intellect 
and will, for good or bad.111 Our feelings may distract us,112 or help us to concentrate.113 
As was at length discussed above, our feelings also guide us in the choice of objects we 
study and motivate us to study them. Likewise, our thoughts may affect our feelings, and 
even our body. As was mentioned above, witnessing morally good acts is a cause of 
pleasure,114 and witnessing injustice is a cause of anger,115 and then perhaps sorrow;116 
wonder is a cause of pleasure,117 while contemplation is delightful118 and receives its 
                                                 
 
108 ST I 78,1; ST I-II 4, 6. 
 
109 ST I 78,1; ST I 81, 3. 
 
110 ST I 78, 1; ST I-II 22,1; ST I-II 24, 1 and 2. 
 
111 ST I-II 24; ST I-II 77, 2; ST I-II 33, 3.    
 
112 ST I-II 77, 1, 2.  
 
113 ST I-II 77, 1. 
 
114 ST I-II 32, 5 and 6. 
 
115 ST I-II 46, 7. 
 
116 ST I-II 36, 1. 
 
117 ST I-II 32, 8. 
 
118 ST II-II 180, 7. 
 260
motivation from the appetitive power.119 Thus, it is possible for the rational soul to 
influence the sensitive soul in such a way that the delight or pain understood by the 
intellect would overflow and be felt as the delight or pain of the passional kind.  
Delight and Perfection  
Thomas mentions overflow when he says that the “lower part” is perfected by the 
overflow from the “higher part” in heaven.120 When we attain happiness in heaven, we 
are “perfected and bettered” by attaining God as the object of our love.121 We are 
perfected and bettered even by attaining lesser goods which are suitable to us.122 And this 
in turn is a cause of delight.  
Like all beings, we tend to our ends and to our final end, which for us is 
happiness.123  We pursue that last end, and all the proximate ends, because we desire our 
perfection, our completion: “Since everything desires its own perfection, a man desires 
for his ultimate end that which he desires as his perfect and crowning good.” 124 We can 
achieve our ultimate perfection only when we achieve our final end, but achieving our 
proper good even regarding proximate ends helps us to be more perfect.125 We are 
perfected by the attainment of an intellectual good to a greater extent than by the 
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attainment of a material good. Intellectual good perfects us, completes us, to a greater 
extent than sensible good, because it perfects us as rational creatures, and it is our 
rationality that differentiates us from other animals and raises us above their level.  
When we become more perfect, we feel delight.126 Delight results when we obtain 
the object we desire and rest in that object. When we contemplate, we have obtained the 
good which is truth and we feel delight: “For pleasure [delectatio] is the enjoyment of the 
good, which enjoyment is, in a way, the end, just as the good itself is.”127 And as was 
discussed, the delight of contemplation is not mere intellectual delight, that is, joy, but 
joy accompanied by passion, by sensual delight. Thus, while the intellectual good 
perfects us more than a sensible one and the delight of intellectual kind is greater than the 
delight of a sensible kind,128 we cannot have one without the other.  
Delight of Contemplation - Conclusion 
Thus we have explained how delight, specifically sensual delight, might be in fact 
present even in the act of contemplation of truth. Truth is a rational, not sensible, kind of 
good; and contemplating truth is an intellectual activity. That, in itself, might be the cause 
of joy (gaudium), which is not a passion, as it pertains to the will alone. It might not be 
the cause of joy if we engage in contemplation in a morally questionable way. However, 
contemplation is preceded by study and study begins with simple observation, with 
noticing things in the world around us. Even though our end is the contemplation of God, 
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we learn about God last, after we learn about created things.129 As was discussed in 
previous chapters, the acquisition of knowledge by human beings relies on sensory 
perception and is guided by animal appetites, by passions. The most relevant passions are 
love, desire and delight. If the acquisition of knowledge depends on the formation of 
phantasms of loved and pleasant objects, and on pursuing something one loves and 
delights in, then it is easy to see that those passions would contribute to the experience of 
delight when we eventually get to the contemplation of truth; those we might call 
“antecedent” delights involved in the process leading to contemplation. These delights 
belong to the sensitive part of the soul. When we get to the point of contemplating the 
truth, this can be only done by the intellective part of the soul. The intellect cannot feel 
the delight of a sensual kind or any other passion, for that matter. However, in Thomas’s 
writings we find many references to what might be called “psychosomatic effects”, which 
he calls “overflow”, and which for him signify the influence that intellect has over the 
sensitive part of the soul and the body. Because of this influence, the human estimative 
power becomes cogitative power, human passions acquire a different quality than mere 
animal passions, and desire for knowledge activates the feeling of desire in the sensitive 
part of the soul. The intellectual enjoyment (gaudium) then likewise ought to overflow 
into the sensitive part of the soul, kindling the feeling of delight - sensual delight 
(delectatio). That is also consistent with Aquinas’s terminology according to which joy is 
a species of delight. Thus where there is intellectual joy there ought also to be sensual 
delight (although not necessarily vice-versa). Thus, the second reason why there is 
delight in contemplation would be that overflow from the rational part of the soul.  
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Now we can also appreciate why the intellectual delights are greater than 
sensible delights. Sensible delights derive from the satisfaction of sensual desire, which is 
delight in the loved object. But some of that is also present in intellectual delight because 
of the process that leads up to our understanding of some truth. Then there is the joy of 
contemplation of truth, which overflows into the sensitive part of the soul, and which 
causes the feeling of sensual delight by its influence. That means that when we 
experience intellectual delights, we experience some sensual delight because of the 
process that led up to it, some sensual delight because of the overflow, and we also 
experience joy which is the rational delight. It is no wonder that intellectual delights are 
greater than sensible ones since there are altogether three factors contributing to the 
experience of their delight in them. Thus, we find an explanation for delight in 
contemplation and we can see that there must be a great deal of delight in it.  
In the investigation of the way in which the sensitive soul participates in 
contemplation, several times we come across the mention of overflow. Aquinas mentions 
overflow (redundantia) when he talks of phantasms being experienced by the saints in 
heaven, when he speaks of cogitative power’s function on earth, when he speaks of 
human experience of passions in general, and particularly when he speaks about desire 
and delight. And he also mentions overflow when he talks of heavenly perfection.  
One more thing needs to be noted about the phenomenon of overflow from the 
intellective soul to the sensitive soul: the intellective soul can affect the sensitive soul 
because the intellect is incorporeal, spiritual in nature. According to Aquinas, spiritual 
entities have the power to affect the material entities, but not vice-versa.130 The sensitive 
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soul, although not material in itself, depends for its operations on the body, and the 
body cannot by itself affect the intellective soul.131 Instead, the intellect retrieves from the 
sensitive soul whatever it judges to be important. Thus, the intellect abstracts the 
intelligible species and the intellect may decide that we ought to act on certain feelings or 
it may decide that we ought to act against them. 
The intellective soul comprises the intellect and the will, and thus, represents our 
rationality and freedom. While we cannot function without the information provided by 
the sensitive soul, being rational among animals we do not have to follow the guidance of 
the sensitive soul - we do not have to act on that information. Discussion of whether it is 
good or bad for us to follow the guidance of our passions lies outside the scope of this 
work. Here we must only note the mode of interaction between these two parts of the 
soul, and particularly, the way in which the operations of the sensitive soul are necessary 
for the rational activity of contemplation.  
Thus, the sensitive soul contributes to contemplation in two ways. First it provides 
the intellect with the information about the things in this world and guidance as to their 
usefulness. The intellective soul cannot think without phantasms derived from sensory 
objects - it cannot judge the usefulness or harmfulness of things without the guidance of 
the cogitative power and the desirability of things wthouth the guidance of the passions. 
The intellective soul depends on the operations of the sensitive part of the soul for its 
functioning on earth. Without that support of the sensitive soul, we could never acquire 
any knowledge, and we could not get to the point where we can engage in contemplation. 
Secondly, the sensitive soul participates in contemplation in a passive way, because of 
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the overflow from the intellective part. The desire for knowledge overflows to cause, 
or perhaps to intensify, the experience of desire, while the intellectual joy overflows to 
cause, or intensify, the feeling of delight. The sensitive soul is never “shut off”, even if 
we are concentrating our powers on an intellectual activity. Even in heaven, the sensitive 
part of the soul will participate in the contemplation of God, for Aquinas tells us that by 
the overflow from the higher parts, we will experience phantasms and delight even in the 
“lower parts” of our being. That is because we are complex beings and we should 
experience delight as complex beings and not as parts.  
Delight in Heaven  
It behooves us to also consider the delight of saints in heaven, since 
contemplation of God in heaven is the last end of every human being, that towards which 
all our actions are supposed to lead. A complete discussion of what Aquinas says about 
heaven is beyond the scope of this dissertation, but a brief look at a few of his thoughts 
about delight and perfection in heaven may help us to better appreciate his holistic view 
of human nature and his recognition of the that fact that we are animals, even in heaven.  
Resurrection of the bodies completes our heavenly happiness 
If all goes well, we will go to heaven, where we shall enjoy the Beatific Vision. If 
we look at the heavenly happiness, which essentially consists in the contemplation of 
God in the presence of God, from the perspective of the object of contemplation, then it is 
obvious that the body, the senses and the passions are not needed for the enjoyment of 
such contemplation. We can enjoy the Beatific Vision without the assistance of our 
senses. Before resurrection, separated souls are happy because they already possess 
Beatific Vision. However, if we look at the heavenly happiness from the perspective of 
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the people who are supposed to enjoy that happiness, then we can see that it is 
necessary for those people to be complete, rather than mere parts of themselves. People 
cannot be completely happy as themselves until they get back their animal bodies, 
because intellectual enjoyment is not enough for a creature that is an animal. After the 
resurrection, the saints in heaven will be able to experience happiness not merely as 
souls, but as complete human beings, with all the powers belonging to a human being.  
 According to Aquinas, the body will be resurrected by divine power, 132 and thus, 
every human being will be made complete again, a creature made of body and soul. With 
the body, our senses, appetites, and passions will be restored to us. We are also told that 
the saints in heaven shall experience delight,133 while those in hell shall suffer.134 In a 
body which is perfect the senses would be also perfectly keen.  
It does not seem that it would matter whether or not we have keen sensory 
perception in heaven. To contemplate God in heaven, we do not need the senses, for we 
can contemplate God as a spirit, thanks to God’s grace, and without the use of phantasms. 
Aquinas considers whether the body is necessary for our happiness in heaven, and states 
that, strictly speaking, it is not necessary, because intellection of God in heaven does not 
require sense perception. 
For the intellect needs not the body, for its operation, save on account of 
the phantasms, wherein it looks on the intelligible truth, as stated in the 1st 
part (q. 84, a.3). Now it is evident that the Divine Essence cannot be seen 
by means of phantasms, as stated in the 1st part (q. 12, a.3) Wherefore, 
since man’s perfect Happiness consists in the vision of the Divine 
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Essence, it does not depend on the body. Consequently, without the body the 
soul can be happy.135  
 
Without the body, and without phantasms, sensations and passions, separated souls can 
already enjoy the Beatific Vision. However, Aquinas tells us, that while the body is not 
needed for the heavenly happiness essentially, it is needed in a secondary way, because 
the perfection of human nature requires the body. He says: “For since operation depends 
on a thing’s nature, the more perfect is the soul in its nature, the more perfectly it has its 
proper operation, wherein its happiness consists.”136 Since a human is a composite being 
made of body and soul –a tripartite soul – human perfection demands that all the parts of 
human being be perfect. The completeness and perfection of a human being will be 
manifested in perfect operations of the soul. And since happiness also indicates final 
perfection,137 our ultimate happiness ought to be the happiness of a perfect human being. 
Therefore, Aquinas says that for the full enjoyment of the Beatific Vision we do need the 
body. He says:  
The desire of the separated soul is entirely at rest, as regards the thing 
desired; since, to wit, it has that which suffices its appetite. But it is not 
wholly at rest, as regards the desirer, since it does not possess that good in 
every way that it would wish to possess it. Consequently, after the body 
has been resumed, Happiness increases not in intensity, but in extent.138  
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Here Aquinas distinguishes between the object of contemplation, “the thing desired”, and 
the subject, “the desirer”. We do not need a body in order to contemplate God, but we 
need the body in order to contemplate God as complete humans. It is our nature, not 
God’s nature that requires us to be reunited with our bodies in order to enjoy complete 
happiness.  
The body is necessary for the complete happiness of a human being, because a 
human being is a composite creature, made of body and soul, and such a creature cannot 
be completely happy unless it is itself complete. A human being is not the “ghost in the 
machine,” it is the composite of body and soul. If you separate the soul from the body, 
the body will die, while the soul will live as a handicapped, incomplete being, a partial 
being, i.e. a separated soul. The soul must be united to its body if there is to be a whole 
human being. That is why Thomas says: “The man is not a soul, but something composed 
of soul and body.”139 I can speak of myself as “I” only when I mean that I am a creature 
made of body and soul together. 
Separated souls in heaven are happy because they are already enjoying the 
Beatific Vision. But, as was discussed in chapter 2, separated souls are somewhat 
dysfunctional.  They cannot think very clearly140 because our thinking depends on 
phantasms. Our thinking is also helped by our passions, but without the body and the 
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sensitive part of the soul (which cannot function after the death of the body141) there 
are no passions.142 The intellective part of the soul cannot feel passions. Without the 
sensitive part of the soul we cannot even experience sensations, because sensations are 
characteristic of animal life.143 While we exist as separated souls, we are without the use 
of senses and without any feelings, whether sensations or emotions. Here we must note 
that strictly speaking, separated souls are not people, so that it is not even correct to say 
that we exist as separated souls; for separated souls are only parts of us.  
Separated souls can experience intellectual joy (gaudium), but they cannot feel 
sensual delight (delectatio). As was discussed above, the delight of contemplation 
includes both joy and sensual delight, and is experienced by humans as beings composed 
of bodies and souls. Separated souls cannot experience complete delight of contemplation 
and thus their enjoyment of the Beatific Vision is not as perfect in extent as it can be for a 
complete human being. That is why the body - the animal body - is needed for the perfect 
happiness of a perfect human being.  
Sensory delights in heaven  
Aquinas tells us that we shall experience sensations in heaven. It is not necessary 
to have sensations in order to experience the Beatific Vision, but it is necessary to 
experience sensations if one is an animal without a defect.   
  Aquinas tells us that the saints in heaven, after the resurrection, will experience 
sensory delight. In the delight of contemplation, as was discussed above, there is a 
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component of a sensual delight. A resurrected body implies the resurrection of the 
sensitive soul, and that in turn implies the capacity for sensations and passions. Since the 
bodies will be perfect (physically perfect), our sensory perception will be more acute in 
heaven than on earth. Thus, we will have an even greater capacity to feel delight than we 
do in earthly life. (Likewise, the bodies of the damned will have greater capacity to feel 
suffering, because of their keener senses.) Aquinas tells us that we shall be free from 
suffering in heaven, but we will be able to experience sensual pleasure. He says: 
“Nonetheless, this incapacity of suffering will not cut them off from the modification 
essential to sense knowledge, for they will use their senses for pleasure in the measure in 
which this is not incompatible with their state of incorruption.”144 Saints in heaven ought 
to experience sensations, since the fullness of life requires that they have sensations. In 
the Supplement of Summa Theologica we find more textual support for it. In Question 82, 
article 3 we read: “All are agreed that there is some sensation in the bodies of the blessed; 
else the bodily life of the saints after the resurrection would be likened to sleep rather 
than to vigilance. Now this is not befitting that perfection, because in sleep a sensible 
body is not in the ultimate act of life, for which reason sleep is described as half-life.” 145 
Knowing God is our ultimate happiness; however, knowing God and experiencing that 
happiness with every particle of our being makes that happiness more perfect than merely 
knowing. 
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dimidium. ST Supplement 82, 3; See also: IV Sent. 44, 2, 1, 3. 
 271
We are also told that all the senses will be actual, so that the saints in heaven 
will experience delightful sensations of every kind all at once, for otherwise human 
nature would not be in its greatest perfection.146 That means that we will be able to see 
light and colors, to hear music, if any, to smell beautiful scents, perhaps to feel delightful 
taste in our mouths and to feel delightful touch.147 Thomas especially emphasizes 
capacity of resurrected bodies for touch: “The body of man when he rises must have the 
capacity to touch, for without touch there is no animal. But that which rises must be 
animal if it is to be man.”148 We do not need the senses to contemplate God in heaven; we 
need the senses to be perfectly happy as ourselves. If we did not feel delight even on a 
sensory level, then we would not be human beings contemplating God, but only parts of a 
human being, an incomplete, mutilated being. The resurrected saints in heaven will 
experience not only the intellectual satisfaction of knowing the essence of the First 
Cause, not only the joy (gaudium) of being with God, but also sensory delight 
(delectatio), a passion. In heaven people will experience more acute feelings than on 
earth, due to greater perfection of the resurrected bodies. And those experiences will be 
delightful.149  
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Perfection of a human being in heaven   
 Thus, in heaven human beings will attain their final perfection. The body will be 
resurrected by divine power and will be made perfect and incorruptible. The perfection 
which human beings will achieve in heaven includes the perfection of the body, of all 
parts of the soul, of the disposition of a whole person.   
We shall be perfected by grace, yet grace only perfects nature; grace does not 
change our nature.150 When we talk of human perfection and human happiness in heaven, 
we must keep in mind that it is the whole human person that is perfect and perfectly 
happy. Let us recall (from chapter 1) Thomas’s reaction to Augustine’s remark about the 
body as a burden. Thomas says: “For since it is natural to the soul to be united to the 
body; it is not possible for the perfection of the soul to exclude its natural perfection.”151 
Thus, perfection of the body is necessary for the overall perfection of a human being. 
Perfection of the body also implies perfect operations of the vegetative and the sensitive 
part of the soul.  
 Naturally, our rationality is more important than our animality. Perfection, first of 
all, pertains to the intellect and the will. Our intellect will never again suffer deception.152 
Our will shall be fixed forever in willing the good.153 That perfection of the rational part 
of the soul will overflow into the sensitive and the vegetative parts of the soul.154    
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In earthly life our intellectual processes are dependent on sensory perceptions 
and specifically on phantasms.155 That dependence makes it impossible for us to see the 
essence of God while we live on earth. When Thomas discusses rapture156 he says that 
those who experience it in this life and therefore in a mortal body need to be separated 
from the senses, because the senses would have interfered with their direct vision of God. 
However, in heaven there will not be anything between us and God, so, if our senses 
were to receive any information from God, they would not be a hindrance but a help to 
the enjoyment of God. It would increase our enjoyment for then all the powers of our 
soul, including the interior senses, would be involved in the contemplation of God. 
Indeed, Aquinas tells us that our natural perfection demands that we will experience 
phantasms while we are enjoying the Beatific Vision. Those phantasms are produced by 
the overflow from the rational part of the soul.157      
In our earthly life, all of our powers, whether of reason or the powers of the non-
rational part of the soul, are to help us to achieve our ends, and ultimately our last end, 
which is happiness. Our natural appetites orient us towards the good, our will can will 
only the good, and our reason judges whether something which appears to be good is a 
real good. The reason governs the actions of rational creatures like humans, but the 
passions and natural inclinations are necessary to orient us towards our good and thus 
assist the reason in making correct judgment. In earthly life, the lower, that is, the non-
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155 ST I 84, 7 and 8. 
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rational part of the soul, is necessary for achieving the perfection of the “higher,” that 
is, the rational part of the soul. We advance from the perfection of the lower part to that 
of the higher part.158 But in heaven, we are perfected in the opposite way, for our intellect 
is the first thing to be perfected, while the non-rational parts of the soul and the body, the 
last. In heaven we are perfected by God’s grace.159   
The perfected body, and the sensitive part of the soul which belongs to it, will be 
completely under the governance of the rational part of the soul. We will not experience 
inner conflicts any more between our desires and our understanding of what is the real 
good we ought to pursue. Thomas says: “The body [will] be perfectly within the soul’s 
dominion, and will share in what is perspicuity of sense knowledge, in the ordering of 
appetite, and in the all-around perfection of nature; for a thing is the more perfect in 
nature, the more its matter is dominated by its form.” 160  
As we behold God, who is the ultimate good, all of our appetites will be directed 
to God as the good. Our will shall will the good, that is, to be in conformity with God’s 
will.161 Thus, we shall attain perfection in regard to our disposition, which perfection in 
earthly life is called virtue. The soul will achieve its perfect goodness because it will 
share in God’s goodness, while the body, with its senses and passions, will be perfectly 
under the dominion of that perfected soul. Since the ordering of appetites will be 
perfectly governed by the soul, such a person will achieve perfect virtue.  
                                                 
158 ST I-II 3,3.  
 
159 ST II-II 184, 2;  SCG IV 86, 3; SCG IV 92. 
 
160 Corpus proprietates participabit quantum possible est, in perspicuitate sensuum, in ordinatione corporei 
appetitus, et in omnimoda perfectione naturae: tanto enim aliquid perfectius est in natura, quanto eius 
materia perfectius subditur formae. SCG IV 86, 5. 
 
161 SCG IV 92. 
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Since in the state of perfection the body will be under the dominion of the 
rational part of the soul, and our appetites will be perfectly ordered, we shall never be led 
astray by our passions, and that will remove one of the major causes of our earthly 
suffering. In the state of perfection we will love and desire what is truly our good, and the 
attainment of that good will bring us delight. Because as perfected human beings we will 
be made complete, with the body, senses, appetites and passions restored to us; we will 
feel love and delight on all levels possible for a human being.  
In heaven we shall be perfected in every way. The intellect will be perfected by 
attaining to the knowledge of God, the essence of the First Cause.162 The will shall 
forever will the good.163 The sensitive appetite which naturally orients us towards our 
good will unerringly orient us towards our greatest good, that is, God.164 That means that 
our desires will be only for the real good, and since they will be satisfied, the result will 
be delight. The body will be made perfect, and with it the sensory perception will be 
made perfect.165 Our passions will also be perfected.166  
Overflow  
In heaven the passions, the sensitive appetite, will be perfected by the overflow 
from the intellective part of the soul,167 which in turn will be perfected by grace, which 
will enable us to contemplate God. Perfection attained by the rational part of the soul will 
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overflow into the sensitive soul and the body, thus the lower part will be perfected by 
the overflow from the higher part: “In perfect happiness the entire man is perfected, in the 
lower part of his nature, by an overflow from the higher.” 168  
Aquinas mentions several times the overflow from the rational soul to the lower 
parts. Because a human being is a composite being, made of body and tripartite soul, and 
because a human is also an integrated being in which whatever happens in one part 
affects in some way all the other parts, the states of the rational part of the soul 
appropriately affect the sensitive soul and the body. In earthly life the overflow pertains 
to the cogitative power,169 to desire,170 to desire for knowledge,171 and to the spiritual 
delights.172 Thomas also says that the Beatific Vision will be the cause (among other 
things) of phantasms, by the overflow,173 and that in heaven, the lower part, i.e., the 
sensitive soul and the body, will be perfected by the overflow of the perfection of the 
rational soul.174 Even the perfect agility of the saints, i.e., perfect ease of movement, will 
be caused by the overflow. Thomas says: “For weakness is what we experience in a body 
found wanting in the strength to satisfy the desire of the soul in the movements and 
actions which the soul commands, and this weakness will be entirely taken away then, 
                                                 
 
168 Dicendum quod in perfecta beatitudine perficitur totus homo, sed in inferiori parte per redundantiam a 
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when power is overflowing into the body from a soul united to God.”175 In general, 
the body will be influenced by the perfection of the soul which has attained its final end, 
that is, the Beatific Visions. Thomas says: “Therefore, just as the soul which enjoys the 
divine vision will be filled with a kind of spiritual lightsomeness, so by a certain overflow 
from the soul to the body, the body will in its own way put on the lightsomeness of 
glory.”176    
In the text which immediately precedes the last quote about the overflow to the 
body, Thomas says that passions will be influenced by the overflow. Passions are bodily 
changes and also the movements of the sensitive soul, and are experienced by us as 
emotions, such as fear, anger, pleasure etc. In heaven, the only passions possible will be 
those of love and delight, since there will be no more strife, or pain, or any unfulfilled 
desires. Love and delight have both intellectual and sensual components (dilectio 
presupposes amor, while gaudium presupposes delectatio). Thomas says: “But the glory 
and power of the soul elevated to the divine soul will add something more ample to the 
body united to itself. For this body will be entirely subject to the soul – the divine power 
will achieve this – not only in regard to its being, but also in regard to action, passion, 
                                                 
175 Infirmatem enim experimur in corpore quia invalidum invenitur ad satisfaciendum desiderio animae in 
motibus et actionibus quas anima imperat: quae infirmitas totaliter tunc tolletur, virtute redundante in 
corpus ex anima Deo coniuncta. SCG IV 86, 3.             
 
176 Sicut igitur anima divina visione fruens quadam spirituali claritate replebitur, ita per quandam spirituali 
claritate redundantiam ex anima in corpus, ipsum corpus suo modo claritatis gloriae induetur. SCG IV 86, 
2.        
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movements, and bodily qualities.”177 And since our sensory perception will be more 
acute in the perfected bodies, our capacity for feeling passions will likewise increase.  
We shall need our bodies in heaven not only to be complete, but also to fully 
enjoy ourselves. Aquinas says: “For the soul desires to enjoy God in such a way that the 
enjoyment also may overflow into the body, as far as possible. And therefore, as long as it 
enjoys God, without the fellowship of the body, its appetite is at rest in that which it has, 
in such a way, that it would still wish the body to attain to its share.”178 Again, we find 
the mention of the overflow from the intellect to the lower appetite and to the body. The 
delight which the intellective soul feels in heaven overflows into the sensitive part and 
the body. That points to the feeling of delight as a passion and not mere joy of possessing 
the vision of God in heaven. Thus, we find the mention of that sensual component of the 
delight of contemplation even in heaven, and, like in the case of earthly contemplation, 
the sensual delight may be experienced because of the overflow from the rational part of 
the soul. The joy of the rational soul overflows to the lower part of the soul and the result 
is the feeling of delight.   
Causes of feeling sensual delight in heaven 
If we are to be completely happy, as complete human beings, then it would not be 
enough to merely know the goodness and beauty that is God, for goodness and beauty 
must be felt. We know the truth of God, but we feel His goodness. We feel it, love it and 
                                                 
177 Sed ex claritate et virtute animae ad divinam visionem elevatae, corpus sibi unitum aliquid amplius 
consequetur. Erit enim totaliter subiectum animae, divina virtute hoc faciente, non solum quantum ad esse, 
sed etiam quantum ad actiones et passiones, et motus, et corporeas qualitates. SCG IV 86, 1.               
 
178 Appetit enim anima sic frui Deo, quod etiam ipsa fruitio derivetur ad corpus per redundantiam, sicut est 
possible. Et ideo quandiu ipsa fruitur Deo sine corpore, appetitus eius sic quiescit in eo, quod tamen adhuc 
ad participationem eius vellet suum corpus pertingere. ST I-II 4, 5 ad 4.       
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delight in it. In heaven, as on earth, we can feel the attraction of the good, love that 
good, and since our desire for it is satisfied, delight in the good.  
There are several reasons why we experience sensual delight in addition to 
intellectual delight in heaven. As was said above, people in heaven will be able to feel 
sensations179 and they will be able to experience all kinds of delightful sensations 
simultaneously.180 We are not told what the source of those sensations will be. Perhaps 
there will be sensible objects present which will be delightful. Even if there were no other 
kinds of sensible objects, at least there would be other people, bodily present, perfect, 
lovable and loving. The presence of such people would be sufficient to be the cause of 
our delight.  
Sensitive apprehension is possible for us through the formation of phantasms. 
Apprehension of things is directly connected to the passional response to the same things, 
because in the animal, the cognitive power and sensitive appetite must work in 
conjunction. Phantasms representing sensible objects (including people) in heaven will 
also be connected to the passional response. Since everything in heaven will be 
delightful, our perception of it will lead to the passional response of a delight.  
Thomas also tells us that there will be phantasms produced in the sensitive parts 
of the soul by the overflow of the intellectual delight caused by the Beatific Vision.181 
Those phantasms would also cause the passional response of delight. Thus, two sources 
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of phantasms – the perception of delightful objects, and the overflow of delight 
caused by the Beatific Vision - cause the experience of sensual delight.  
The Beatific Vision would be, first of all, the cause of intellectual delight. 
Intellectual delight, i.e. joy (gaudium), belongs to the rational part of the soul. According 
to Aquinas’s view of a human being as a composite and integrated being, there is 
naturally an “overflow” from the rational soul to the sensitive soul, which influences the 
functioning of our senses and ennobles our passions.182 That is why what happens in the 
rational soul is reflected in the sensitive soul. As was discussed above, joy cannot be 
experienced without sensual delight. So, the joy of experiencing the Beatific Vision will 
also be the cause of sensual delight because of the overflow from the rational soul.  
Finally, Thomas says that delight results from the attainment of greater perfection 
which results from the attainment of some good, by reaching an end proper to us.183 
When we attain the greatest, ultimate good and the final end, which is God, and when we 
become ultimately perfect, we shall necessarily rest in that good and feel the greatest 
delight possible. Attainment of complete perfection implies the most perfect and 
complete delight of which we are capable. Complete delight includes both intellectual 
and sensual delight.  
From acting for an end to delight   
We always act for an end, and ultimately we do everything for the sake of our 
final end. When we gain even one of our proximate ends and find some good proper to 
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us, our response is love of that good. That love is the cause of desire for the good. 
When we obtain our good we are perfected by it to some extent and that is the cause of 
our delight. That process begins in our earthly life and is completed in heaven.     
Finding our good involves our whole being, including the animal way of gaining 
knowledge, i.e. sensory perceptions and estimative/cogitative power. These will not be 
suppressed in heaven, although their role will be only to augment the perfection of the 
whole being. On earth, these powers are needed for us to gain knowledge, while in 
heaven, the knowledge which we shall possess of God will overflow into the powers of 
the sensitive soul.184  
Finding our good on earth also depends on the direction of the sensitive appetite. 
When we do find some good, our response to that particular good is love (amor).185 In 
heaven, we will know our greatest good, that is, God. We shall love God with the love of 
choice (dilectio), but we shall also love God with the love of attraction (amor).186  
Love 
The good is lovable, the greatest good is the most lovable, and in heaven we shall 
meet God who is the greatest good and thus the most lovable being.187 In heaven we shall 
be able to contemplate God, and we shall behold God, who is the most lovable of all 
things. Our love shall increase, for as Thomas says: “One delights in seeing the object 
loved, and the very delight in the object seen arouses a yet greater love.”188 He uses here 
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the word amor, which is the love of attraction. Thomas tells us that God draws us to 
Himself by that love of attraction,189  and thus we can love God passionately. Since we 
also understand the goodness of God, we can love God in a sense of dilection.190 And 
since we will be in the presence of God, and communication between us and God will be 
made perfect in heaven,191 we shall also possess charity. In heaven, we shall be able to 
love God in all those ways thanks to God’s grace.  
Although in heaven it is love as charity that will manifest itself; charity, as 
Thomas tells us, also presupposes love as amor.192 Joy which belongs to the rational soul 
influences the sensitive soul and causes the feeling of delight. That happens even in 
earthly life. In heaven, we will love God not only in a detached, rational way, but also 
passionately, for we are creatures capable of passions. Thus, we will experience love 
(amor) as a passion, and, of course, we will also experience delight (delectatio) as a 
result.   
Desire   
Aquinas uses the word amor, the love of attraction, to describe love of the good. 
Our last end is our greatest good. Natural love orients us to that good. In heaven we shall  
attain our last end and possess our greatest good, which is God. When we find the lovable 
good, we desire it and move to obtain it. If we do attain our good, we rest in that good 
                                                                                                                                                 
188 Aliquis in visione rei amatae delectatur, et ipsa delectatio rei visae amplius excitat amorem. ST II-II 180, 
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189 ST I-II 26, 3 ad 4. 
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191  ST II-II 23, 1 ad 1. 
 
192 ST I-II 26, 3; II-II 27, 4. 
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and that rest is called delight. In heaven, when we find true beatitude, our desires are 
fulfilled and there is nothing else we will seek.193 Thomas Aquinas tells us that the 
Beatific Vision will also satisfy our will: “the desire for happiness is nothing else than to 
desire that one’s will be satisfied.”194 Strictly speaking, ultimate happiness is an operation 
of the speculative intellect. However, the Beatific Vision is what we truly want, and thus 
it will ultimately be a satisfaction of our will, and also, a satisfaction of all our desires. 
When we possess final happiness we shall possess everything we could ever want. The 
accident which attaches to the Beatific Vision is delight, because Beatific Vision is our 
greatest good: “Wherefore since happiness is nothing else but the attainment of the 
Sovereign Good, it cannot be without the concomitant delight.”195    
What we ultimately desire is, of course, not delight, but knowledge of God as the 
essence of the First Cause. For human beings, the ultimate end and ultimate happiness is 
the Beatific Vision.  In heaven, the beatified engage in the perfect contemplation of God. 
But God is infinite and the creator of all, and as such cannot be comprehended by any of 
His creatures. The created intellect cannot know all as God knows, but can have 
knowledge only in proportion to its capacity: “Therefore no created intellect in seeing 
God can know all that God does or can do, for this would be to comprehend His power; 
but of what God does or can do any intellect can know the more, the more perfectly it 
sees God.”196 How perfectly we may see God depends on the individual:  
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Of those who see the essence of God, one sees Him more perfectly than 
another. This, indeed, does not take place as if one had a more perfect 
similitude of God than another, since that vision will not spring from any 
similitude; but it will take place because one intellect will have a greater 
power or faculty to see God that another. The faculty of seeing God, 
however, does not belong to the created intellect naturally, but is given to 
it by the light of glory, which establishes the intellect in a kind of 
deiformity.197  
 
According to Thomas, the one who can see God more perfectly is the one who has a 
fuller participation in God, and that means the one who has more charity: “Hence he who 
possesses the more charity, will see God the more perfectly, and will be the more 
beatified.”198 That is because charity is the cause of desire, and where there is more 
desire, there is greater capacity to receive that which one desires. Thus those who love 
God more, desire God more and are prepared to receive God’s glory in a greater measure. 
Their desire will be satisfied. Charity is friendship with God. Thus, those who have 
greater charity, that is, those who are admitted to friendship with God, will see God more 
perfectly and know God better.     
Charity is a theological virtue which we receive from God.199 Charity is a virtue 
which may be given in earthly life, but it will be perfected in heaven.200 Aquinas tells us 
                                                                                                                                                 
196 Nullus igitur intellectus creatus, videndo Deum, potest cognoscere omnia quae Deus facit vel potest 
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198 Unde qui plus habebit de caritate, perfectius Deum videbit et beatior erit. ST I 12, 6 (Ibid.)    
 
199 ST I-II 62, 1; ST II-II 23, 2 and 3.          
 
200 ST II-II 23, 1. 
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that human perfection is charity.201 Charity is a kind of friendship, communication 
with God.202 Charity is in the will as its subject, and therefore in the rational soul.203 
However, even charity is not disconnected from the sensitive soul for it presupposes love 
of attraction, love as an inclination to our proper good. According to Aquinas, charity 
begins with love we have for ourselves,204 because we naturally wish to preserve 
ourselves and to attain our good. It is important that we love ourselves in the right way, 
i.e., that we choose a greater good over the lesser one.205 We ought to love God, because 
God is our greatest good.206 Thomas says:  
God will be to each one the entire reason of his love, for God is man’s 
entire good. For if we make the impossible supposition that God were not 
man’s good, He would not be man’s reason for loving. Hence it is that in 
the order of love man should love himself more than all else after God.207  
 
It is natural for us to love ourselves and to pursue our good.208 Natural tendency to pursue 
our good is love in a sense of basic inclination. Manifestation of this basic inclination is 
love as a passion which causes us to pursue our good as a particular good in particular 
situations. Our sensitive appetite orients us to our good, the intellect judges whether it is a 
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real or apparent good, and the will wills the good presented to it by the intellect. In 
this way, we are approaching our greatest good which is God. However attainment of our 
greatest good is beyond human power, and so, God helps us by infusing within us the 
theological virtue of charity.209 Aquinas says: 
Just as God is supremely knowable in Himself yet not to us, on account of 
a defect in our knowledge which depends on sensible things, so too, God 
is supremely lovable in Himself, in as much as He is the object of 
happiness. But He is not supremely lovable to us in this way, on account 
of the inclination of our appetite towards visible goods. Hence it is evident 
that for us to love God above all things in this way, it is necessary that 
charity be infused into our hearts.210      
Charity (caritas) is love (amor) perfected.211 Grace perfects nature. Thus even intellectual 
love which is charity presupposes the passion of love as attraction for the beloved 
object,212 and we are also supposed to be drawn to God by love as a passion.213 Any 
detailed discussion of charity is beyond the scope of this dissertation, but it needs to be 
noted that charity, which is the ultimate perfection of a human being, also presupposes 
love as a passion. 
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210  Dicendum quod sicut Deus secundum se est maxime cognoscibilis, non tamen nobis, propter defectum 
nostrae cognitionis, quae dependet a rebus sensibilibus; ita etiam Deus in se est maxime diligibilis 
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 When we contemplate God, our desire is fulfilled, our end is reached, we 
attain union with what we love and we are also loved. Since we contemplate God 
Himself, we are also drawn by God to Him, passively, and thus feel the Divine Love. 
And because God as the object of contemplation is infinitely lovable, our love for God 
has no end.                  
Delight   
Love causes us to desire union with the object we love, and the fulfillment of that 
desire is the cause of delight. Contemplation of God in heaven is the fulfillment of our 
desires and the union with what we love the most. Thomas says: “Contemplation may be 
delightful on the part of its object, in so far as one contemplates that which one 
loves…there is delight in the contemplative life, not only by reason of the contemplation 
itself, but also by reason of the Divine love.”214 Contemplation, even on earth, is 
delightful; but in heaven it will be perfectly delightful: “The contemplation of God in this 
life is imperfect in comparison with the contemplation in heaven; and in like manner the 
delight of the wayfarer’s contemplation is imperfect as compared with the delight of 
contemplation in heaven.”215 Heavenly delight will be perfect, because it will correspond 
to our reaching our final end and our greatest good.  
The rest of the appetite in the good is delight.216 In heaven we attain our final end 
and our greatest good - our desires are fulfilled and delight necessarily follows. In heaven 
                                                 
214 Contemplatio redditur delectabilis ex parte obiecti, inquantum scilicet aliquis rem amatam 
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we reach the ultimate perfection, perfection of the soul and of the body. As a result, 
we can experience delight on all levels. In heaven we will experience joy (gaudium), 
which belongs to the rational part of the soul. We will also experience sensual delight, 
first because of our overall perfection, and also because of the overflow of delight from 
the rational soul. Ultimate happiness will be the cause of our joy217 and delight.218  
Delight in heaven will be perfect in every way. As perfected beings we will be 
able to experience delight and joy perfectly. We will not be distracted by any diseases.219 
We will not be distracted by any temptations. Contemplation of God will be continuous 
and eternal, enjoyed by people whose intellectual powers will be perfect, people who will 
possess wisdom. That contemplation will cause the greatest possible joy (gaudium). The 
grace which will perfect the bodies and the intellectual part of the soul will also flow to 
the sensitive part of the soul. The senses and the passions will be perfected. People will 
experience sensations again and those will be nothing but delightful. People will feel 
passions again, namely love and delight. In heaven we can feel delight even more keenly 
than in this life, because our bodies will be more perfect, and because there will be more 
reason to feel delight.  
Delight of a rational animal     
Heavenly delight must be a perfect and multifaceted delight, of a perfect and 
complex being, a rational animal, possessed of intellect and will, but also possessed of a 
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body, senses and passions. First of all, there is intellectual enjoyment of the Beatific 
Vision. However, operations of the sensitive soul, namely sensory perceptions, and 
passions such as love of attraction (amor) and delight (delectatio) are needed for the 
complete enjoyment of human happiness not only on earth, but even in heaven. Thus the 
sensitive soul is necessary both for the attainment and for the enjoyment of heavenly 
happiness.  
Our capacity for feeling sensual delight will be perfected in heaven because our 
senses will be more keen. We shall feel love and delight of any kind more because of our 
greater perfection. In heaven the operations of the sensitive part of the soul will be 
perfected by the overflow from the higher to the lower part, but ultimately we shall be 
perfected in all of our parts by grace. But grace does not change nature; only perfects 
it.220 Our nature does not change in heaven. Even in heaven a human being shall remain a 
rational animal.   
Conclusion 
Thomas tells us in ST I-II 3, 3 that the operations of the sensitive soul enter into 
happiness antecedently and consequently. Antecedently we need the operations of the 
sensitive soul to acquire knowledge and to contemplate. We need sensory perception in 
order to acquire any knowledge. We need our cogitative power and our passions in order 
to guide us in our research. We need the sensitive appetite and the passions in order to 
motivate us to act. Finally, we need phantasms in order to think, and even to contemplate. 
Consequently, in heaven, we need the sensitive soul no longer for the acquisition of 
knowledge or any guidance, but simply for the full enjoyment of our happiness.  
                                                 
220 ST I-II 109,1; ST I-II 111, 1. 
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In earthly contemplation, we need phantasms to think and passions to guide 
us, which we will not need for the contemplation of God in heaven. But even in heaven, 
our bodies and all the parts of the soul shall be integrated and affect one another. We 
shall not be separated souls any longer, but souls united with their bodies. As complete 
human beings, we will be able to think clearly,221 while the sensitive soul and the body 
will again feel delight, thanks to the overflow of the rational part of the soul. Operations 
of the sensitive soul enter into our happiness consequently, after the resurrection. We 
need the body and the sensitive soul not only to attain happiness, but also to enjoy it.  
As human beings, we achieve our full perfection through intellectual 
contemplation, and ultimately through contemplation of God in heaven. Thomas says that    
in heaven, the lower part will be perfected by the overflow from the higher part, while on 
earth, the perfection of the lower part must preceed the perfection of the higher.222 We 
can now see how the perfection of the lower part is necessary for the successful 
contemplation on earth, and that the perfection of the higher part overflows into the lower 
part even in this life, and certainly in heaven. We love, desire and delight in 
contemplating the truth, in contemplating God on earth and in heaven, on both levels, as 
intellectual beings and as animals at the same time.  
 
                                                 
 
221 ST I 89, 3. 
 
222 ST I-II 3, 3. 
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